THE KUSUMÁNJALI,

OR

HINDU PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING,

BY

UDAYANA ÁCHARYA,

WITH THE

COMMENTARY OF HARI DASA BHATTÁCHARYA,

EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY

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Message received

Mr. Jones

T. A.
TO

PROFESSOR MAX MÜLLER,

IN MEMORY OF

OLD OXFORD DAYS.
CORRIGENDA.

Page 10, l. 21. For "capacity" read "desert."

Page 23, l. 10. Dele "since your major premiss will not be universally true," and substitute "since your own example 'blue' is not found everywhere."
PREFACE.

The following treatise is very celebrated amongst Hindu logicians, and, however little it may be calculated to interest the general English reader, it will certainly not be without a use and interest to those Europeans whose studies are directed to the higher branches of Sanskrit literature. They will hardly fail to be attracted by a work which, though obscure and technical, professes to grapple, from a Hindu standing-point, with the world-old problem, how the existence of the Supreme Being is to be proved; and perhaps those who are interested in the history of philosophy may turn over some of the pages with curiosity, especially when they occasionally recognise old familiar arguments and objections in their quaint Oriental disguise. The Kusumánjali is as much inferior to the tenth book of Plato's Laws or the twelfth of Aristotle's Metaphysics, as Hindu philosophy itself is to that of Greece; but nothing can rob India of the merit of an original system of logic and metaphysics, unborrowed from any other land. It has been said that the past history of philosophy is the record of glorious failures in the attempt to solve an insuperable problem; and it cannot be uninteresting to trace the brave efforts of a Hindu thinker, far away from the circle of Christianity, who, perplexed by the doubts or open disbelief taught in many of the systems current in his day, endeavoured, however vainly, to build for his countrymen the first truth of Theology on a firm logical foundation.

— Audacia certa

Laus crid; in magnis et voluisse sat est.

Udayana Achárya, like nearly every old Hindu writer, is a name and nothing more. He shines like one of the fixed stars in India's literary firmament, but no telescope can discover any appreciable diameter; his name is a point of light, but we can detect therein nothing that belongs to our earth or material
existence. The details of his life are a blank,* and the very century in which he flourished is an unsettled question in Hindu literary history.

Dr. Hall, in his valuable 'Index to the Bibliography of the Hindu philosophical systems,' (p. 20,) has endeavoured to identify Udayana with Uddyotakara, (whom he places not later than the seventh century,†) but this is untenable, as will be proved, I think, in the sequel.

The first point to settle is the order of the series of ancient Nyāya works, 'the sūtras of Gotama and Kanūda having been explained and annotated by a triple [or rather quadruple] set of commentaries.'‡ The order which I venture to propose is as follows,

I.—The original Sūtras or Aphorisms ascribed to the Rishi Gotama or Akshapāda.

II.—The Nyāya-bhāṣya,—a commentary on No. I. by Pakshila Swāmin, sometimes called Vātsyāyana.

III.—The Nyāya-vārtika,—a commentary on No. II. by Uddyotakara Achārya. I procured lately, from a pandit of Nuddea, a fragment of this work containing a portion of the first book.§

IV.—The Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-tīkā,—a commentary on No. III. by Vāchaspati Miśra.

V.—The Nyāya vārtika-tātparya-parisuddhikā,—a commentary on No. IV. by Udayana Achārya.

My reasons for this arrangement are the following.

* The only incident I have met with, is the dubious tradition given in the 'Rational Refutation of Hindu philosophical systems,' p. 6, note.
† Uddyotakara is mentioned in Subandhu's Vāsavadatta, which Dr. Hall has proved to be fully 1200 years old.
‡ Colebrooke.
§ There is an incomplete MS. in the Asiatic Society's Library, which professes to contain the third and fourth adhyāyas (ity uddyotakariga nyāyavārtake, &c.), but it is only Vāchaspati Miśra's tīkā.—The Nuddea fragment contains only the vārtika to the first three sūtras,—its colophon is

हृत अध्यक्षाध्यायोमुद्वात्तत्त्वाध्यायाः चाल्प्रथेत्रध्यायच्छि-

छोटविविखं समूहं
In the Calcutta Sanskrit College Library there is a MS. of the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-tīkā, the opening lines of which I subjoin.

This passage is evidently a commentary on the work of Uddyotakara Achārya, whose opening words (yad Akshapādah,) the author professes to quote and explain; and he states that the Nyāya Sāstra was originally delivered by Akshapāda or Gotama and completed by Pākṣhila Swāmin, and that Uddyotakara compiled his Vārtika or ‘annotations’ in order to clear away the erroneous interpretations of Diṅnāga and others. The Sanskrit College has also a MS. of the Tātparya parisuddhi of Udayanāchārya, which is undoubtedly a commentary on No. IV. Thus it commences with an invocation to Saraswati, vākṣyevāmaṁ tathā bhuv saṁbhūna vāsasvātvaṁcititvaruhito. And it then proceeds to comment on the first Sloka quoted above—विनिर्वाक्तं ऊक्तं विश्वदेवम् &c.

Now if Vāchaspata Miśra commented on a work of Uddyotakara, and Udayana again on the work of Vāchaspata Miśra, Uddyotakara and Udayana must be different persons.
A second question however now arises,—who is the Pakshila Swámin, to illustrate whose work Uddyotakara compiled his Vártika?

The only Nyáya-bháshya now known to exist is that which bears the name of Vátsyáyana. By the kindness of Professor Griffith, I have procured a MS, of it from the Benares College Library,* and, on comparing this work with the quotations from Pakshila Swámin’s bháshya which are frequently given in the fragment of the Vártika and in Váchaspati’s Tátparya-tiká, I have discovered that the two works are the same. A few extracts will make this evident.

The Nyáya bháshya of Vátsyáyana thus commences,

[Translation]

... and continues,

... and concludes,

Similarly in the third leaf of the Tátparya-tiká we read, तदेव प्रथमस्यतापत्यसुः भायुषादिवाचवातावरथेमात्रे ‘प्रमाधेतेजः प्रतियार्थादिवात् तथातः तावरथेमात्री’। तथा शाख्य नित् आयुष्यादिकसमन्वयो भद्र च विधिसमन्वयस्याः च रूपिन घटनाश्वायाः रूपिन घटनाः। तथात वापानित्वाथवाताः।

The words of the várтика, with their enclosed quotation from the bháshya, are thus quoted and explained in the tiká. After discussing some doubts, it goes on,

... and concludes,

* It contains 123 leaves, and its colophon is दत्तं वायुवर्ती वायुसम्बूध वाचसप्तिकः.
The third Adhyāya of Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya opens with परोक्षवालि प्रमाणार्थ मेधसिद्धां परीक्षते तत्तताकारोहि-भा विविधते। and similarly the third adhyāya of the Tātparyaṭīkā commences, भव भायाथे ‘परोक्षवालि प्रमाणार्थ मेधसिद्धां परीक्षते’ रति वृजान् को तेन। Then again, a few lines after, अभाव प्रत्ययत्त्वाश्च यथावित्ते न प्रमेयावर्णित्वं यथा ‘तत्ता-कारोहि’ रति। Shortly afterwards it adds तात्तेस्तै वातिले-बाले यथार्थ सार्योः।* 

There can, therefore, be hardly a doubt as to the Nyāyabhāṣya of Pakṣhila Swāmin and that of Vātsyāyana being the same work.† The latter name seems to imply that the author wrote the book while his father or elder brother (compare Pāṇini 4. 1. 105 with 4. 1. 94, 101, 163 and 164,) was alive. Pakṣhila was his private, Vātsyāyana was his generic, name. Swāmin may imply his becoming an udāśha, or it may have been merely an honorary title. The Pandits similarly have a tradition that a Nyāya-vārtika was written by Bhāradvāja. Dr. Hall mentions in his Catalogue that Udyotakara belonged to the gotra of Bhāradvāja, and the same thing is stated in the colophon to the Nuddea fragment; and thus the two apppellations, Vātsyāyana and Bhāradvāja, will mutually illustrate each other.

We may thus consider it as proved that Udayana Añchārya is the fifth, not the third, in the series of Naiyāyika authorities; but are we able to determine anything as to the time in which he flourished? We can hardly hope to fix it with precision, but we are not left wholly to conjecture, as we have, I think, a terminus à quo as well as a terminus ad quem to limit our chronological uncertainty.

We must here again have recourse to our former expedient of arranging the different authors by their respective quotations,—

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* Similarly the lines quoted from Pakṣhila Swāmin in the Sarva D. Sangraha, p. 115, are found in Vātsyāyana, (MS, fol. 4.)
† I hope that the Asiatic Society will publish the Nyāyabhāṣya in the Bibliotheca Indica, as a second MS, has been just procured from Nuddea. No work could be of greater importance for giving an insight into the older Nyāya.
the only data which the total absence of literary history in
India allows us to use. In this way we can establish a second
series of writers, viz. S'ankyara Acharya, V'achaspati Mis'a,
Udayana Acharya and M'adhava Acharya; and, as in this series
the dates of the first and last are known, we can approximate-
ly determine the dates of the intermediate pair. We cannot
be far wrong in assigning S'ankyara Acharya to the beginning
of the ninth century of our era,* and we know by the testi-
mony of copper land-grants as well as tradition that M'adhava
Acharya and his patron V'irabukka flourished in the earlier
half of the fourteenth century.† Now V'achaspati Mis'a, the
fourth in our previous series of Naiy'ayika authors, wrote one of
the most celebrated glosses (the Bh'amati) on S'ankyara Ach-
ary'a's commentary on the Ved'anta S'utras.‡ We have seen
that Udayana Acharya commented in turn on V'achaspati; and
his own work, now presented to the reader, is several times
quoted by M'adhava in his Sarva Dars'ana Sangraha.§ Now in
India a writer must have long ceased to have any visible con-
nection with the present before a Pandit would trouble himself
to write commentaries on his works or quote from them as a
well-accepted authority; and perhaps therefore we may, with-
out fear of much error, fix V'achaspati Mis'a in the tenth, and
Udayan'acharya in the twelfth century. It is something to
think that the author of the Kusum'anjali may have been an
unknown contemporary of Abelard.

The Kusum'anjali consists of seventy-two k'arikas or memo-
rional couplets, divided into five chapters; and as the author's
aim was to pack his arguments into the smallest possible com-
pass, the book is of course unintelligible without a com-
mentary. It is not generally known that the author himself com-
plied such a commentary; and in fact it is not improbable

‡ Both the Bh'amati and the Nyaya-udatika-atiiparya-tika are mentioned in
V'achaspati's own list of his works, see Dr. Hall's Catalogue, p. 87.
§ As e. g. p. 7, l. 18; p. 113, l. 6; p. 120, l. 13; p. 133, l. 4.
that the work, as it originally appeared, was in verse and prose,—the latter portion consisting of detached passages of varying length, introduced between the stanzas to supply the necessary links for understanding the argument. There is an imperfect MS. of this description in the Sanskrit Coll. Library. It is called the Kusumánjali, and contains the first chapter in 2 fol. ; but it unfortunately ends abruptly at the beginning of the second. It is remarkable that there is no sign of division between the two chapters,—the discussion of the second objection goes on in unbroken continuity with that of the first. As the work is very rare and Dr. Hall does not notice it in his very copious Catalogue, I subjoin a few more details.*

It commences with the first Káriká (sápratipaksha,) as the opening invocation; then follows the second (svargyópavargyó.) Then follows the long prose passage (beginning with iha yadvyapi, and ending with abhávéchchheli,) which is always given as supplying the place of the third káriká. This is followed by the first additional remark.

तत्र न प्रथमः कल्पः, ततः; सापेक्षालक्षादिवः(here follows s'rl. 4.)

न च खर्च संसारेऽघेकविन्दुः कमुः निरपेक्षा भवतुस्मृति, तदा विष म्यारेव, न खर्चेव वा, न गु वादाचित्त खात्। क्राक्षारेव भवतीति चेत् "हेतुभूत्तिनिविष्ये न खानुपाख्यविष्णूः च। ब्रह्मवर्गविद मैत्रसमवेशिनिमयताः।" हेतुभूत्तिनिविष्ये भवनस्यान्नेत्रालेन सर्वदारिशेषायात्, भवग्रंथविनिविष्णूं पञ्चदारिशेषार्थम्। उत्तेजः पूवैः खर्चसतः ख्यात्यालापमुखेन सर्वार्थितम् पदांगुप्तोऽत, पौराणिकसमथ कार्यकारार्थम्; व चेतं पूवैः स्वप्नग्रंथेषु तत्त्वः एदारिशेषान्नेताः। अक्षुपाख्य हेतुले प्रागिक सर्वप्रथः सुः, बदलन्त-लापेः। 'सार्वत्तं नाशस्यार्थितम् कार्यासमंद सर्वविशेषोद्वै सार्वत्तं नाशस्यार्थितम् कार्यासमंद सर्वविशेषाः, धातु तु अनुपरेत यथा विशिष्टीयसंदेशविशेषाय रति सभात् रति कसः।'

* Udayana is not specified as the author of the commentary, but it seems to belong to the same author as the kárikás, since there is only one parvatipaksha name for both, and the prose and verse follow each other as from the same pen. Unfortunately the MS. is carelessly transcribed and full of blunders. My extract contains many conjectural emendations.
Besides this commentary of the original author's, various pandits have written commentaries to illustrate the work,—for an account of these and the secondary glosses which these have in turn elicited, I refer the reader to Dr. Hall's Catalogue, pp. 82-84.

The Kusumánjali was first printed in Calcutta in the 'Saka year 1769, with the commentary of Haridásá Bhátáchárya,—and it was subsequently reprinted in Bengali letters in the Samvat year 1916. For the present edition, two old MSS. have been collated,* which have been long in the possession of Naiyáyika families; and from these I have introduced several emendations into the old text of the commentary.

I have endeavoured to make my translation as accurate as I could, but I cannot fail to have left inadvertencies, for which I must plead in excuse the thorny nature of the subject. I have consulted pandits in all difficulties, but, as their explanations are necessarily given in Sanskrit or Bengali, it is not always easy to detect the frequent subtle distinctions of Hindu metaphysics. The translation is as literal as I could make it so as to be intelligible, and I have every where endeavoured to supplement it by copious notes. But I cannot hope that the general reader

* Lent to me by Pandítá Jayánáyaka Táarkapancháánana and Pandítá Mahéśá-\chandra Nyáyaratna.
will be much interested in the major part of the treatise. Hindu philosophers reject all attempt to mix the dulce with the utile; and, as Dr. Röer has well observed,* "the punishment of this mystery and exclusion is the want of interest felt in the study of their works." I have subjoined a short synopsis of the whole argument, which will shew the ground over which our author professes to travel; and I hope that any one interested in the subject will be able with a little attention to master most of it. The only really abstruse portions are the latter half of the first and third chapters, and the discussion on the meaning of vidhi in the fifth; and these will certainly not repay an English reader for the trouble of understanding them.

In my translation I have frequently borrowed Dr. Hall's terminology, as found in his admirable translation of Pañjita Nehemiah Nilakantha 'Śātrī Gore's 'Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical systems,' and I beg to express my continual obligations to the pandit and his translator.

But my acknowledgments are especially due to the Professors of the Sanskrit College, without whose assistance hardly one page of my translation could have been made. I have associated the name of Pañjita Mahēśachandra Nyāyaratna with my own on the title page, as I read the original with him; he has also helped me in the collation of the MSS., and his short gloss on the more difficult passages will be of great service to the Sanskrit student. But I must not omit to express my many obligations to Pañjita Jayanārayana Tarkapanchānana and Pañjita Tārānātha Tarkavāchaspati, the Professors of Philosophy and Grammar,—the two most learned Hindus I have met during my residence in India, and whose names, I hope, will be not wholly unknown in Europe from their respective editions of the Vais'eshika Śāstras and the Siddhānta Kaumudi.

E. B. C.

Calcutta, March, 1864.

* Categories of Nyāya Philosophy, Introd. p. v.
SYNOPSIS OF THE KUSUMANJALI.

First Cluster.

The contemplation of God produces liberation; but the doubt arises,—is there a God for us to contemplate? the universal practical consent of mankind is conceded, but a fivefold theoretic objection is raised against His existence, i.—iii.

A. There is no such supernatural cause of another world as adrishta or desert.

This leads to a discussion on the relation of cause and effect, iv., v., the Mimásaka notion of a distinct category, called capacity, and the Vedantist and Sánkhya tenet of one common material cause, vi.—xiii.; the Sánkhya system is discussed, xiv.; the materialist, xv.; the Baudhā, xvi., xvii. Objections against causality answered in xviii., xix. Adrishta being unintelligent, its acceptance involves the concession of a Supreme Being to direct it, xix., xx.

Second Cluster.

B. Sacrifices &c. are a sufficient cause of another world, and we need not assume any Supreme Being.

This is met by arguments drawn from the need of an external authority, and the fact of successive creations and destructions of the world, which involve the destruction of the Veda from xon to xon, i.—iv.

Third Cluster.

C. There are arguments to prove God’s non-existence, as drawn from the six current proofs (pramánas),—

a. from perception (pratyakṣa) as He is not perceived.

This is met by a discussion on the nature of non-perception, i.—iii.

b. From inference (anumána) iv.—vii.

c. From comparison (upamána) viii.—xii.

d. From testimony (śābda) xiii.—xvii.

e. From presumption (arthópati) xviii., xix.

f. From non-perception (anupalabdhi) xx.—xxiii.

The two last are denied to be proofs,—the four first are shewn to be silent against Theism.
Fourth Cluster.

D. Some of the Mīmāṁsakas hold that even if God did exist He could not be an authority (pramāṇa) to us.

The Mīmāṁsaka definition of pramāṇa is shewn to be erroneous, i.—iv., and its true definition given in v., vi.

Fifth Cluster.

E. There is an absence of any positive argument for God’s existence.

To meet this, eight separate arguments are given in i. These are discussed, ii.—v.

A new interpretation of i. is then suggested which would give eight Vedic arguments. This is interrupted by a discussion on the true meaning of vidhi or ‘command,’ vi.—xiv. The second interpretation of i. is resumed, xv., xvi. The subject is summed up, xvii.—xix.
कुसुमाञ्जलि:।

श्रीमद्दशयनाचार्यविरचित:।

श्रीरिद्धाबहार्चार्यकत्वाख्यानचित:।

श्रीमंचेषुचन्द्रनाचर्यकत्वाख्यानचित:।

तत्तथितेन तु संख्यनिधानायान्यः

श्रीमत ५० वि १ वांकुलसाहिबः

वंशोधित:।

कलिकाता-राजधान्यां

वांकुल-मिशन-यथे मुझित:।

शास्त्र: १७ शृं। खोंडकाव्य: १५ शृं।
कुसुमाच्छलि:।

प्रथम: स्वयं।

रामदीपदेवगीताविद्या तात्माप्रमुद्धसाधनविवर्धयन।
चैवसाभ भविक्रमजन्मानं केवलम परपतनयें। नमस्ते।।

इति तत्तात्त्विधितं चक्षुरामानुपादकन्य क्षत्रप्रयोगाविनं
समुलं कुमारं गुणकमाह।

सत्यचार: वनं परमविद्यादेवज्ञानं वक्तो।
विविष्णू न विविष्णूधरतरवाहनमाध्यकमः।।

दैवश्रेष्ठ निवेदित: पदकुरु धर्मायामाय भम-चेतां मे रमयधिनिलवमनवायामयसमाज्ञा:।।

एवाध्येयं निर्देशः। न्याय: दससस्मयोपपन्नविश्वासप्रतिप-दंकं वाकं। य एव कुसुमाच्छलिः। से मस चिन्द रमयतु दुःख-
वाचायविविधिं करेतु। अनवनं सम्बद्दोपरविहितं, विवादा-
मुद्दं: पूर्वंचैरेव विराधाभिपूजानादिति प्रकाशः।। श्रविं यथा
भाज, दैवश्रेष्ठ पदकुरु, यथेते: ज्ञेयतिविश्वथ चा यद्य प्रत्यायाकं, तथ्यं
ग्रहृतकर्णं, तथ निवेदित: तद्रक्षयतथा उत्पादित:। चेत: 
कोष्ठानं, धर्मायामायं समुददव मकरन्ते दुःखिनिगे मया सहस्त्रं,
भवतु दुःखिनिगे मया मनं मनुष्ठये। प्रसुनाच्छलिषितामाहः।
विद्यादि। यत्र वस्मीचानि, पत्रोऽर्कुशेष्य दिविकिरणादिना
पश्चिमो बिन्धोरे चक्षू च तथा, यतां पचासं दुःखानां विकाशो
चक्षू च तत्पतिः वा। वतामुपवचनं पादर्शनं परिमवाम सम्बन्धे
स्वेषेष्य प्रेगडैधेन सधाराकरेण बद्रु उत्सव श्रानन्दति लेन च।।
विमर्दे न करुणातिंद्रिने न विवर्णाः नायणाध्यामतंस्मान्।। श्रादतः
तुलके रति स्वान्ते दृति प्रक्षान्ते, स्नानाः माध्योक मधु, तथा
भूरत्वानिस्मानम्॥ वायुप्ने, दृति प्रामाणिहि पचास्यक्रे देव-
निश्चिते दृति चावतः, परे विशिष्ठासिवतसाध्याध्यायके धर्मिंशि,
प्रवर्। प्रक्षप्रेष बरो श्रान्यं चक्षात्, एतेनायधारिष्कुकुपसा-
विशिष्ठापरम्वराः।। यतां विवर्णानां, परं विकेशीत्वेन, मलः
चनोऽद्वा वाचिः, तथा। प्रेगडैधेन प्रमया बद्रु उत्सव श्रानन्दो
लेन, एतेन यभिषार्यायालिविद्विशिष्ठाविरोधानाः निराशः।। वि-
मर्दने विराधिप्रमाणाविद्वायाः न विस्माः न कार्यावमः,
तेन वस्मातिसचाराहिंस्मान्।। श्रादतं मैचाः, रति द्व्यमाणं दृति
हिष्ठित:।। दृति वायातः, प्रक्षान्तं द्वयमाणं सनै चक्षायाध्यायताः
निराशता, तदेव माध्योक्त, तथा भूरत्वानिस्मानम्॥।

‘लोकयसरपद्यं निवेदितं नायणा भूषणसदा सनमसाधे
महाभावः, कविबद्विषाध्यायो कविद्विषाध्यायो भवनार्ति-
द्रामिष्ठास्यानिविशिष्ठाय भार्यानाचप्पलात् तवानन्तवेत भृजोऽ
पायालात्’ दृतिमविष्ठायामाच।

* ‘क्रिप्तवितिहि भावे द्वयमाणं प्रक्षान्ते।’ दृति सप्त्विस्मारे।
† “समाय वा षोध श्रद्धां अतोऽप्रेतो सनैको निदित्यासित्वः।”
दृति दृष्ट सदा॥
प्रथम:  स्वर:  

खर्गोष्णः परमाञ्चलां वीर्य भीमानम्।

यदुपासिद्धावं परसाक्षी विषयणे॥ १ ॥

खर्गोष्णः: खर्गुकशे: श्रवणवर्गोऽप्रकाश्यमित्यरससमुखः।

देवस्मनसञ्जादुरुढ़द्वारा खाआवचालकारकार्य वा मुनि वेदः।

“तमेव विद्यालाम्यत्वमेति माया: पञ्चा विध्यतेः:यशाय” (श्रेष्ठोति)

दत्तमुखविनीतस्तुल्यार्थमेवोऽसम्। खाआवचालकारकर्मचे

श्रेष्ठतः मा माया: “यदासभान्विजानोपास्यमक्षोति पूर्वः।

किमिक्ष्णं कदा कामाय संघातस्मृतसुरूपितं” (द्यस्यद्वारे) द्रव्यत॥ २ ॥

इति च च च पर यथं कमपि पुर्वार्थमयं मानात्। श्रुद्धवृक्षखाभाव

देवार्थनिवेच्या। श्रावदिविशा चिन्द्र द्रति कार्यं। कृष्ण-

कर्मचिविक्षितपरमार्गश्रेत्रा निर्माणकायमध्यायमयमय-

प्रदोतकारनुष्टाचक्षितं पाथवर्मवः। लोकवेदविश्वेत्रस्य निर-

वर्म: खर्गस्यथितं महाधारुवनन्। शिव द्रति ब्रह्मः। पुष्यो-

कर्तम द्रति प्रेवा:। पितामहः द्रतिः प्रेवार्थशोः। धन्यकुष्ठीय

द्रति यानकः। यवस्याः द्रतिः द्विग्नम्। निरवर्षतः द्रति दिग्नम्

वह्ना:। उपाख्येत मेहित्य द्रति भौर्मांशकः। लोकवेदार-

सिद्ध द्रतिः चार्यः। यावदुर्पुर्वक द्रति नैधार्यः। किं

बजना:। कार्यवेदार्थि विषयमार्यापवते। तस्मिन्वेव भाग्याचर-

प्रवर्तकस्युह्नधानविवासं सुप्रभवद्धार्तः। भगवति भवे

तत्तववेदेष्ठ एव कुमा:। किं निष्पणीयं। तथापि। श्यायर्येव

मीलघो शरणवपदेशेनात्रक्रा। उपाधयवत्र जिधे श्रवणमन्दरा-

क्योः सि भगवान् वज्रः। अविनुत्स्तीतिहर्षपुरुषरापः॥ २॥
কুশমাস্ত্রিঃ

দ্বাস্যে মন্ত্রণ বর্হতি "শ্রীতি মন্ত্রণ!" ইতিভূতে: "আগমন নাগমানেন ধানাধ্যায়তেন ৎ। চিন্ম প্রকৌশল প্রস্তাতি সমতে যাগমন মং" ইতিভূতে খ। তত্তিব ব্রজুত: পালচর্য হুয় ইতিপন্নি:-অসীকি ক্ষু পরস্পর ধর্মাভাবাত। মন্ত্রস্বাপি পরস্পর ধর্মাভাবাত ঐন্নম্বাদ্যাত তত্ত্বাদ্যাত কর্মায় ম্বায়াভাবাত বিুপীয় তথ্যালালাত তত্ত্বাদ্যায় ভাবায়পি।

মুমুক্তি দ্বিতীয়রসিতঃ বুধ্যা বোধ্যাব্ধুপ: শাদী চাম্বাঠী বিস্বাস চিত্রপূঃ চিত্রঃ বাধিয়েখুঘন। চিত্রঃ হুয়রিয়েখান হুয় চিত্রসিতাএকার দেবাভিনবিষ্ণুঃ পত্র কৌশাঃ কর্ম ধার্মায়সস্তাসদর্শানিহীরী চিত্রঃ বিপাকা জানায়ুরাগাঃ শাস্ত্রায় ধার্মায়স্য নিন্দি কৌশো নিন্তাভালাঃ সম্বাদায়ী বেদঃ প্রচোতক। প্রাকাশক: বেদঃ নিত্যান্তী ঘটাদী কর্তণুন্যায়ান বিপাকষ্টা শিক্ষিয়া, শিবি বিলিয় শিক্ষা পিতাভুঃ অনং ক্ষুঃ অং ব্রজুত দ্রুত্য ব্রজুত। চন্দ্রাস্থ: বালকবিকর্ণঃ মাত্রান্মায় চারামুখভারামুর চারিবিভিনবিষ্ণুঃ উপাস্তায় ঘলন দেখিতে মন্ত্রাদিীঃ ধর্মায় মুদ্রকুঘন বাবুপাণ্ড তমোপনুবা চরি শ্রী শাস্ত্রী বালকবিকর্ণুন্মায় মুদ্রকুঘন বাবুপাণ্ড সংক্ষেপলায় দেখায়।

‘তুমুলু উবর্জন:’ ইতি নাহেন ইন্তেখন তত্ত্বাদ্যাত তত্ত্বাদ্যাত ॥ ২ ॥

ধার্মায়সু তাম্রায় কৌশো নিত্যান্তী তঁহাতে প্রতি বৃত্তায় চ তত্ত্বাতু তত্ত্বাদ্যাত তত্ত্বাদ্যাত ॥ ৬ ॥

ধার্মায়সু তাম্রায় কৌশো নিত্যান্তী তঁহাতে প্রতি বৃত্তায় চ তত্ত্বাতু তত্ত্বাদ্যাত তত্ত্বাদ্যাত ॥ ৯ ॥
प्रमाण: साइड़कं ।

अश्विनिकां नीतिसङ्ग्रहः परलोकानेतराः भेदति प्रतिष्ठा । त च प्रमाणं: कारणधार्मकाधिपत्याः गाबेशलादिति । गाबेशल धाराचित्कांलं, तथा च कार्ये श्रीतुकं काराचित्कलं भेदमयधार्मिकः। नसु घटादितिः ब्रह्मचारी घटादितिः, तथा च तथा काराचित्कां वाचम्, एवं तत्कारणपरिषारचित्ककं काराचित्ककं श्रीतुकं वाचम्।

"नन्दु ध्रुवं वचारवचार चाकौ नाना-दुर्गमतिः एवं श्रवणिकारणयं विचित्रार्थायां। नन्दुकाप्रयोगं श्रीतुकं नाना-दुर्गमति।"

विषेषां परशिकार-कार्यो विचित्रार्थायां। नन्दुकाप्रयोगं श्रीतुकं नाना- दुर्गमति। विषेषां परशिकार-कार्यो विचित्रार्थायां। नन्दुकाप्रयोगं श्रीतुकं नाना- दुर्गमति।

"नन्दुकाप्रयोगं श्रीतुकं नाना- दुर्गमति। विषेषां परशिकार-कार्यो विचित्रार्थायां। नन्दुकाप्रयोगं श्रीतुकं नाना- दुर्गमति।

ब्रह्मचारी धिकारस्य भेदमयधार्मिकः, विषेषां परशिकार-कार्यो विचित्रार्थायां। नन्दुकाप्रयोगं श्रीतुकं नाना- दुर्गमति। विषेषां परशिकार-कार्यो विचित्रार्थायां ॥ ৫ ॥

"अभिवृत्तिः भवति, न किंचिदप्रेचं कार्यमिति, अतएव अश्विनिकां नीतिसङ्ग्रहः परलोकानेतराः भेदति प्रतिष्ठा । त च प्रमाणं: कारणधार्मकाधिपत्याः गाबेशलादिति। गाबेशल धाराचित्कांलं, तथा च कार्ये श्रीतुकं काराचित्कलं भेदमयधार्मिकः। नसु घटादितिः ब्रह्मचारी घटादितिः, तथा च तथा काराचित्कां वाचम्, एवं तत्कारणपरिषारचित्ककं काराचित्ककं श्रीतुकं वाचम्।"
कुण्डमालिकिः।

शक्षादिति किं चेतुतिनिधणं भवनिनिधणं वा,
खातिरिक्षेतुतिनिधणं पारमार्थिकेतुतिनिधणं वा, चेतु-भविष्यितुकलमनोक्षेतुकलम Cक वरस्वाधिकारिन्याख्यतम्।
ीव ताकर्मरूपस्वहरिक्षविद्यतान्तः, नियतायविदिकरेऽ च कादाचित्कल्याकायप हेतु भावः॥ ॥

‘चेतुतिनिधणं कार्यकारणभवाः: कादाचित्कल्याकायपणु-पप्पत्तथ कल्यः, तथा विज्ञायानिधिस्मुख दशारितिविचारितया
दशायाचरणलि कादाचित्कल्याकायप : कारणानार्क च वञ्जुमलक्ष्यात्।’
चच्च वञ्जुमलक्ष्याकाप्रक्षिप्तस्तगण: कारणता, भक्तिश्वराधिकारः मतिर्विचि नाना भविष्येतिनिधिः
“नियो नियोव शाक्तिर्निनिधिः भविष्येतुताः” हेतु तस्य विद्यानातू।
‘वञ्जुमलक्ष्य दशारितिप्रक्षिप्तस्तगणिभविष्येतिनिधिः हेतु हृ भविष्येतुताः।
नायसः
तु दशारितिज्ञातेङ्कृियतेव तेजायमेव, विज्ञातीयः अविद्यालयात्रा
कार्यानुसारक्षतिकरणे धूमार्दिनवञ्जुमलक्ष्यात्तु स भाद्यः।

* शक्षादितिविष्क्रमेन निष्क्रमेन देषुपरः तलव नजोधिनयातु तद्भवे
कार्यसः भवणं साभू, व्यवस्थाभवनेनाः भवनिनिधिः भभैते।
उभयविधानतः प्रकारक नजोधिनयं नियन्त्रत हेतु प्रकारविकृतमुः
कः। अथ शक्षादितिसमुदितिविष्क्रमेन विनिधितियेन देषुपरः
नजः निनीविष्क्रमाभः भभैते। तथा च दशारितिविनिधित्वं विनिधित्वायामाभः भभैते।
अर्थसीकारतः कार्यसः भवणः साभूत्विधिकरणसायतैः देषु
भवणः च च चाण्याभिन्वतिविनिधित्वं विनिधित्वायामाभः भभैते।
प्रथमः सत्वमः |

खाच दणफुकारशाशनवधानख निम्नखवारणिविशिष्टवधानख प्रति- फलितरविकिरणविशिष्टवधानख च प्रतिनिधिमः, कारण- तावचकेतकारविक्रियावर्धने कारणतावचकेतकारारविक्रियावर्धने वधाने कार्यमेणक उल्लासातु, फुकारशाशनविशिष्टवधानेतीतापि वञ्जापोऽ। बऽद्रि च दणफुकारारविक्रियावर्धनेदुरं वञ्जापुकृष्णका श्रवः कालोते तदा नैतत् समाधानं, परस्तु तारणवज्ञानिण्यं वैजायं प्रत्यायम्यं दीपलाविविवंति न पदार्थानाराज्यी- क्षणम्। अहुमर्थांमां

प्रवाचिनः नादिमानेन न विजायोकश्रवः

तचै चलवता भावमन्यशालिरेकथः।। ॥ ६ ॥

प्रथमः कार्यकारणप्रवाचः नादिमानू चनारिः, विजायोक्षः पर्णारदु एकश्रवः न प्रवाचः, अनवचकेतिरेकथास्थाये नियतते निबंधोऽ चलवता भावं चलः करणेऽः, वैजायं कल्यायथमिति भावः। विज्ञायामां प्रति तु विजायोक्षः

कल्यायथमिति भावः।। ॥ ६ ॥

'ननु चत्वा एक व दीपः अशांकरारीतीविकारारी पर्णारदुकारारी च, तथा एकस्व ब्रह्म चं वा कार्य- कारणविशालमेदान् प्रतिपुत्रस्मि भिन्नभिन्नवूढ़ेतिमुखा प्रकाशतिरिव चेतुरस्तं, तथा च वाहुः धारिणादयेः' दैवत्राधे

एकः न कमः कापि वेष्टितेः बसस्तः न।

श्रवःइदे न चाभिःः अक्षमात्रः दुर्लक्षमः।। ७ ॥

एकः कारणस्त्रियं न कार्यां कसः, बसस्तः एकः
जातीयकारणसा प्रथेयाच्छन्न न कार्याणाचे विचारचे वेजाला, 
तथा न कस्मिककार्यनिवावष्टकत्ता कस्मिककार्यशिष्टः विजातीयकार्यजनकत्ता च विचारक्षेत्रमित्रित्यस्यः। ‘शक्तिमेद्रादेव चानाचीवादेकान्तः कार्यवेजालाः’ दात्तश्रद्धा निराकृती शक्तिमेद्रादेवता न चासिन्न दात्तः। चो येता, न शक्तिमेद्रादेव: अभिमोचन यतःशक्तिश्रजसंतोरमेद्रादाः मेद्रादेवः च तत्तेव कार्यः 
लक्ष्यकारिः एकसाधकारणलभण्जग्यका दैत्यपलिनिधियस्यः। ननु 
खथावादेव एककारणसा विचारकार्यनिवावष्टकलकम् दयायमेव 
खथावाः दुर्लभमेव दात्ततासाध्याः। एकसाधक्यां कार्यं जनचिंतयथे च: खथावः, 
कार्यान्तरजनकलाः तत्साधुःसाध्याः दृष्टप्रकाशमा अलादिलं 
खथाः, खथावाः दुर्लभम्बलावर्दियस्यः। प्रदीप्त्यां तत्तकार्यः 
साधयोऽन्द्रक्यमात्मार्दिति भावः॥ ७॥ 
‘ननु दुःखालिदिध्यां देत्यर्द्यस्य, न तु दागादिः खगालिदी- 
हेतुः’ दयायमेव 
विभक्तः विभस्तितविहः न दुःखालिदिध्यां वा। 
दृष्टप्रकाशमा गापिः विभ्रेक्षोऽपि नेद्वृश:॥ ८॥ 
विभग्न्यः परशोकार्थिः खगालिदिध्यां चागार्दाः प्रदीप्तिविर- 
फळा न, न वा दुःखालिदिध्या प्रदीप्तिविरस्वाधनाद्विशाखा- 
धिताः, न च दृष्टप्रकाशमा पुजायांतिधवानिधिर्दिधिका, तत्त्वेर- 
पैरितपि तद्राचर्याः। ‘केवलित द्राहाकर्तन खगालिदिध्यां 
कार्यादिकं प्रकृतिय खयमनिधार्य धिनतिः स्थापः प्रवत्तिः’ दयाय- 
मात्रिक विभ्रेक्षोऽपिः नेद्वृशः दात्तः। क एवं लोकार्तर चः
परम्परार्थां नामार्थविधिः शैक्षितकर्मोऽभिरामावधानसवाप्पतिः
तथा च यागार्दिः शुद्धिरेव खगार्दिफलकस्य यागार्दिमान
भितः॥ ८ ॥

"ननु यागार्दिं खगार्दिवेत्तरस्तु न तु तस्मावश्रूतं तथा"

drayacha

चिरर्ध्वं स्वायान्ति न कथा निर्विशेषान्ति विना।

क्षणां निर्विशेष्यान्ति न भूते:संज्ञातिरपि॥ ८ ॥

चिरर्ध्वं यागार्दिकम् अतिशयं तत्त्वस्थानुकूलवापारं
विना पद्धाय नास्ति न समये, चिरर्ध्वकारणस्थः यापारदार्शिव
थेवलं, च तु अनुववस्य संक्षारदार्शिव सति। "ननु भोगां-
मिळानमूङ्ग कारणमक्षः १० तिति निर्माणायातः म्योगः १० तिति।

निर्विशेषाणांमहेऽऽमधुष्ककेपविपश्युतोऽवस्थानासि आत्मानां सम्भागः
प्रत्यात्मानियो भोगः संज्ञातिरपि अटूटवस्य स्वोजातिरपि
भूतैन्यां कालूत्तरां श्रीराशार्चां त्वात्मासाधारणः
तदुपास्य श्रीराशार्चिं यादिभिः अग्निनां द्राजनानियः॥ ८ ॥

"ननु भोगार्दिक एव धर्मविषेधं तौतीश्यः प्रतिनियतं-
भोगार्दिधिशास्त्रकोऽसि, यथा दार्शार्दिनियांगको वज्ञार्दिनिषं
शक्तेदः; अथर्था तांतशालेष्व कर्त्तवानकवांगातु सति
प्रतिष्ठाने द्राजापते ॥ न च मण्डाऽवभाव एव कारणस्मृ
दृति वाच्यं, कारणस्व भावल्योगालाम, किंतु शक्तिः श्राक्षरं
करोदिति मण्डादिः प्रतिष्ठनं उच्चाति, तथा च शक्तिः खो-
कार्यं।" drayacha
भावो चचा तथाभावः कारण कार्यविचारः
प्रतिभयो विषायी तद्वेतः प्रतिभ्यः ॥ १० ॥

व्याख्यानवच्यते सर्वोत्तरा भवे ध्येः कार्यः तथाभावः
कारणमपि, 'कारणं भावलयां' द्विगुणात्मस्य विचारसः। 'शक्ति-
विष्कर्षं प्रतिभक्षकलनुपपत्ति:' द्विजाच प्रतिभः दृष्टि।
विषायी कारणाभावः, च च महते मश्चाधबाधाभावः
मश्चादिः, तत्तत्त्वविवधाने: पुराण एव प्रतिभः, खर्चिं कस्य-
चेतं च मश्चादी प्रतिभक्षकप्रयोगः दृष्टि भावः। भौमात्मक-
नाथम् 'उत्तेजकाभावकुटिविष्णुमध्याभावेण वेदुले गैरवानु
खायबह्यस्मातिः वधारी कर्म्येतः, प्रतिभस्य स्वतः शक्तिः-
कृपस्म। चचतु 'शक्ति: प्रथमस्ती विन्कीकरणन्या विन्कीनिधि, प्रतिभक्षकेन च तथा विशाखे उत्तेजकेन पुनःकृतम्। च च
शक्तिरित्यतंतुकलमिति वाच्ये, शक्तिनुमुक्तशक्तिमेले कार-
शालं' दृष्टि। ततः, विन्किनिधनाश्चर्णकस्तनापेक्षया उत्तेज-
काभावविष्णुमध्याभावेक्षरः वरं वेदुलोधियात्, तथा चा-
कृष्णशक्तिरेव तथ कारणतार्चेदिकचा कर्म्येतः' दृष्टाकः।
ततः, शक्तिकुमाः प्रतिभक्षकेन वेदुलोधिजकक्ष शक्तितत-
विन्किनिधत्वाशाह मन्त्रशक्तिसमपस्तातिः दृष्टि ॥ १० ॥

“ननु 'श्रीष्णु प्रेमाचरति, श्रीमानबन्धनः' द्वायादेश्न ग्रामवस्थानः
काश्चार्जाभाववचारणजनको वाचारो श्रीमनिधिः कर्म्येतः,
'प्रेमाचरति एव श्रीमानबन्धताय कर्म्येते' दृष्टि वाक्षेपातः।
किष्क थे चतुर्विचारार्थिन्या कियते च तत्तत्त्वमल्लवक्रमः-
प्रथम: ग्रंथम् ।

पारजनकः यागवत्। किच्च भौज्ञादिविषयमापरमाश्चात्मकः
भौज्ञादिविषयमानुपप्तिः। एवं मासाकर्षणादिविषयमाहिनिहि
खमित्या शक्तिनिवृत्तम्। अवाचतरुस्

संस्कारः पुंशः एवेष्टः प्राचणाशुचिदिबिः।

खमुणः: परमाश्रणाविशेषः पाकालाखः।। ११।।

प्राचणादिभिः: संस्कारोऽवृत्तः पुंशः पुश्चः दशः: खोजः:
प्रतिःनः नानाशशिक्रक्रमवाचशः एकाच्यवाचः यशोस्मिः महः
प्राचणादिज्ञायाकवाचस्तनकः सचवेन कल्पनात्: दृष्टःद्वाराभवे
शति विशिष्टः काव्यानारःहविशिष्टः खमनकल्पन-नाशः
संस्काराचितिनिवृत्तयवस्कः तत्र्य खमुपसमन्वयेनवेत
श्रीचिन्तिलयः कल्पः: एतेनाधिमालयतः: प्रष्टःवादविपि तत्त-
त्वःध्वानुकाध्वानुकुल्कः प्रभूविनिः। श्रीचिन्तिति: च श्रूचः प्राचण्टि
इवादविवः प्राचणादिज्ञानारःखम्यागादिरूपपरस्वपत्रित्या
जन्मायालाृतिवषयाः कर्तम्। ‘यो यद्वन्तः महर्षीभिष्मायितवः शुभः धर्मवात्त्वभ्रमन्तः
तृतीयस्तवां विशेषः पावयामि तत्रः कल्पनाया विशेषः
व्याहारिकी विशेषः परमाश्रणाविशेषः विशेषः
तेन पाकालाखः पारजनकः दिबिरिष्टः: परमाश्रणाविशेषाः
विशेषः पावयामि तत्रः एवः श्रीचिन्तिति भावः:। १२।।

‘नन्द वधः पाकालाखः विशेषाः तत्रार्थां वीणमुक्तः शक्तिरादिविष्याः,

* मासाकर्षणादिविषयमाहिनिहि शक्तिनिवृत्तम्: जिनः पावयायामि पुष्चःमःनिः
मदीनामान्तः विशेषः प्रभूसिवृत्तम्। एवः मधुवर्तिः:।
करकादेःच प्रतिष्ठात्त्रुववामिन, कथयच प्रतिमादेः प्रतिष्ठानेहायोऽ्\| तथा च प्रतिष्ठात्तव वनिस्कारार्थादिस्वभन्नाया पूज्यताप्रेयोगिका खोकाया' द्वयाचार

निमित्तमेबसंवाधार्यादिवनुवादवादः।

श्रवणात् सचिवालायन प्रश्नब्रह्माचार्योऽपि वा वृ। १९ \|\|

निमित्तमेद: श्रूपनेदः, देवता: प्रतिष्ठाविभिन्ना सचिवालायनाय जनास्वारमसकारादिविना शाराध्यनीयतात्मावादशन्ति, प्रति-

शालविधिना देवतानां प्रतिमादे अन्धकारसमकारे, चाष्ट्रा-

चालदिश्रेणि तदुप्राधामानाभावः। देवताज्ञानविवादवादः

पञ्चार्थपुजितलधि: प्रतिष्ठात्तवधीच चाष्ट्राचालदिश्रेणर्थावावासी-विशिष्टा पूज्यतान्याचार्यमिका, तथा रुपयोगिनी प्रतिपर्व पञ्चायतान्याचार्यमिका, तथा घपयोगिनी प्रतिधिका। वशु-

तन्त्र प्रतिष्ठाकालोनवादसुंख्यार्थादिस्वभन्नाभावः प्रतिष्ठा-

अंकवान्नांग: पूज्यताप्रेयोजनक: 'प्रतिष्ठितं प्रपूजये' द्रित्र ज्ञेन

प्रतिष्ठाच्यवेदिकास्वामिती द्रिक। १९ \|

'वसु तुम्हारेपरिवर्तादे परिवाराविधिना वनिस्कारादेः जनये,

तथा नसनास्ववमानादिर्दकत फलं जनये' द्वयाचार अयेरतानिशित्व द्रितिभामाह् केवलम्।

परिवाराविधिना मताः १९ \|\|

चण्डकर्तर: पराजयः, सचिवालायादिर्द्रक परिवाराविधिना द्रितिभामाहि केवलुकन्तुश्चर्षार्थाभाव परिवारामिले नाति: खोकाया। श्रीसचिवालयस्य परिवाराविधिना तुम्हारा-

माफ़कः श्रीरावः पा प्रवासः निश्चयमे वेति ज्ञान सच्चारि। यद्या
प्रथमः काव्यः ।

हस्तिलाभाय जननाय, तथा च प्रतिव्राणुषपश्च मुद्रितप्रेक्षा
धर्मेतिधुमदिमपेक्षाग्रुषनां जन्यते। एते व 'ब्रह्मवधाकरणाः
पुष्पमाचार्यनां कर्त्य तस्म वहकारि ताहुवश्चान्त्र अहै' द्विभापित
पराशाम् ॥ १५ ॥

बायधाः 'पुष्पमाचार्य्यः अकारणः, नता एव कुटेको
निभः। प्रकटिकाशेतना परिषामिनि निम्ना एका, प्रकटेषु प्र- शमपरिसमायु बुद्धिमित्रतत्तवं, तदार्थी धर्मं: श्लानामाचार्याः
-नेतृथविरामाविरामाध्यंधर्मंकुम्पा; बुद्धिमुखः केच्छवाद्वय- बधसंगमाध्यंदेवः वा, भवनायाकाररकोकारात् अनभव- खेत्र सत्तिकाले खुश्तयात्वर्याचारण्। अचितनाया: प्रकटिकार्या-
या बुद्धिमाुंभायमानायमानुपच्छ्या खामाविकाशेतया
पुष्प: चिन्दु: धर्माधिशेषरेवेदार। तत्र प्रकटेन्दान् पत्ता-
तागुणाकारश्रुत्यत्र परसनमर्गश्चतस्ततसतान्त: श्च, मं- खक्षारुशनाथरी तमांगायथा वाक्पाणिपादपापूपकाय देश्चि-
खाण्य, तत्कान्: पद्म सनातनानि दुर्धिप्रेग्योत्रावायाकारानि
जायन्ते। कतुकम् 'मूलप्रकाशतिरितिकतमहाद्राया: प्रकटिविविक- तयः। पूजरंत्रकान्त विकारो न प्रकटिन्नि विभासः: पुष्पः' च (साकांक्षा)। पद्म सनातकाचेताकोल्प्यारुपाय चेति चेति चेति।
वैत्तिक निम्न खामाविकाशेताहिस्वयविश्वाविश्वाभावेक- 
निर्माणः खातः प्रजवधीनेषुपरिविश्वाविश्वाभावेक- 
निर्माणः खातः प्रजवधीनेषुपरिविश्वाविश्वाभावेक- 
निर्माणः खातः प्रजवधीनेषुपरिविश्वाविश्वाभावेक- 
निर्माणः खातः प्रजवधीनेषुपरिविश्वाविश्वाभावेक-
चंद्र विषयचैतन्यावच्छेदक्षापि वायुज्ञानुपपत्ति', श्रीमाय: सन: 
खीराय: यहांमें इन्द्रियखं विषयचैतन्यावच्छेदनियाम- 
मकलं। खस्त्रयायं वायुलाभिमानिनं न मनोरंजनमिकर्मिभि- 
मानं; श्रीमायं चिन्तनाभिमान नियतविषयाभिमानवषयप्रकृतिहस्ता- 
राज्यि खीराय:। आयामस्थमुखिर्व वायुसधायुपर्यायं यस- 
वायुपर्यायं जलनवति ततुच्चित्तत्स प्राचुकावान्यकोणिगि खीरायः। 
तस्मिन ग्रंथरिपियाभिमान सम्बन्धः विषयः पुवर्कखं ग्रंथपर- 
राज्यकं; एवद्व बुद्धिचर्मामार्हविषयावच्छेदक्षाभवानु 
प्रेक्षे माहः। मेदाच्चिन्तेनां करोमोन्याभिमानः। ततुकं 
'प्रकृतं: कीमसमाप्नि गुणः: कांमाणि सवंमः। ज्ञानस्वरुपी 
त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त्त́
वनः वर्षं वर्षावमानतेः अनिःसारः स्तत् वधनिश्चा तदौपन्यानातः बाच्या श्रवित्वभावश्चानुपयित्वभावात्, तथा च तदनत्रः प्राकः तदार्थित्वभावमिहः चन्द्रिकृतिनिर्धारितेऽविचारिदिकार्यानुपत्तीः अर्थान्नाशः खादिज्यायः ॥ १४ ॥

‘भववत् चेतनायेदद्वृत्तत् चेतनस्तन न निधविषुः। किती कायाकारपरिषधन्तविशेषः गौरीः ज्ञानीति प्रसीदया रूपवस्त्रिङ्गः’ दृष्टान्तः

वाचनास्त्वकः भास्कर न च गायनरूप खिरे ॥ १५ ॥

श्रीरीक्षा चैतन्ये बाह्यक्षायामनुभूतत्व चैववे स्नारणं न स्तत् चैतन्यद्वृत्ता नेर्वेषाकारणमिव। न च बाह्योख्योत्तोरणं भूतं श्रीरमः अर्थात् प्राकः तदार्थित्वमानाय परिमाणसे से द्वाराय द्वृत्तात् पूर्वपरिमाणनाथात् अन्यनाथात् चैतन्यात् क्षुद्रकालतात्। न च कारणेऽविश्वभूतत्वार्थाच भावात् ध्वनिष्कर्षानुभूतत्वात्, अस्येतु मात्रानुभूताद्वृत्तमेल्कणात्यापन्नस्ति। ‘श्रृङ्गपादानव- वनाया उपरिद्वेश वक्तमः स्तत्’ दृश्यमात्र न च गायनरूप खिरे द्वित। खिरे खिरे पुनः पुनः पुनः गायनरूपोत्तोरभावात् काराबि श्रीरीक्षायामनुभूतत्वं चैव अस्त्वं च विच्छिन्ने काराबि तदनिर्भूत अस्त्वं न न नामों पुनः गायनरूपेऽविच्छिन्नेऽविच्छिन्नकारादेवनुपादानलात्। न च विन्यासानामः चैतन्ये नेवारकार्यानुपत्तं खादिज्यात् खादिज्यात् अस्त्वं ज्ञाति वाच्यं, तथा विच्छिन्ने काराबि तदनिर्भूत अस्त्वं न नामों पुनः गायनरूपेऽविच्छिन्नेऽविच्छिन्नकारादेवनुपादानलात्। न च परमाणूस्तं चैतन्ये तेवार्थ खिरलात् खादिज्यात् खादिज्यात् अस्त्वं विच्छिन्ने काराबि तदनिर्भूत अस्त्वं नामों पुनः गायनरूपेऽविच्छिन्नेऽविच्छिन्नकारादेवनुपादानलात्॥ १५ ॥
कुछमालिक: ।

‘नमस्तु चण्डक्र:’ तथा ‘चुंबम्परमाणुपंचेनोपादेवे- चारोपरमाणुपंच दृति न चारणानुपर्ति:’ देवरावण

न वैजायण्यिना तत् खात् न तस्मान मुम्भवेत् ।

विना तेन न तस्मानायनृथं निर्धारं विना ॥ १६ ॥

वैजायण्य कुब्रेण विना न नत् चषिकलं खात् मिथातीयथःः

श्यर एव वैजायण्य, वषकारंराजानामावबाराहानुसारः कार्यज्ञानाः

नामपत्रः जिज्ञासान्वयाकुण्डरीर्ज्ञानकान्तस्य; वैज्ञानिकः

दानब्रजे क्षु: चषिकलण्ड क्षात् । तस्मान जातिश्वेते च ऐन्ध्रके

कलायातीतीकोभिषेकद्वैमुग्धामणि मयुलसानं न खात्त, धूम

कुब्रेण वषकारं ज्ञासान्वयाकुण्डरीर्ज्ञानकान्तस्य लिंगमार्गात्

विषमतिष्य विज्ञातीयं धमक्तित्वं विषमलमादायाः धूमसा

म्या घटेलतानिर्धारात्, तथा ‘चार्यकारणमावतीप्रयत्नचालम्

वाणिज्याचारिणिः वाणिज्याचारिणिः। तस्मानमानोकंभात्

अच च तत् ग्राहणसेव मानबित वाच्या, निर्विश्वयक्षेिक्त तताचा बिव

वयान्यत्यथा रामायण, तत्त्व च श्विवक्षालोकितथा ‘चषिका’

दृति श्विवक्षालोक्त्वाध्यात्मिस्त् । किच्छाकुम्बुकं विना न जातिः

श्रायिवर्धिन षोडशरतुः, श्रायिवर्धिन पचाय ये न तथ भचात्, श्राय

ीविश्वयापि कुतुष्क्षेिश्वासी तदन्धचाय चचात्, कुब्रेण मात्र। तथा

हथ्या: सम्बोधितात्। जल एव जलादिवयाय नामं घटले,

*विज्ञातीयं खाण्डकालवर्क्षपुर्वाधिग्रहमाद्राय घट रथनुगत-

धोतिः ॥ १६ ॥

*विज्ञातीयं खाण्डकालवर्क्षपुर्वाधिग्रहमाद्राय ।
‘नवस्तु चर्किले सन्देहः। न च प्रत्येकभाषावेलन सेंकिलिंगां कथं च दृश्य वाच्यं स एवारं घट द्यायं सन्देहश्चायाः।’ अचार्ये
सेंकिलिंगां सन्देहं न ग्रामाभिे विरेते विनानो।
एकतानिन्दयेचेन चणे तेन सिरे सत: ॥ १६॥
सेंकिलिंगां सन्देहस्त्रय प्रत्येकभाषायाः विश्वकरणात्। न च
प्रत्येकभाषावेलने, तथापि तत्तदन्त्यवाचेन विश्वकरणात्। प्रामाण्यानुसारे च चार्ये चिन्तिष्ठिंगां सन्देहः। विरेते विनानो। सन्देहश्चायाः। प्रामाण्यानुसारे चायायाः।
काष्ठनिर्माणात्। ‘ननु प्रत्येकभाषाया: प्रामाण्यं संग्राहः। सून्-
पुनर्गारं केलाये त एवाऽः तेन देवाः देवायांसमन्दलस्तरात्।’ तथारू चक्ते।
चेन प्रामाण्यं विष्णुद्रखमींवर्जितेण सन्देहं चर्किले तत्तवादये
मससस्त्रये च एवायाः। चणे न नामांले किन्तुं सत्। तदरू चिन्ते
सिरे सिरे चर्किले नामांविषयमांवर्जितेण सिरे सिरे च न नामांले किन्तुं
स्त्रये एकस्त्रये नामाविषयमांवर्जितेण। एकस्त्रये नामाबाणां
कालसमेत्यां अविरेतात्। तत्तत्त्वसर्वादमोऽनुसारमात्त
तत्तत्त्वसर्वादमात्। ॥ १७॥
तथारू परि-भाषाध्याजनानामात्। तथारू प्रामाण्यं
‘कारणलेखाभाष्यकेलापाठिक सस
ससस्त्रये निश्चित च निश्चितवर्त्तु चार
ससस्त्रये यथा प्रत्येकभाषायाः। कार
रणमण्यमांविषयमांवर्जितं सससात्।’ द्वितीये उपाधे
रंगेन समाविष्टे तद्धार्तवत्त्वायाः। सौपाधे
किच्चु कारणलेखाभाष्यकेले चत्तत्त्वार्थ्य काठं सससात्।’ तत्तताः

*तथा च सच्चे कारणलेखाभाष्य चार्ये निश्चित कार्यविद्वेषाः।
कुशमाग्नि:

छेत्रश्रीमणाकृत्य नीलाधरपि न वसुवत्।
तथुकं तत्र तन्मकाध्यिति साधारणं न किम् || १८ ||
छेत्रश्री कारणलं, अनादृत्य अभिनविम, नीलाधरपि न वसुवत् न प्रामाणिकं, तथा 'थतं पारसाधर्मिकं तत् साधारणं चं निष्कारणं च कारणलं चन्द्रं न साधारणम् अते न नरसाधर्मभवत्' देवयिपि न खांत् दृष्टान्तसाधारणतेन नीलाधरकारणलकीकरणं सन्नाभावात् निष्कारणं नीलाधरं: प्रमाणागेर्सरलात्। किशोरायुक्तं दृष्टिपति तथुकंकिंति। तथुकं चव-कारियुक्तं, चतं कारणं, तत्र कारं, श्रीमिति नौत्तरारबंध कारणलम्। कारणलं वाधारणं च देवाप्रनिमाख इति साधारणं न त्विमिति। नीलाधरपि सन्नाभावात् चतुर्वै-नीलाधरिनिः सन्नाभिमाण्यं, तात्र गन्ध्र वाधारणं चव-कारियुक्तं, अनकल्लमयकारियुक्तं सन्नाभवचारं सन्नाभिमुखलात् || १८ ||

'समावत्तीत्वस्तूर्यं भावजन्यं, विन्यविभूषणां काष्ठं
देशतथं व्यतिरेकाभावात् व्यतिरेकेन्द्रत्यावत् कारणा-
भावसंगततः, तस्मातरेकाभावजन्यतात्तिरेकमित्रियोग्मितात्
कारणतात्त्वकलाषं, तथा च समवावधिकारणं अथवा समवावधि-
kारणसन्निमित्तभावमिति न कारं अनन्तरं तस्मात्त्वाभावमेव
tाभारं अनन्तरदहृद्यस्य सिद्धापमि, तथा च न गति-
नियतात्त्वकारणीशभूषणं सन्नाभवकलं कस्योंत्' देवायुक्तं
पूवभौविष्णवं छेत्रस्य योगते चेन केनासित्।
प्रथमः स्वबः ।

वापक्षापि नियम धर्मिष्ठोदरणया न चि ॥ १८ ॥

वातिरेक कर्तभी न कारणलं किन्वनस्यासिद्धुनिवयतपूर्वभावः।

चि देती, चतो याप्सो न वातिरेकः धर्मिष्ठाक्षरमावेजनापि
तथा भृमापणां दृश्यते भीतते वेन केन्द्रित वापक्षा
नियमावामनः वेन केन्द्रित प्रभृतते, अन्यशा धर्मिष्ठोरेव
न खातः तथा च धर्मिष्ठाक्षरमावेजनाशिष्ठु तथा चेतुः, चतान
कं प्रति कपालादेवनन्तथावातिरेकदर्शनां समवेतकार्यं प्रति
द्रव्यम् द्रव्यालेन कारणलां कल्पवा दृष्टिविद्याधिषेधे परिषे
धेष প্রবালী ন্যায়মাত্র প্রবালী নামকরণার্থ প্রবালী নামকরণার্থ প্রবালী নামকরণার্থ প্রবালী নামকরণার্থ প্রবালী নামকরণার্থ প্রবালী নামকরণার্থ

eव च देते न कारणवाणं हवनज्याविषेष न चेत दृष्टि नित्यकार
णां दृष्टिकर्षनीभुतस प्रक्षणां ন ন শ্লামাদি' দৃষ্টি ঘোষশ্বাতः।

एव च देते न कारणवाणं हवनज्याविषेष न चेत दृष्टि नित्यकार
णां दृष्टिकर्षনीभुतस प्रक्षणां ন ন শ্লামাদি' দৃষ্টি ঘোষশ্বাতः।

dलोकः वस्तुकारिणिःकिर्मसा भृषु कुञ्जीतितो

मृक्षलात् प्रक्षितः ४५७५र्च्योविषेष यथोदि

देवेऽश्रृं विद्यत्रप्रधािবनाकस्कारक्षां

बचातः धावितया समक्षिष्ठिति बच्छातु श्रामी नम। १८॥

दृष्टि प्रथमः स्वबः ।
দৃতি সরকশমায়া, শর্করা শচকারিণিঃ। শচকারিঃ
করণস্য পশ্চা শচকারিণিঃ মায়া, অধিবলং
শচকারিণিঃ শচকারিণিঃ মায়া, অধিবলং
শচকারিণিঃ শচকারিণিঃ মায়া, অধিবলং
শচকারিণিঃ শচকারিণিঃ মায়া, অধিবলং
মূলন্ত প্রজ্ঞা: হেন, তলভাণপ্ররিধানলাঃ স্বাভাবিকা, দেহধি তক্তা, শ্রীম দেবে মনে মনবিধ।
ব্যায়মায় বাচাবধিরিঃ ব্যাচাবধিরিঃ ব্যাচাবধিরিঃ ব্যাচাবধিরিঃ।
ব্যাচাবধিরিঃ ব্যাচাবধিরিঃ ব্যাচাবধিরিঃ।
ময়পি মিথ্যাজ্ঞানাদিঃ কুন্তান: মিথ্যাজ্ঞাজনায়া, তথা: 
কুন্তান: কিংবদন্তী যা বিষ্ণু স্যাসানি দিতি। ২০।}

দৃতি শীতরিদাসভাষার্থিরচিতকামাকাল্যায়নকারিকানাং।
ঘোষালকামাকাশনামম।
कुसुमान्यतिः।

द्वितीयः स्तवकः।

श्रम्याज्ञि परमाकशाधग्नानुगानसञ्चारस्वादिति द्वितीयवले
प्रतिपत्ति। अन्यथा ईश्वरं विनाशपि परमाकशाधग्नागानुगान
पञ्चाश्च वस्मिव च घाघादे: खरंश्चाधनलस्य वेदग्नन्यात्,
निन्यन्तिर्देयतथा च वेदेऽऽ सामायणः, महाजनपरिप्रस्थापणः
सामायणः गच्छ दृश्च वेदकारणणथा मेघरविद्धिः, थागदित्वम्
द्वितीयाश्चकपिलाहं पुर्वः एव वा वेदेऽऽ सु' द्वाकाच
प्रमायः प्रत्यक्षनात् षष्ठप्रस्थािग्वात्।

तदर्याज्ञाकविवश्यािम विधानत्वरस्म॥ १ ॥

शाश्वेती ग्रहा वञ्चम्यार्चवान्यार्चकूष्णणजया दृश्च गुर्णा
धारत्वा ईश्वरविद्धिः। ननु सकथकास्वर चात्यार्चवार्चकूष्णणजया
धीर्यणः, चकथक च वेदेऽऽ निर्देशालम्बव्र ग्रामायणप्रयोज्यकमस्य,
महाजनपरिप्रस्थापणः च ग्रामायणणः' द्वाकाच गच्छ प्रस्थाि
सञ्चारस्वादित। प्रलयाच्छ चुरुवेदनास्तृत्तरवेदस्य कथं ग्रामायणः
महाजनपरिप्रस्थापणः तदा अभवान। बहुसानियलं
जयति गणर्य दृश्च मनोयिष्ठधिनः, प्रवाग्यािवेदकूष्णणनियलि
मयू प्रस्थािग्वात् नास्त्यित भवः। 'कपिलाद्यः पुर्व
वर्गादृशे पूर्वसहायकाश्चेतोगम्यत्वानुभावात् शाचात्तत्त्वसखा-
था: कतराः सल्ल’ द्रवत् आयत तद्विश्वासितम्। विवर-
निर्माणसमस्या अश्वमविशिष्टसम्बन्धे यदि शवास्त्राश्वाश ला-
धवादेक एव नाद्वृत्: खोजित्तरा ष एव महवानीङ्मः, अनी-
श्वायविशचक्ष्यान्वित च विशास्य पुव नास्फोति वैदिक-
यववधाराविक्रिया दृति न विधातरसख्य: ईश्वरानिर्णयेन दृति श्रेष्ठः: ॥ १ ॥

‘तलु वर्गाश्रयस्ववादिति न शुक्ल प्रख्ये मानामाभावात्
दृति। चिन्तारच्छायविचितार्चाचरपूर्वकलिविन्यसः, कर्मः
विवर्णविपक्कतथा कालोपाधिलक्ष्य भोगवायलुत चुगन-
दृश्य संस्कृतिनिरोधानुपपन्नः, राज्याश्वा राज्याश्रयमथिन-
यमत् सर्वाधुतवेश राज्याश्रयलभावात् उत्तरकार्तिपि राज्य-
स्ववधारानुपपन्नः, प्रथोज्ज्वालक्षमिभीरभावात् वर्णे
भावे श्रद्धवधारानुपपन्नः, घटादिनिर्माणे नेपुष्पक्ष पूर्व-
दृश्याधारानुपपन्नः सर्वाधाराभावात् घटादिनिर्माणाचवेछेदादि-
स्वायत्वाधिकाशः तथाच

वर्गादिनश्वायविधिनिरोधः सुधुसितवत्।
विवर्णक्षेष्टवर्धेन साचावत् वभावात्: ॥ २ ॥

वर्गाः वर्गादिनश्वायविधिनिरोधानुपपन्नस्वायत्वानुपपन्नस्वायत्वानुपपन्नस्वायत्वानुपपन्नस्वायत्वानुपपन्नस्वायत्वानुपपन्नस्वायत्वानुपपन्नस्वायत्वानुपपन्नस्वायत्वानुपपन्नस्वायत्वानुपपन्नस्वायत्वानुपपन्नस्वायत्वानुपप

वर्गादिनश्वायविधिनिरोधः सुधुसितवत्।
काशी कालिसभिषिकनिषाधिकारजनकाश्रुतिनिरोधवन्त कालिसभिषिक
पास्त समस्तात्त्व काश्रुतिनिरोधाधिकारसंरक्षण छन्नियोगः
स्वपनिवेदितत। शब्दितशाक्किशिरः, तथा पद्धतकाल्‌
शाक्किशिरोगलिकाष तद्वान; यथा वा छड़ियन गोमयाहुर्छिन्‌
काष्ठ कुलकल्या काश्रुतिशिषेणुड्डरुतिशिषेपान्‌ केवलान्‌ ददानीह
श्राणात्‌ माण्डोद्वन्ति, वेजायुक्त कार्यतावर्जितकलात्‌
न यभागः। यथा मायावी श्यामीराधिलितमुनिकं
कला दक्षिणकं घटमाण्डयादि नियोजे घटायन्त्र धारनायं वणाय
वालकाल व्यवस्था। प्रश्नवक्ष्यंत्येवरोपः प्रश्नवक्ष्यं प्रायकम्बकम्‌
वापणं शरीरद्वयं परिमेत्र व्यवस्थारं कला तदाणिनानां
श्राणि प्रायित। एवं घटादिसम्प्रदायमधि खण्डं कला विन्नक
ष्टि, तदविदसकं मायावत्‌ सामाद्य हृतं। समयं श्राणियं
यहः॥ २॥

बाधके निर्यातात्याधकमाण्डः
जनायंकारवियादि: श्रीः: खायायकर्षेऽः।
काशर्गर्गनको खुश्च: श्राद्धार्याय मीमांसा।॥ ३॥

श्राद्धार्याय वेदादिसम्प्रदायाय खुशोद्वन्तीयान्तः, कुमः
जनायंकारवियादि:। प्रश्नवक्ष्यं, वेदादिसम्प्रदायोऽयममेभनात्‌
मुस्थिततेन धर्मानलात्‌ प्रदीपवन्त। खुशोद्वन्तीयादि: अनुमानित।
पूर्वं मायायं प्रजाक्षुत: पुराणानार्थित्यात्मकमीमांसना:।
श्राणि सम्बोधकामिग्रुद्धावर्जितजनान इति अध्यायः।
पूर्वं च बाधक्षर्टतिस्तु भंस्कारः। ततो गर्भे ततो जनाताननादस्‌
द्रवादो कर्मस्वदिति संस्कार्यः। पूवं श्रवणाभ्यासः स्तुः-वेददार्पणं तत् एकः। श्राहः ध्यादिर्दशगति विशाखः।।
विशाखे रिहादि दृष्टिधर्मरिहादिसंग्रहः। पूवमुक्तशिष्ठर्नभ-खनेणाय विनितांत्र्यः। ध्यादिन्दुत्तस्यः। खेदाः
हति चन्द्रितः। पूवेऽ तपोभागः स्नानः स्नानात्मः स्नानतित्वः।
कर्मेऽ एककः। यक्षः च विसंदः। क्षुद्रहानेनकादिति
हर्मः। पूवेऽ श्रवणः श्रवणोऽतिरिद्धेवः। शार्य-वाधितथुशुतः स्नानादिस्नहु द्रव्यः धर्मः।।
शार्य-शाखः यथायथः कर्मैन्यागादः। यशः। सामार्थ्यः ध्रामः। श्रवणः। कारणः ध्रायात् विश्वाशः। कार्यः
ध्राः द्रव्यः।। एवः श्राखः नामः तद्नार्थः तस्मिनः नाम
हति प्रश्चितः।। भृवेयाचदैत्यासोविकासः काथा-स्थवयात्मानीन्म्वार्यः। शर्यः ध्रायात्
निर्दिष्टादः। तद्द्वारः भाषणः।। तत्परिश्चाः वेदाभाष्यः
भित्तिः। ॥ २ ॥

शवकार्यम्याचक्षः कामाचः
कारं कारमैलीकाहृद्बनं सामाध्रावः। पूवमहरसः
छारं हारम्पौर्ज्ञ्ञासः। कुर्वमः जग्नः क्रोऽहः।
तं देवं निर्वयाचलदभिधानः। भवस्
विश्वेश्वरः स्ववः प्रति नमन्नः भाष्यमन्येपि ॥ ४ ॥
हति द्रव्यः। शवकः।
कुसुमास्त्रिलिंगं।

हनीयं लक्षकं।

तद्भवावेदक्षणमाणवं वाचनम् दृष्टीविश्वासपति।

‘भुजने घटाभवं कर्तारस्ववणपरमेश्वरभावं सहात्। पर-
सम्बन्धोऽयोग्यतया योग्यानुपस्थितेऽभावात् नाभावश्च। यदि
तदा श्रद्धाक्षेत्रस्योपाध्यायं सामायं: सिद्धेन्’ द्व्यत्रां

योग्यास्तु: कुतोऽयोग्यं प्रतिविधि: कुतस्यारम्।

काथीमे वायुः श्रद्धां कानोमानमार्गम् ॥ १ ॥

श्रद्धामेव परमात्मा योग्यानुपलब्धिः कुतः: सैव बाधिका,
वा कालिः वा न बाधिका, अन्नपांकाश्चर्माधंधविश्वास.
पति:। श्रद्धां योग्मेव तथा च कुतः प्रतिविधि। यथा-
स्वाभावः श्रद्धाः न वायुः किन्तु याध्वकाभाव एव तच। प्रकटे
मुखमण्डले साधकश्च वक्ष्यलात्। ‘नमु कर्त्तलकष्यकरीर-
प्रयोजनाभिधानं विशेष्यं पुरुषं’ द्व्यत्रां कानोमानमार्गमिति।
सैव रक्षस्य च पवत्वाधितः। षड्ब्रह्मव च धर्मांगंकमणे अनुमानवाध्व एव ॥ २ ॥

‘नमु अध्यात्मंयुपनीत इश्वरसङ्कल्पलाभावं: तस्ते
वास्यान्वयं साध्यं।’ द्व्यत्रां

व्यावस्याभवत्तैव भाविकी च सिद्धेश्यता।

अभावविरचितां वस्तुः प्रतियोगिताः ॥ २ ॥
कुष्यास्तििः।

वार्ष्ण: प्रतिष्ठेषः, तद्भाववस्ता भाविकी पारमार्थिकी
पि चतः: विशेषता धभाववाश्चयता, तथा चालीकं न विश्व-
वनितायः। धभावविशेषकालं प्रतिष्ठितमिलवत् नेति ना-
सीत्रे प्रतिष्ठेधाधिकरशमवत् प्रतिष्ठेयवमिलनीतिः भावः।। ॥ ॥

'ननु धोगभाग्याकायपुलक्ष्या कच्च नाभाववशः' द्यतनत शाश्च
दुष्टेपुलक्ष्यामायी भण्डारकादिधीयायता।
न तत्सा वेष्टिप्रोद्वित्ति नाभि वार्ष्णापुलक्ष्ये।। ॥ ॥

धोगाध्यायनुपतिक्ष्यरमवामायरिका, अन्यथादस्तीन्द्रयमाने
प्रक्षे दयाये। द्यायमता च प्रतिष्ठितमिलववत्यतरवालपुलक्ष्याशास-
धीकारधानम्, एवं भार्वणे धोगायता दृढा दृष्टिका
पुलक्ष्यामायी वाच्या, तत्सा स्याध्यायनुपतिक्ष्ये किंतु पुलक्ष
प्रेक्षाय, अङ्गुरे च च सा धोगायता नाभीतिः।। ॥ ॥

'नम्भायम्बा किभीडिवमिल्लस्त: खंगिष्कर्त्तानिन्दृपकल्लितिः
वा भास्त्तात्' द्यतनतः

* प्रतिष्ठेधाधिकरशम तद्भाववस्ता उपमभाव प्रतिष्ठेनिं"प्रकाश-
पाणी नादमी कार्यकार्यकृतनाकः प्रशासं विषयनिमित्तः। द्यत।-
इयायतारसरिता अनुपाश्चि भार्ववस्त्यके वाणी न सभीति।
तथा च प्रवालयुक्तविधिन शाल्यी प्रामात्र्येके विशयवाहितः च भु-
राकारधीकारधानः, अस्त्रे च विशयवाहितः पिनादविदेशकरितः
पीणारिकारधकारधाः। तत्र प्रथमव प्रवालशिष्या विनिता चा
वब्र्देव विशयवाहिता इति धर्मः, द्यर्थायतान्तरसते यत स्थवर्च जाने।
भार्वणे श्राङ्गवर्षास्मृतवानुसारायते विश्वायता वाच्या, तत्-
सचे च श्राङ्गवर्षास्त्राप्चवनीनिं प्रवाहवाहितं न पृथ्वीमवाद्वारः
 itself: न भास्त्तात् नाभीतिः।। द्यतनति सभीतिः भावः।।
नान्य शास्त्राय शिखृणात्वापि तत्चेव या॥ ४ ॥

शिक्षिते संपर्यायािि यथे दयिति शिल्पाधिनम् गोगो-चरे श्रमाति ईश्वरे चेनिति शेतोरशान, आदालेन शास्त्राय शिक्षिते: पञ्चशेष तत्वायस्यादाहिष्ठितर आत्मा वा पञ्च दृति विकस्य शिल्पाधिनं चेनिति दृत्वा ।'नन्यात्मः जाति: पञ्चः' तचाच जाताविषि तत्चेव नेति। आदालेः जातिर्ग चिङ्ग-कर्चिः दयिति शिल्पाधिनं चेनिति तत्वायस्य चेनिति ददितीः शिक्षितायः॥ ४ ॥

'नन्यागमादिशिल्पाधिनिः पञ्चतं शाधि' तचाच

आगमादेः प्रमाणुले बाधाशिल्पाधिनिः॥

आदालेः ते चैव शिल्पाधिनिः ददिता॥ ५ ॥

आगमादेः प्रमाणुः तत्वतः ईश्वरः कर्तमादिशिल्पाधिन्ति कर्त-वाशासाध्याय साधः। आगमादेः प्रमाणुः चैव शिक्षितः

उद्देश्यता चतुर्भः॥ ५ ॥

मत्र चास्तिकाः 'श्रमाकारिष्णुः चिं, चञ्चल पञ्चचं तथाशि

दयिति शिल्पाधिनिः पञ्चतं आत्मः

श्रमाकारिष्णुः चिं, चञ्चल पञ्च आत्मः।'

आदालेः बाधाशिल्पाधिनिः॥ ६ ॥

बाधाशि दिः सम्बन्धःपञ्च दुर्भवः॥ ६ ॥

बाधाशि दिः सम्बन्धःपञ्च दुर्भवः॥ ६ ॥

बाधाशि दिः सम्बन्धःपञ्च दुर्भवः॥ ६ ॥
कुसुमान्चकः ।

लक्षा ननुपलब्या, चेतौ प्रत्यथकारे चचुरािक वाधिते सति प्रत्यथमपि प्रमाणं न धातु, ननुपलब्यकारेिपि तस्ति सचे तु विष्णुराित् ननुपलब्यरभाववधारणं चेतुः । एवश्च रत्नार्थिभेः
विष्णुरािता राननुपलब्यरभाववधारणं विष्णुरािता, परार्थश्चा
\* तीि कुतां नानादेवतुः तदातेि तस्ति सचे चनुपलब्यरभाववधारणं विष्णुरािता। श्रद्धा िचेदननुपलब्येव न चेच्या श्रद्धा तत्सरामः ।

याणाताविधिराश्रमः तकः श्रद्धाविधितः । ॥ ३ ॥

ननुपलब्यरभाववधारण नानादेवति काढानारदेशा
नारायणर्विधिराश्रमः श्रद्धा धातु कादानारदेशानानरायणर
\* नानादेवतिः विष्णुरािताः सति ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः ननुपल
विष्णुरािता तराः सति ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः ननुपलब्येव तराः सति ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः ननुपल
विष्णुरािता तराः सति ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः । ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः । ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः ।

ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः । ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः । ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः । ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः । ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः । ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः

राणाताविधिराश्रमः तकः श्रद्धाविधितः ॥ ३ ॥

मनुष्कं श्रद्धानिर्वर्तकं तदाच तकः श्रद्धाविधितः । ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः

विष्णुरािता तराः सति ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः ननुपलब्येव तस्ति

राणाताविधिराश्रमः तकः श्रद्धाविधितः ॥ ३ ॥

श्रद्धा ननुपलब्ये तस्ति चेतुः ननुपलब्ये तस्ति चेतुः

श्रद्धा ननुपलब्ये तस्ति चेतुः ननुपलब्ये तस्ति चेतुः ननुपलब्ये

श्रद्धा ननुपलब्ये तस्ति चेतुः । ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः

श्रद्धा ननुपलब्ये तस्ति चेतुः । ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः ।

श्रद्धा ननुपलब्ये तस्ति चेतुः । ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः

श्रद्धा ननुपलब्ये तस्ति चेतुः । ननुपलब्येव तस्ति चेतुः
काव्यम्। विपचक्षा विपषे देवतारवाच्यतिरिक्तं यतं यावक्ष्या ज्ञाते
 ताब्धूतेनां गमकलमिति भवेः। अभिवाच्यत्त्र च उपाधिश्राधीना।
 तस्य काव्यम् हि ग्रेगुरानं अध्रुनामुपजीवकः। तद्दृष्टं चैवेत्स वायुकांशावधारणा" दत्त। अन्ये 
केचार देवत: परमनामान्य अध्रुनामुपजीवकः; तथा हि 
उपाधिश्राधीनां तुंगित्वारिः वायुः। रेतुतावक्ष्यान्य अध्रुकस्थिति—
दृश्यतया श्रायते, तत्र एव उप स्मीपवाच्यतिः अध्रुनाशिष्णि— 
करणे खधिं अग्निः अध्रुनाशिष्णि वेधनावतीति उपाधिश्रधारण 
अवाकुमादिशाधारण:। ते: वेदाध्यविभूतं चैवेत वायु— 
कांशावधारणा विष्णुमये नेष्मते माधिरणधे न साध्यंश्य— 
उपाधिश्राधीन:। ॥ ३ ॥

"गुन्युपामामीमिये बाध्यं खात" अन्येपामामान्यालिनिप्रमाम—
शान्युपामामात् न बाधकलमिति कौशिकादयः। तत्र शाहू—
शाख प्रायो नाराय यावक्ष्यामान्यालिनिकृतिरुत्, शाहूम न द्रुवं
गुणः कर्मवा गुणसमवेतलात्। न स्मार्येन ब्राह्मणीयशिष्टकात्
कामाफळितान्यलालाः, नामावः। प्रभुवायोगुणराध्यात्।
तथव न प्रवशस्यस्मिनमिक्रयपातमाशिष्णोद्वः, नापि प्रतिधी—
गिश्यान्यस्मिनविनिर्मित्रं यावक्ष्यालिनिकृतिवाच्यान्यस्मूलः गुवय दति
श्रायमानान्ये शा ग्रेगुराक्ष्यान्यस्मिनविनिर्मितिवाच्य यस्माद—
प्रत्यक्षात्, नापयुपामामामे विश्वातप्रतिपन्नस्ये पायु— 
श्रायमानान्ये न श्राच्यं तथायान्यं तिरिकान्ति तत्राच।

* उपाधिश्राधीनां।
परखरविरोधे विश्वास न प्रकारानामुखितः ।
नैकतापि विश्वासामुखिस्माचविरोधात् ॥ ३ ॥

न प्रकारानामुखितः न नेभयानामकलं, विश्वास विरोधात्, नैकतापि न भावाभावानामकलमेव, विश्वासानामिति
हेतु गृहिणिश्च विश्वासार्थां परखरविरोधिष्ठितः। विरोधायेव प्रतिपादयति उस्माचविरोधात् । नामान् दक्षुने च भाव-
लपितोऽस्मि कथमभवता, न भाव दक्षुने चाभावलपितीर्थ भावलम्। कथमभिग्रामः सादृश्यं भावाभावाविवि
शिष्यामिष्यां, भावाभाव श्रममपदार्थं भावले च गुणवले धृतवले निर्गुणाले भावाभावाणि च गुणायले कर्में तदन्वले
गुणालं निर्गुणानि:शामान्यभावले समवेतले च समवायलं सम-
वेतले च अभेकान्तितले शामान्यलं एकास्फितलि विशेषतं। एवं
शक्तिपुष्कर्णद्योयां पदार्थं निराकारः ॥ ४ ॥

'ननु भवतु शादृश्यं समानघंसं एव, तद्भक्षके स्वयं समानं
मानानं ातू' वर्णांश

शाश्वतस्व वैधर्ष्यं मानमेव प्रश्वते।

ष्ठीपर्णिर्या वक्तमिति चेतु प्रज्ञां न किम् ॥ ५ ॥

ष्ठं गृहिष्यकृत्य दृति ज्ञानानवरं या गृहिष्यकृत्य दृति घोः
प्रमाणान्तरादेवर्त। ष्ठं 'एतस सर्वदेवं ताक्षेत्रेश्च हृदयं
विभागुपप्पमित्यापन्निर्विवी' दृति, गायकाव्यं गवयक् गो-

* नैभयानामकलं उभाभामकरिश्च विवेकः ॥
हत्याः कवचः

गववशास्त्र त्वं विभागश्वप्रक्षयोपपिंतेति न मानान्तरं
शास्त्रश्रावकं मनायमिति॥ ८ ॥

वैभविकानित्वतपमाने दृष्टि नैवायिकः प्राप्तः
मन्नन्त सर्वचेदः संज्ञाया: संज्ञान वचः
प्रवचनान्याश्च धर्मादुपामानां विदु:॥ १० ॥

फलमिवयननां दृष्ट्वायाछवः, संज्ञाया गववाधिवंशाय,।
संज्ञान गववलानित्विशिष्टेण वचः, समस्या श्रेष्ठः, परिच्छेदः
निष्ठचः, उपमानस मानान्तरं फलमुपपमिति:, प्रवचनादेर-
वाचालात् इत्यनिर्भिष्ठरश्रामानयामथात्॥ १० ॥

“ननु गववस्त्री गववपद्वाच्य देशनिदेशवाक्यादेव शिक्ष-
धीरस्तु, ‘गववलाविष्ट्या धर्मीं गववपद्वाच्या गववस्त्रीशलात्
श्रावकानुजाः’” तत्तुषः

शास्त्रश्रामाचित्त्वाचित्त्वाप्रतीतितः।

समथे दुर्योहः: पूवैं श्रव्यनुनुनयापि वा॥ ११ ॥

समथः: गववलादिजातिपुरांजारे शिक्षाप्रमाणं:, य
च दुर्योहः: श्रावकानुजानादा न समावति, गववलाख तेन पुरा-
उम्मेदीतलात्। न च शास्त्रयेव प्रवचनित्वमिच्यतं गत्वानां
*तस्य मुखलेषां प्रवचनित्वमिच्यताः॥ ११ ॥

“ननु प्रथमस्ता गववलशाप्रतीतलेपि यथा गववलेन प्रयर्थे

* तस्य तद्भिन्नसे सति सहभागवत्क्षरुपसार्दयाय, श्रव्यनित्वमिच्यतुः
श्रावकानुजादेवशालात्, समभवति वाचां धर्मीं गववधर्मीं नाव-
तदा गोपकृतिः गवयपदवाच्य द्वातिदेशवाक्याः पञ्चक्षेत्राः गवय-लपरात् तेन रूपेष शक्तिधीर्षुः तवच्
अनुनमयादनानां न वाकं छायादिक्षति।
पदाधीक्षयवैधुष्यात् तदाचिन्तेऽक्षति: ॥ १२ ॥

गोपकृत्यादिनाधिकारं गवयपदवाच्यवाच्यकथा-ननकतथा ब्रह्म गवयलाविना शक्तिधीर्षु नालोकः ज्ञानस्य वहर्वमायात्, थत पदाधी पृवाच्यविधुषा; केनापि रूपेणा शक्तिधीर्षः थर पदाधी सने शच्चिदेशवाच्येऽयमः। तत्र पदाधी सने कृष्णतिथिः यथा कृष्णाः धार्श द्वारांcit। ॥ ‘नमु गवय-पद्यं भवविचिन्तितं भानुवर्जितं साधुपदलावितम् सामान्ये ज्ञातं सु-समानार्थक्षयविचिन्तितं कलवाहें सच्चिदेशभिन्नाः’ िति चेत् आपकटवहें दक्षपेयावं-भिन्नेऽयक्षयविचिन्तितं। ‘गवयपदं गवयलग्रुविचिन्तित-कम्यं द्वातिदेशविचिन्तितं कलवाहें धार्श भवविचिन्तितं कलवाहें’
िति यत्तिरेक च भानुप्रार्थिन्य न वषुवति, यत्तिरेकः सु-समानार्थक्षयविचिन्तितं कलवाहें। गवयपदवस्राच्यविचिन्तितं कलवाहें धार्श धिरोधनु-भवविचिन्तितं वमसानं श्रमानं नमानं। एवं धिरोधनु-भवविचिन्तितं कलवाहें। गवयपदवस्राच्यविचिन्तितं कलवाहें धार्श धिरोधनु-भवविचिन्तितं वमसानं श्रमानं नमानं। एवं धिरोधनु-भवविचिन्तितं कलवाहें। गवयपदवस्राच्यविचिन्तितं कलवाहें धार्श धिरोधनु-भवविचिन्तितं वमसानं श्रमानं नमानं। एवं धिरोधनु-भवविचिन्तितं कलवाहें। गवयपदवस्राच्यविचिन्तितं कलवाहें धार्श धिरोधनु-भवविचिन्तितं वमसानं श्रमानं नमानं। एवं धिरोधनु-भवविचिन्तितं कलवाहें।

‘ब्रह्मणेनास्वाधकलेन शक्तिधीर्षुः अनुमानार्थसते।'
दृश्यि वैभविकः, “पद्मश्रवणमण्ड पदार्थशा रे एते पदार्थे। परस्करं संग्रहवस: आकाशः यथागतांतसितमुक्तिश्चारितानं दृश्यि गाम्बैश्यतितपस्मारितपदार्थवस्तु॥ (१) दृश्यि नागमानुः संग्रहितः, किं वा ‘एतानि पदार्थे’ स्मारितपदार्थश्चारितपदार्थे। (२) दृश्यि मानवतद्विभि, द्विभि तद्विश्वविविष्कलनिमाणः’” दृश्यि, अथात्

अनेकः परिच्छेदः श्रावः व न निर्देशः।

आकाशः श्रावः न चेतुक्षमान्यतिरत्बवस्तु॥ १।२॥

च च पदार्थप्रवचनमण्ड (१) संग्रहः एवेति यदि संग्रहवसंग्रहः वाचिते, स्मारिततं श्रावः दृश्यि संग्रहाः कुमारः यथा वाचिते, संग्रहितः, श्रावः न संग्रहितः॥ (२) आकाशः श्रावः दृश्यि। श्रावः च ब्रम्हयात्मपद्मास्चारितपदार्थविशिष्टः, च संग्रहाः, व कुमारः श्रावः विद्यमानः संग्रहाः।

* आन्तः प्राप्ते पदार्थशब्दमण्डः यथा च चान उदाहरणमितः संग्रहः, तथा उदाहरणमण्डः संग्रहः त्रिधा भवति: संग्रहः संग्रहः त्रिधा भवति:।

† परिच्छेदः निर्देशः।
‡ साक्ष्य विश्वासः, न तु चावः।
§ कर्क्षिकः व रजसः संक्षेपम्बालः।
|| श्रावः वाचिते संग्रहः यथा च, श्रावः वेदविविष्कः न चाय साधनायणेच नाश्चोति।
कुङ्कुमप्रिमा

'भनु योग्यताविहिता श्राविन्तिरेव चेतुरक्ष', तथाच योग्यस्तिरिधन्या दृष्टि वायुज्यूत्या, प्रभुगति पुणेर राज्य: पुष्पापणसायतामभिन्नयोगिन्य निराकारकन्याराज्यद पुष्पपदायोगिर्मिभिवानाम्

॥ १३ ॥

प्रामाण्यराख् 'बेदेच्छायापैन्यतया तत्व वक्तुनानुमानीः
शक्ति: प्रमाणं, लोके तु ज्ञानप्रकाशानमेवतिं, दुःखति हि।
तथाच 'प्रयं वक्ता सूक्ष्मत्वावस्थायं योगं विवेचनं
ज्ञानप्रकाशानमेवतिं ज्ञानविभाजनेऽस्मिन्
कलायुगं विवेचनं च न चेतुरक्षं, यथा प्रत्येके
वक्तुनानुमानिश्वेत रस्तुमानात् साधारणार्थाचार्यः
कृति स्वतंत्रम्यागः पुरुषर्वनन्दिनियुवादको खोजिकः
शर्मा न प्रमाणं' दृष्टिः पार्थः, तथाच

बिर्यातिविशेषन्यात्री प्राचीन्यथा निर्णये।

आर्यसिद्धान्तितिस्मेव बिक्षुप्रवन्दिता ॥ १४ ॥

बेदेच्छायापैन्यतया मामक्ष्य चक्षुश्चोक्ष्ये स्वप्ने निरीक्षये
बिक्षुप्रवन्दिकलकं, आर्यसिद्धान्तितिस्मेवानामानसं श्रद्धाशोपेषः
या विश्वासविश्वासरूपकलात् ॥ १४ ॥

'नसूक्ष्मलक्षसंश्च वातिरेके च श्राविनानुरुपसंगीतो निर्धारि
चेतुरक्ष', आर्यसिद्धश्रवलक्ष चक्षुस्वरूपावस्थायो च साधारणार्थां
लिखित, वाक्यार्थी: प्रथमसतेतः नामानायकि वास्ते' दृष्टि, पार्थाचार्

* भक्तेद्वाराय विशेषवाविषयात्, श्राव 'विवेचः' द्वन्द्वनाबंधः।
† चार्यविवाहितः प्रमाणसम्बन्धि प्रामाण्यविचार्यः।
वसंपूर्वकारः: सारितलातः पद्ये रमो।
वसंपूर्वतः द्रति निर्देशाविषये वेदवाक्यं न तत् कुतः॥ १५॥

सामाजिकनियताश्च चतुर्य सागराद्वितीयमार्थायामेव सदथविश्वासानातु, चनः वेददृष्टः अन्नस्थयमवजहो द्वितीयस्त्राः, तथा तत्परोऽभोजी कार्तिकाः श्रीमा चतुर्विन्यस्त्राः। वसंपूर्वकारः श्रीमा 'वसंपूर्वतः' परस्परं संवेदः वसंपूर्वकारः पदे: सारितलातः द्वागुणसमानातः संवेदः निर्देशाति तत् अनु-वादकलं वेदवाक्यं न कुतः।

यतूऽ 'पद्ये न करणं किन्तु पदार्थं एव, सत्यं एव पदार्थं-रकवादः श्रीमा श्रीमा अर्थं धार्मिकं च द्वारा-विश्वासः पदार्थविश्वासः कार्तिकायाविद्याभ्रमः,' श्रीमा 'पदार्थश्रीमा श्रीमा श्रीमा अर्थं धार्मिकं च द्वारा-विश्वासः।' ततः 'पदार्थश्रीमा श्रीमा श्रीमा अर्थं धार्मिकं च द्वारा-विश्वासः।' तदनुसारः 'श्रीमा श्रीमा श्रीमा अर्थं धार्मिकं च द्वारा-विश्वासः।' पदार्थश्रीमा श्रीमा अर्थं धार्मिकं च द्वारा-विश्वासः।

* तत् द्वे पदद्वारा विशेषांच्छेद्दशेषां वाक्यांविशेषांतरंभम-प्रेतार्थाधिको जाते त।
† अत्र विधेयकिफ्याद्भावात् नाबविभागः द्रति न, किन्तु सम-भिथिकृतद्वारा ज्ञातास्वलोकवाद्रे, शुद्धपदार्थार्थम समं शुद्धद्वारा-न्यव विभागानुभवामादिति भावः।
‡ अत्र भावः पदुः वाक्यसिद्धां पदार्थविश्वासानि कार्तिकायां कार्तिकायां सिद्ध, पदार्थस्य पदार्थविश्वासानि कार्तिकायां कार्तिकायां कार्तिकायां सिद्ध।
व्रतमानन्यम्

चापञ्ज्ञापकलात् दृति ग्रहणतमपास्तं, पद्यानामिथयच भाषानामार्थात् प्रतेश्वेषापिष्टं सामान्यकलावि डालापातात्।

नेश्वाचार्यमायोकर्ष्यपरांपरिन दर्शनमथाधिकः न कर-पणम्ब दृति, तत्त पदार्थानामालतातारिद्रघपत्या अवकारण-लात्, पदार्थकल्याणापि नियोगार्थटता अवकरणलात्, पद-ञ्ज्ञानी वरणपालात, पदार्थमहुतेिलिपारलात्, कविकाव्यादि-खस्ते च मानसानां।

‘ननु श्रद्धातिरिच्छन्नस्म प्रमाणं, च एव वाचकायस्त, त-वर्षिन्: ‘प्रकटम्: किच्यामाणार्यु: कामार्युः: कामार्युः। वच-ञ्ज्ञारीणामुद्दामा कार्यम्बितिः अन्यते’ दृति गोत्रां पटनि, प्रकटेऽपृश्च्चमहुतस्त: गुणः: चलाविस्तरः, किच्यामाणार्युः कामार्युः कोष्टादर्शः कर्तिनि चत्तोस्त: मन्तः, तेनाभिमानिनं कर्तिनि च मानसानां: विशेषत्वमविनात, कार्यम्बिति: न चेष्टा’ दृति, अचाचाचार- न प्रमाणमानातानाक्षणीपावृष्टे काविदारोत।

अद्रक्षृष्टं: वर्णे च न निम्बाणस्म: चम:।।

संस्कृतं: वयोकरलभावकारिकं: शत्रुं: भावान्यन्तर चर्माणां: चिन्त्यवर्तिकाक्ष्मानवत॥

* अथ भाव: यथा प्राध्यात्मिकान्ति नाम: कार्यांच्छल्लतं वाचिक्ष्माल्लासानं, साध्यवाचिक्ष्माल्लासानं: च ज्ञात्वात् कवितिः।

† पदेनोनिर्विभं, ‘देवः: भावस्तेन्द्रदेवः: देवः। यदा तत्त न कार्यं अवस्थानं: देवस्स्तेन्द्रविभं न स्वयं मानसानस्ते, तदेव चचार्यम्बिति।
द्रम्यांत्याभावात्, ऋगसूक्तं व निहितं लोपितम् प्राप्ति
वेदकारी निधि: सर्वा: निर्देशः प्रवेदानात्।

‘नमः सत्यार्थकारमानां न ह गति:’, तदात्म
नामोर्त्त कार्यान्तः: सर्वाधिपि प्रवेदानात्।

निर्देशानुसाराधारी न च स्वरुपि तत्तदः॥१९॥

अध्यायात्मः गाणवल्लात्पत्यो एव, सर्वाधिपि बहुः: "मनः
सवः प्रवर्तिते” इत्यादिभि: प्रतिपद्यतात्, ऋगैः न मुख्याभो
ध्वनिन विरोधाधि: दिविगमकलिचायार्ष्यिनिगुणग्रन्थः
क्ष घन्यन्ति नात्मकयाचाराचिन्तनेन नुक्तुणिनः, साधः
क्षुद्रान्तम् कार्यान्तः हृदयार्थितकम् अनुमानार्थितकम्
कर्मार्थान्तः॥१७॥

'ननु सचिवः सर्वाधिपि: स्थानं अनुपद्धाराधिपि प्रवर्त्यदिक्रोऽहिन्त
शुद्रशाकुप्रपित्रेवाच्छ ईश्वरे वाधिका, नष्ठाङ्गमनुपद्धाराधिपि
स्थिरः प्रवर्तितुत्थ न जानानि वन्द्यालागुपि:ः, अर्थविश्रार्थि सार
नामार्थः', तदात्म

द्रम्यांत्याभावान्त: ग्रह्यात्मिति न ग्रहः।

तदाभावात् प्रवर्त्यदिक्रो शाष्ट्राधिपयथम् विधिः।१८॥

प्रथितोर्तितः न ग्रहः, प्रहस्तुपद्धालः प्रजाः ग्रामाभावात्
प्रथितोर्तितः, प्रसाधिनि ण: ज प्रतिति: वाक्षाभावात्,
प्रसाधिनि जागृहितोपमेल्ये विभिन्नेषु इति नाग्नेश्वरर्थताः।
कस्माप्रसाद\\

अनुस्थान कर्मवादेयमय विधि: अनूपादेव प्रतसेवपति:\\
वेदांतसामाप्याप्यां: न वाच्यापन्तमाणानांस्\\

तद्विषाद\\

अनिवार्याः नाचिर्विरोधात्त्विश्व नामस्य ॥ ९४ ॥

जीवी देवद्रोणि गृहि नास्तित्व ध्वामानानांः वर्णिनः धीरोऽर्थः\\
तत्त्वसन्यासायायायाय नामकिमनापपति:\\
अनिवार्याः श्रवयाको नायपापदः: भाववचात्तिरिक्षण ध्वाय-\\
किव वातिरेकाः, ताहु नायपपपन्नामो वातिरेकवातिरेकोऽवेव ॥

यदृपि वाचिद्रिथि गृहि नास्तित्व ध्वामानानां विरोधार्जा-\\
नेनविरोधादिगेदामविषयता कचिदश्रोवयात्त्वपापति:’\\
द्वितीय, \n
तदृपि न, न दि वाचको मानमाण्यार्धः, तथा सति एकं\\
माण्य भजोत, विरोधधानांः तु विषयमेध्वेत्वमानां-\\
न्यामानविच्छेदः, तथापि विरोधे भिन्नविषयः: एकविषय-\\
न्यां विच्छेदः नाति प्रमाणपश्चात्त्वादिति, अनुस्थान धूमसांप-\\
पवयानानि विन्यम् गमदेविद्विराटिनिः प्रकृतिरिति प्रकृतिमयनमानं\\
न खान्, अनुस्थानावच्छेद्य वज्जुनुपलशः: धूमस वज्जव-\\
धनमित्व विरोधेयस्मावच्छेद्य वज्जववज्जुपममयथाय-\\
वत्ते खान्, अनुस्थानावच्छे: मा वाच्यापनमयस्त्रिवानर्विशेषः: खाद्विति द्वितीय ॥ ९५ ॥

अनुपलशिर्मेन नेरे बार्तकण्यि धूमसांपाृपितित्वादिति नान्मस्म्,\\
वहस्ते नायपपपन्नमाणानां भेद नेत्रादे
प्रतिपणदरपरपराच्यादिक्षायानुपचारानुसार

चर्चात्त्वातनुपस्मिः कारणं ततौ प्रथमं, शास्त्रालुप- 
शिष्यवाचस्पदानां शास्त्राणमानात्, अन्तपरोक्षस्मावेश दक्षिण- 
वन्यालाभ, अपरोक्षवेश शास्त्रकरणकामात्, घटार्धप्रयत्न दत्त- 
घटातामायवेषोपनिष्ठानोनुपचारानुपस्मिः करणं, अधिक- 
रमणग्रहयाधिकारपंप श्रवणाधिकारविश्वासच, वायो श्रापभावस्था य पश्चात् 
अधिकरणग्रहयाधिकारपंप गुणपरिवर्तनात्, श्राक्तारणतिज्ञानवेश इत्य- 
कन्यामानांशाध, भाववेशाच चेतनं। अन्तपरो- 
दिव्याशालुपभवणं भावभूतकरणखलिपणनामोजनमृत्यूमात ना- 
नुपस्मिः करणं किन्तुस्मिः विवेचितं। ॥ ५५ ॥

शाधकान्तरमाण

प्रतिपणचर्चित सादवेश्वापारार्थद्वारनात्।

अन्तपरोक्षवेशाणिक्षायां सिद्धात्मकं विकल्पनात्। ॥ ९९ ॥

इत्यथा च। करणमिति साधयं, प्रतिपणचारकलात्, व- 
यानुमानं घटकेव तदरमवेशापि याचकं तदाक्षरमिति।

'ननु प्रतिपणचारककलातनं, अन्तपरोक्षवेशाणिक्षायां, 
श्रवणवेशं इत्यथा शाक्यवेशाणिक्षायहेतु' इत्यज्ञ श्रावण 
अधिकारपं यथार्थवाच वधानं हि। यापारार्थद्वारनात इति।

* भयं भावं अभावविधानसा प्रबर्तानं तत च अनुपपवेशालं 
उभयदिवस्तः, विशेषतः पूर्वपल्लावविद्वृत्तिपुण्यायुपपम्पवेश साध्यं 
बलिन्द्रं, विक्रमाचारा प्रवर्तासामायकं इत्यथा करणमिति। भयं-
प्रबर्तानं तत्संबंध करणमिति।
नन्तुप्रथाववत्व घटाभावववत्व तत्त्वतः घटाभावववत्व तत्त्वतः प्रस्ताव व्यवस्थापित व्यवस्थापित तत्त्वतः प्रस्ताव व्यवस्थापित व्यवस्थापित नन्तुप्रथाववत्व घटाभावववत्व तत्त्वतः गरणव मानवतः दीर्घव मानवतः दीर्घव मानवतः

* चर्चा भाव। घटाभावववत्व भूलौण दिर्शत विमिियुपुवित विमिियुपुवित विमिियुपुवित विमिियुपुवित विमिियुपुवित विमिियुपुवित विमिियुपुवित विमिियुपुवित

† उत्तरविशिष्ठवाने रनिन्त र कर्मवस्तु निमिियुपुवित घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व

उत्तरविशिष्ठवाने रनिन्त र कर्मवस्तु निमिियुपुवित घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व

उत्तरविशिष्ठवाने रनिन्त र कर्मवस्तु निमिियुपुवित घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व

उत्तरविशिष्ठवाने रनिन्त र कर्मवस्तु निमिियुपुवित घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व

उत्तरविशिष्ठवाने रनिन्त र कर्मवस्तु निमिियुपुवित घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व

उत्तरविशिष्ठवाने रनिन्त र कर्मवस्तु निमिियुपुवित घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व

उत्तरविशिष्ठवाने रनिन्त र कर्मवस्तु निमिियुपुवित घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व

उत्तरविशिष्ठवाने रनिन्त र कर्मवस्तु निमिियुपुवित घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व घटाभावववत्व
शिक्षानिधान, यथावर्तमान प्रकारं प्रति प्रतियोगिता जार्यं, तत्वं भावायु निरिक्ष्यकार्य नाश्, प्रतियोगितार्थी निर्माणं उपलब्धिता, यथायथ प्रतियोगिता न तत्र जार्यं, तत्वं भावायु निरिक्ष्यकार्य नाश्वर दल बहुरुपस्ताय, श्रुत्यावस्था भावाभाव स्वाभाविक रूपस्थाय, ध्याय अपेक्षा कर्त्तव्यार्थं उत्तर भावायु अधिकारस्य वा श्रुत्यावस्था, अपेक्षा वा संयंभाव समवायं सम्बन्धाणं तथा श्रुत्यावस्था शाल्यं तथा शरणां रुपरेति भावविर्ष्याप्राप्त्यं, निरिक्ष्यकार्यं वा हर्षाधिकार समवायं, हर्षाधिकारस्य वा हर्षाधिकारस्य विशेषातं स्वरूपं, उन्नतमानाभावं हर्षाधिकारस्य विशेषातं स्वरूपं, धर्माधिकारस्य विशेषातं स्वरूपं।
तथा द्वि वन्‌रेव प्रमाणे: परमरथा निर्विकल्पकविषय एव
मानने, अनुमानाद्वारा वज्रादि: पूव कदाचित्विनिकल्पको-कारात्, घटाभाववद्वृत्तेति दिवशिष्टप्रस्थबचात् ष्वभावे-
नाधिकरणेश्व प्राप्तेभवतापि खोकारात्॥ ९२॥

खदकाठिसंशयाचक्रोकमास प्रश्वचादिविषयेरवमधरो दूरे विरोधादयः
प्रायो यथौ चक्रविषयकविधुरेरवासापि नास्थापते।
तं यथानुविधेयमेकसमप्रकरणोद्वच्छन्दाद्वोवाचम्
देवानामपि देवयुज्ववित्वाद्वा: प्रपचामि च॥ ९३॥

दृतिव बनीय: खावक:।

खमयरक्ष मुखपिरचणैकविधुरीपहिष्टमाचकमानवाचिते:*
प्रश्वचादिविषये रवाना नास्थापते, विरोधादयं वतोधरोधाधः,
यतं दूरे, सर्वनुविधेयं चक्षं चक्षृति, यथा चक्षुन्द्रा
चतुर्वातिरङ्गप्रकृतिया च चौक्षा वेदवाचवेच्च यस्य तथा, दु:-
खावावैविनिरन्दानावान, यत्नेव उद्वधरत्वाद्वा:। देवानामपि
देवं खावां, प्रपचामि च॥ ९४॥

॥ दृति दलोचवधाक्ष्याकाम्॥

* दृश्यो गणीवायादिरीया दंतरविषयकासत्वोधाध्वात् उपयो-ग्नानिप्रवज्जातीयानि प्रमाणादिनि अध्यमामुनिश्वरसाधकप्रमाणेन बाज्यमानाणि प्रमाणादानेव नास्थाद्वृत्तिस्मित भावः।
कुसुमाण्यिाः।

चतुर्थि: स्ववकः।

स्वैपि तस्माप्रामाण्यलस्य तृतीयविनितपि:। 'ि-erreur: न प्रमाण तज्ज्वानाश्चििह्याधिकाः नम्मणि प्रमाण-भावात्, इििहिः प्रमाणकाठलं प्रमाकरणमध्य नामवति प्रम-माणसुधह्र वचः कः अनुभावः' रविथ्रः

प्रामाण्यस्थिरनिह्यात्रस्यपरस्यमपूर्वायूक्तः।

चन्द्रास्यास्युन्मत्वा माणमपेचतयेकात् ॥ १ ॥

एषवृत्तकृल्यैः प्रामाण्यलस्य न प्रमाणस्य धारावयव-पुस्तायाः: इिि सम्भवत्तमानित्वमानित्वात्। खमते पुष्पस्याच-वर्षार्थेः हि। अनोपथित्यं खृष्टे: अनकानवसमानविष-वक्तव्यात प्रयासाधिनयमामान्यतः वपेलात् तत्र न प्रमाणवच्चर्ष्मानित्वात् ॥ १ ॥

'गुरु धारावानिम् नामायि, स्नानेन हि विमाणिः हर्षः
कम्बुचनीयः, भावः स्नात्स विषयः प्रति नियमे न ख्यातः,

* भवं स्वव: ग्रन्थानां घट ववः प्रवस्यः न तु घटः हि नियमे
हि वदैव उपयोगे तदि ग्रन्थानां घटे वत्केन विशेषः खातः,
खण्डो घटेष्ठायम्य स्वेत भावानामास्य चौदार्शिकारेण घट ववः प्रवस्य हि
विश्वामान्यभिः, ख ववः प्रवेशः भावानामास्य, भावः विशेषः
वेव च नििन: जातवे तस्य ववः प्रवस्यः भावः हि माण-माणाभिभावः हि।

६ २
तथा च तमादायांदृशीतयाविलमेवः। किंच ध्येयं धर्मशुद्धः

दृश्यानवस्थानेव न वा, भास्य उपादानवानस्व उपादान-

विषयतानिषयमायैं धर्मानातरस्थिकारे तत्रायेवविज्ञनवस्त्रा,

दितीये कार्यल हेतुः तचैव उपादानवानवर्त्तमायिः भिषगोरिति

नेषर्ख चित्तारिदिकर्त्तात् चिह्नं।' इत्यततः

खधाकरप्रशास्माभावादुपकारो र्हि दुर्घंतः।

सुपरिशरायं प्रक्ष्येश्वति का गतिरनयवः।। २ ।।

खधारानिषिधार्य वषं विषयताानिषयमाशः, ऋणस्य भाराताधा-

नेषर्ख विज्ञानपत्तिः दृति खधाराव एव विज्ञानक्षुचेरिः।

केशव वर्त्तमाननविषये तदुपात्ताविषये धर्मानात् विषये

भाराताधा उपादानविरुद्धात् भनुस्वा विषयतानिषयमाशः

पप्पिण्निः र्हि भाराव एव तचैव विज्ञानम् दृतः।। २ ।।

'ननु क्ष्यस्य कर्म्मश्च किंतु ब्रह्मज्ञानीयामित्वातंकृतञ्चानामः

बधाश्च परिवर्जनीतो धर्मं जननीयः'। इत्यततः

वनेकानाणात्मिष्टैः न च किंतु ननु क्ष्यस्य च र्हि भाराव एव

तद्देशायथा प्रक्ष्यानवानात्माभिष्कर्त्तिकैः।। २ ।।

* पुराणश्रीवां प्रथमवानवानवादादविशेषज्ञतामावय विनेकानाणात्मिष्टैः

हि-विशेषज्ञतान्तरस्थिकारे तद्देशायथा प्रक्ष्यानवानात्माभिष्कर्त्तिकैः।।

† तचैव भाराताधानन्तरस्थि हेतुः, तस्य जननीयो भास्यम्।

‡ तस्य भास्य वैश्चिन्तः सम्बन्धः, तद्भवानात् तद्विशेषज्ञतात्

भिषगोरिति भाराताधानन्तरस्थिः, तस्य जननीयो भास्यम्। प्रक्ष्यानवानात्

विशेषज्ञात्मिष्टैः।।
কিয়া যদি ধালবঁশদর। 'মরেষ গঠন গৃহিণি' দ্বারা সংযোগে গঠনের সংস্থারিকীভাবে জানায়, যদি করণ- যোগ: কিয়া তদাপীক্ষিকীসংযোগাদি ঘটার সংগঠনকীভাবে দ্বনিত্ব করিবার। এই কিয়া আমাদের স্মরণ ছাড়া নানা নামকরণ করিয়াছেন।

খনি শান্তা ঘট। সাধারণত ঘট দ্বারা প্রথমে ভালুকায় মানে দ্ব্যাস নামে প্রাদুর্ভব।

মর্থর বিশ্বাসনে মানিশ্বাসনে তদুপবযুক্ত বিষয়; যে সমস্যা কেবল সংযোগাদি: কেবল সংযোগ, কেবল 'ঘট- মানে' দ্ব্যাস ঘটানোর ঘটানো: সংযোগ এব সমস্যা 'ঘটনা ঘটে'।

দ্ব্যাসাপি ভাবনা, স্মরণ 'রঙ্গে ঘটে' 'ঘটনা ঘটে' দ্ব্যাস দ্বারাকতন্ত্রে র্যাপস নমুনা ২।

খাভাবাসনের পরিষেবায় নাম নয়।

র্যাপস নমুনে বিশেষ রীতি নিরস্তের তথা মানাম।

র্যাপস নমুনে বিশেষ রীতি অব্যাহত করিয়া মালোম।

যথা ঘটানী মানে বিশিষ্ট: যথা থাক। ভিক্ষুদের কর্ম ঘটানী ঘটানী অব্যাহত বিশিষ্টবাসার্থ দ্বি ঘট দ্বারা মানে বিশেষ ঘটানী বিশেষ বিশিষ্ট।

* ঘটানী বিশেষ বেলা ভাবানী মহান ভাবা বুঝি; র্যাপস নমুনে বিশেষ ভূমিতে যথা, অস্থায় বিশেষ হর্ষনাম।

বিশিষ্টবাসার্থে কানী ঘটে। দ্বি প্রতিষ্ঠান্ত দ্বি, ভাবানী: ভিক্ষু বিশেষ বিশেষ ব্যতিরেকে ধর্মানন্দন ধর্মতাত্ত্বিক দ্বিদ্বিষ্ঠ।
'ननु तथापि नेवरस्थान प्रमा प्रमाणस्थिकालाभावात् एवं
मीररो न प्रमाता न वा प्रमाणे प्रमाणकलाभावीरभावात्'
खचाच

मिति: सचकुपरिस्थितिस्थितिस्य च प्रमाणतः।
तद्धोग्यवस्तु: प्रमाणेः गैति समे सते॥ ५ ॥

चन्द्रारोगृहभवनेव प्रमालमनलेवी प्रद्युर्ध्वाण्विधिः
प्रमाहलं प्रमाष्टवाचिं तथा अकारणेऽपि प्रमाथा तैव-
रस्विहस्ते। तथा प्रमथा राधायोगवववक्षेत्रे सम्बन्धये-
यरस्व प्रमाणमूलिः न तु करणमूलिः तत्तद्विन्यासिति,
'मन्यासायूङ्गयत्र त्प्रावमाण्यमभावात्' दृति सूचे (मय्यसेते
$1.69$) तैवस्व प्रमाणमुक्षे । त तैवस्व पद्धमप्रमाणाला-
पत्ता विभाग्यावात्: प्रमाणकरणार्थिप्रसादाय विभागसहायान्
न तैवस्वाध्यान्यम अभिविषयकले अभिविषयावगहितेन अभि-
लापनिरिति वाच्यम वाधिकरण्यकारकलाभावेनमालाभा-
वादु अभिनिः प्रतिविषयेकले रजतलप्रकारकलमू यद्वें
तद्वगाहिततया तैवस्वाध्यान्यम प्रमालाचिते: ॥ ५ ॥

स्वकार्यवंचातक्षोकमाह

सादारारिजि नियतधागिनि परदारामपेचिस्तै
भुताधीनस्वे नियितनितिलाभार्थशःस्तु:।
लेणारिजिनितनितीविस्तारमप्रभुषभ्यः
प्रक्षेपानकल्यांभिः किमपरेर्मूऽ प्रमाणे गैति: ॥ ६ ॥

दृति चतुर्थः: स्वकः।
चतुत्थ: सर्वकः |

सन्तारामनभवे यथार्थानुभवे, याचार्यारिषि प्रख्ये, नी-
विष्ट्वा विषयीर्थता निष्कासनाविश्वस्य नामावदायामा
करे यथा तथा अनुभवविश्वसकविश्वक द्वारस्य:, नित्य-
योनि वर्णन सदा सन्तोषः, सत्त्ववेदनीयाणि द्वाराशायानम्
शिरिन्यथाः, लेभनीरत्वश्चतोंदिपि चषुदिक्विशेषवेद्यायं तत्त्वमिश्री
विश्वामिन्न यथा दुःखः रागदेवोकापः तत्त्वमिन्न प्रभुः
श्वातूः वेदाग्रामाश्रमज्ञातं चप्पानि चित्यार्थं: प्रमाणम
विवेः, एवमवृत्ते तत्त्वाग्रामाश्रमज्ञातंकल्पत्वविहः पावषः: विं
कर्त्यायिति भावः:॥ ॥

इति चतुर्थोत्तरवाच्यायंभाः

'एवमूः' द्वारायिपाठः प्राचीनमुखी हेनं लाखि।
कृष्णमाण्डलिः ।

पञ्चमः युवकः ।

‘तप्पाधकः प्रमाणभावात्’ हि पद्ममित्रात्याशोः। ‘चन्द्र-भृगुः साधकप्रमाणतः वार्षिकः’ रामचर

कार्यकृतोऽध्यात्मकः पदात् प्रत्ययत: शुद्धः ।

वाक्यात् स्मार्थार्थार्थ: वाच्यो विश्वविद्यमः ॥ १ ॥

चतुर्वर्गं कार्यकृतं घटवत् चक्रकलशं ज्योतिः

रोचकर्ये च प्रज्ञेयानः च्योऽकहि ज्ञातमन्यतांभवम् ।

अध्यक्षस्य कर्म अवश्य शरीराचक्रेष्टं द्राक्षयुक्तकर्मकर्मपञ्चमवेयोगजनकं कर्मं

चेतनाध्यक्षवर्तकं कर्मवेयत् श्रमाधिशत्रूर्तक्षिप्यावतः। ध्यातिति

व्रजाङ्कि घटवत् प्रत्यप्राप्तस्य प्रभुस्वयंवधे ध्यातिति ध्यातिति

विश्वस्य ध्यातिति ध्यातिति ध्यातिति। ध्यातिति गुह्यत्वां पत्तमाभवः ।

छतुर्वर्गं रिक्त्वादिराधातुं नाशपरिययः। व्रजाङ्कि ग्योवमेदि

नाश्व विनाशिलाम् पाण्डमानपद्वत् । पदात् पयतेनेवनेवति

व्यायत्वा पदं भवहारः। पदाधिकमद्रायवधारः । खल्चः

पुष्पप्रमाणः। व्याहारलात् भाध्यन्तिकिलियाधिवधारवतः।

प्रत्ययत: प्रामाण्यं उद्वेदनमां कारणगणनं प्रमाणात्

प्रत्याधिकः प्रमाणतः। नृत्यं दर्शान्तः वेद: चाहेश्वर्यः वेदः चादाववतः। किष्किष्कतः वेदः। पापेस्यो वाक्यात् भारतवतः, वेदः
वाक्यांनी पौष्पयांत वाक्यालं अच्छदारिवाक्यवत्। ‘म्हणु-विशेषत’, डुळकपरिमाणं म्हणजे परिमाणप्रथमजन्वले वति जनपरिमाणलातू तुम्हापरिमाणकपाल्याचरुपघट-परिमाणात प्रकटतांतुंकपाल्याचरुपघटपरिमाणवत्’, डुळ-परिमाण्ययूं परिमाणजनक, नियमपरिमाणलातू अपुरपरि-माणलाळा, एवं वा जगदीश डुळकपरिमाणकपाल्याचरुपघट-डिलंक्यू च गायदार्येशाण्यांमधूलिं, अप्सरासामीरणनण्यतेचा-बँडीरीकर्षणित। विशेषविद्या दृष्टि विशेषायाच्याकलं, तेन नियमविशेषकपाल्यांसिद्धः। ॥ १ ॥

‘ननु शरीरविशेषः कर्त्त्वषया विशेषत्याधारान्यका विशेष-पाध दृष्टि (१), कर्त्त्वषयाचरुकर्त्त्वषयालक्षणालभावात् कर्त्त्व-व्यतारभरु दृष्टि लक्षित्पक्षमता च (२), यदा ‘कर्त्तचारव’ दृष्टि वातिलिविवंधनो (३), यदा चायसा वाजश्रणग्रहणात्मया शारीरिक कर्त्तचारवया, लक्षित्पक्षचरु च विद्यादावशारीरिकति विशेषविशेषविविराजस (४), यदा शारी-—

* यात्रपरिमाणविहीन कपालदयेन शक्ती घटा अयते, तांपरिमाणत्वे वेययां कपालदयेन विचित्रित्य घटा जाते, परन्तु यष्टपरिमाणाश्च रीतीर्या उक्तपरिमाणयेन प्रथमसिद्धिमिति, तत कारणविविधानी प्रमस्य कपाळदये तत्तप्यत्र विद्यास्य तवश्चात्तस्य परिमाणविहीनाभिष्कर्षि, तथा च द्वितीय-घटपरिमाणं कपाळदये विलक्ष्णश्च जन्मस्तिक्षत्वमिति प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति।

† विशेषं विशेष्यानवयं, व्यययं निवल्वं, साधते दृष्टि श्रेष्ठं, तेनेति विशेषायाच्यं विद्ययं विशेषायाच्यं विद्ययं श्रेष्ठं।
रजनालाखुपाधिना यायलाबिज्ञ: (४), रत्न कार्यंहेतै पञ्चश
देषा:‘ः, तताच

न बधायक्ष्यापणीवल्लिर् प्रतिवन्धे न दुर्बले:।
विद्म्भविष्यारिपए न, नारिकुद्वरानवन्मणा॥ ५ ॥

ईश्वरे धर्मिन्हि गरीरवधातु कार्त्तवाहो(१) न, ऋधिकर-पक्षां विना ऋधारवाङ्गारावां ऋधा कार्त्तव्य धर्मिन्याध-क्षणां। ऋधिकरण्याणायकात्या ऋधौपामुख्येऽशेखलम् वसव-वनात्, पवन न विद्म्बवधात्या कुर्क्तिविद्म्भवाह: प्रत्यावासक
दृति, ईश्वरे न कता श्रीरीरलात् दुर्बलमानवायोधेषि ने-खर:। विद्यार्जि न सकारंशं श्रीराजनालात् दृति (२) न प्रतिवन्धम्, सप्तातिपच्छेतिः: श्रीराजेवधातु यायलाबिज्ञाः
दुर्बलात्। वरोधेषि कार्त्तवाहऽ: पच्चधमलवकारात्
विद्म्बवधाधकावताराशि: वसवचम्, उपयोगाया: ‘कता शरीरवी’ दृति वाष्णुवालेष्टत्या न प्रतिवन्ध:। चतुर्थेषि च यद्यि
पच्चधर्ममत्या श्रीरीरो उपकेल्कद्रा न विरेषधः, कर्णल-

* नेति पश्चविध्येष्वाभासरूपाः पञ्चश देषा दृति तदुपयादनमय
यवेदान्तम्।
+ धर्मंई ईश्वराः।
$ अध्याबिलिन्सः, याशिवधर् यायवाके दशस्मान्त्रान्यरामान्य-ः
लक्षप्रविशेषणवाणात् श्रीराजनालेवि: राजत्वाल्पकीमव्याप्तावके-
दशामान्त्रान्यरामान्य-ः
$ प्रकोपित चिवादिकुषपले देरीकिष्ठालंक्षः सम्भवादिष्यः।
विपश्चवाधकमर्च उत्तरारिज्ञायामुः।
राजांश्रीसमायोगिकरणकोशप्रभाषात् तदनुप्रघापनेतु न
विरोधः, विरोधांश्चामिकीः। दृश्यसे च विपचायकतन्
वज्जूत् तदभावसिद्धान्तम् अवस्थानस्यविद्वियोगियोऽवज्जूत
न, शरीरजन्यलोपधेरपि विपचायकाभावेनाप्लक्षात्* ||

॥ १ ॥

'मनु चढ़ोरः कत्ताखात् शरीरीखादिति प्रतिकृतः
तत्कावतारासुनकृततः भावः', तचाच

तत्कावभाष्यचावेश्च, तत्कावृद्धिरदृश्यम्।

अनुकृतसु तत्कावः कार्यरोपेय विभूषणम् || २ ॥

प्रतिकृतस्यतकावार्दीशराविधिस्य आश्चर्याविधिस् दृशः
सः। कतां विना कार्यमेव न खादिति तत्कृत् 'विभूषणं' उप-
कारकः। 'मर्मं बर्भ्या गम्येन मनः नरं प्रवत्तति' (गोताा)।

इत्यावस्था। 'मर्मं धर्मापदेशश्च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना।
वहां कृताज्ञमात्रसः य धर्मं वेदं नेतरः' (मनु, च००१९) इति
तत्कावुरूपस्य शास्मास बलवचस् || १ ॥

'मनु कार्यदले प्रवलवन्यलेपायोजकम्', अचाच

खात्री अयताचारिनः नानुष्ट हृद्घात्मकम्।

हेलभावः फलाभावः, विशेषवर्थो विशेषवार्थः || ४ ॥

* विपचायकावतारेकायास्मातिः पाठजायः
† शास्माचेन्धर उपात्कारक हृद्यमेनावशयः।
‡ विष्णुः चित्रात्मचेन्धरेण्यः, विष्णुवान्। प्रवलविशेषवायु हेलका
मात्र, तत्त्व 'प्रहस्यैव' कार्यसंसारभावसामान्यवेदोऽवर्तिः हेतु
व्यायात् कित्यासामाले प्रवलसामान्यः चेतुलं (स्यात्तति।

॥ २ ॥
न दिन कर्तारं चेतं विला कार्यः। परमायोरेव घनवले-शैतन्यानुपपत्तिः, श्रेष्ठत्वं शेतंग्रन्यशीतावजग्राहात्। अवृ-हमपि दृष्टकारणवस्यकारेनैव फलजनकस्। न च 'रेताहयामेव ब्रह्मारपयो चेतुः, न दुः शिष्यायामारे' हनि, शेषायाविशेष-प्रयत्नसं रेतुलेबधि शिष्यायामारे प्रयत्नशमान्येक्षर-सान्यायायात्, अन्यथा वौजवस्यवमारुविशिष्टे अनंतलाबुकु-रावसायायायां प्रति वौजलेन रेतुलायाया अष्टि विषायापाणीः। II 4 ॥

'ननु घधाओरि ग्रहधमस्य फिं मानसम्' हनि, अचछ वाक्यवालीबिल्पाथियेव धातिविनाशः।

वधोद्ये देन पद्धापित्र, प्रवेयवायु पूर्ववत्॥ 5 ॥

धातिविनाशः: प्रयत्नशमालाविल्पाधि वधोद्ये नाना-रामप्रयोगं आदशायमावात्। अत्यंगुद्धि नादशवधानमूलं, घञचारणशयाभलादि समाधकारोनघातिवधावधारपवर्त-कः पुष्प: विष्णुति। एवं प्रवेयवायुदृढ्यानंधोपामाशादेन्कपुरुषपाठिमूः।

अध्वा कार्यविशिष्टं (१का०) अन्यथा वायुबायेत्, कार्ये तात्त्विनि, तात्त्वविवश्च एव शब्दग्रामाःभित तात्त्विनि श्रवः

* द्रश्य मेवभाव द्रवत्स्य विवरशास्म।
† ननु घटायविशार: पूर्ववृवुवकु राजवकरष्पयवदेश्य रावशास्य, तद्धोर्वेशुर्शोभावस्वय तात्त्वो विधौनेनिति पद्धत घनवस्याः, भासा-पि निष्पाधिशवमिधनात्।
‡ घनवर्णप्रयोगं तात्त्वमायायाः अर्थांप्रेमवोज्यानास्माभवधिति भावः।
वेदोऽ एवेश्वरः। अध्याजनं वास्कानं, वेदार्थं विद्वाकााक्षा
नतः महाजनपरिपरमेवतवास्कानं, वास्कानां तथा वास्कानव
गमितवास्कानां परायामवन्, एवं धर्मार्धश्च वास्कायं नास्वायः। प्रवृ
वति धार्मिकनं, द्वादशरत्रियश्रेष्ठवन् भगवास्वमनांश्चः॥
एवं मोदोशरार्धः तथापि ईश्वरिङ्गः, तद्भवं 'देहं एव
तत्वत्थम, वास्का विद्वानः यतो। ईश्वरिङ्गः एवं सोकन
साधनाः', देहं देहिष्ठं एवं 'प्रवृत्तं सर्वं श्रद्धार्थवः
द्वादशर्वं सत्सात्त्वारस्वं, सोकनस्य थतान्तःः
प्रभवस्वं प्रसारस्तात् 'थं एव सोकिकायं एवं दैविका:', तति
सोकिकायं साधनं एवं सोकिकेष्वयोऽवं वास्क्यं।
प्रत्ययं: विधिमध्ययात् अलसाभिमायं विध्यं, वास्किमायं:॥, ए
वेदोऽ एवेश्वरः॥ २॥

प्रत्ययम: ज्ञातिरिपाणं, या वेदोऽ एवेश्वरः। भत्ताव्य ए

तत् वाणं, विधिमध्यमेन विधः, तन्नास्काकानवः॥ ६॥

विधिमध्ययात् प्रत्ययम: ज्ञातिरिपाणं, या एव देहिष्ठं अत्यतियं
विद्वानव, विधिरिति प्राथम मतं, सर्वत्रादः
कार्यं द्वादशर्वं विधिरिति प्राथम मतं, सर्वत्रादः
तन्नास्काकानवः विधिरिति द्वादशर्वमानः प्राथमाभिमायं विधि
प्रत्ययं:॥ ६॥

॥ ॥

धार्मिकनं धार्मिकनमः, वेदार्थं विद्वानं अनुमितता वेदार्थं
आय्या प्रथिमः॥

† अभिमायं तति वेदोऽ विद्वानं श्रवः॥

† अभिमायं तति वेदोऽ विद्वानं श्रवः॥

† अभिमायं तति वेदोऽ विद्वानं श्रवः॥
प्रद्धर्मिप्रयोज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्योज्यो�ः
पद्माञ्जलिः

‘ननु लिखेत दृष्टांलिखित’ हृदि, त्रिभुष इत्यदि भवानागार्दिति। दृष्टाकरणस्य दृष्टि सत्त्वं प्रत्येकस्य श्रानं कारणस्य यागापि: अभिधारद्वितियार्दिति।

‘लिखिततिकाले चुलालिधिप्रकारधिज्ञेयोऽन्न लिखितः’ हृदि, त्रिभूष इत्यदि भवानागार्दिति। दृष्टाध्याद्वागानम् उपायेच्छादित्वार्थं भविष्यन्ते कारणम्। ननु: प्रच्छादनं तद्दृष्टिनित्यः, तत्त्वार्थमाप्तिः प्रतिविन्ध्यानम्।

तत्त्वाच ब्रह्मात्मानात् दृष्टाध्याद्वागान्तः राज्यात् राजेन्द्रियान्तः राज्यालोकोऽन्ने मानाभावे तस्मि लिखितः जनाये मानाभावाधीतिः।

‘ननु च चद्धानेव प्रवत्कम्पतु, भ्रात्यात्मानस्य न च चद्धावानं, अनुकूलवापरमात्र एव भ्रात्यात्मकः, रथो गच्छति तीव्रादृशि तथाकर्षणात्,’ तताशः

क्षत्रियविभावे कार्तिकप्रबाहे।

येषु एव हृदि, पुर्वं परिशिवते स्व स्वाभा।

* वाचयामागः, नियतपूर्वतत्वेऽपव चारणकालः दृष्टाध्याद्वागान्तः भविष्यति साधारणायामागः। केवल सिद्धा दृष्टांलिखित तथा नियतपूर्वतत्वेऽपाभावाधिकरणं कारणात् न स्वाधिति।

† ‘दृष्टांलिखित इत्यदि अपि इति तत्त्वार्थमाप्तिः, तथा च सुखसंपत्तिर्गतेऽपकार्याः, विनियमकार्याः उपायेच्छादितः। सव च इत्याविशेष वैज्ञानिकाः, विनियमकार्याः उपायेच्छादितः। ब्रह्मात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मारामात्रानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मारामात्रानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मारामात्रानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मानात्मारामात्रानात्माहृदि।

† तत्र दृष्टाध्याद्वागानात्।
चवळे संगीतकांते न जल रति वव्हारांतुः कुञ्जाधारीः।
कर्म न कारकांग्रामितं कुञ्जाळांक्षं रतिः। 'वनू चवळ-
पव्हभावाः खानः' चतु शाष पोव्हति र परस्मिनुरूक्षरावें 
तितीनि फलं विमाने, श्रेयं शांतिरेव, पूवं शार्नमीता, भावं 
ना, फलानुपुस्तांपरविषयं एवाखाताः। यदा फलानु-
कुञ्जाळांलिक्षारस्मिनु पूवापिष्यानु पूवांपरिहतले 
शतिं, शांतिराखाताः, तथा च प्रयाववचनकुञ्जलं पूवां 
परिहतलमितं चक्षुः॥ ॥ 
'वनू धान्तुाः बर्ब: प्रतीतींते, खाताखात च जलनकुञ्जाळ-
पारमाणार्थकलम्, भाषपादेव च चलाभः॥' रति, अरत 
शाष

* अष्टं भावः, करोतिरुचुनकुञ्जाळांक्षारस्मिनुपराबाक्षितं जलाशयां 
दीनां शान्तालं वर्ज्यते वा जलनकुञ्जाळांक्षारस्मिनु ज्ञानातीर्थी नाप- 
परस्मिनुरूक्षरावें प्रस्थातिः च घटावरेष्याकरमं जलाशयां दीनां 
जलमुक्तमय्यास्तावश्याम्ययां प्रथमप्राप्तचतु जलमुक्तमुः 
लब्धिः, तथा च घटावरेः जलनकुञ्जाळांलिक्षारस्मिनु 
प्रथमभावात्तु न कर्तलं शिख्रुः कुञ्जाळ
कर्तारेष्याः।
† तथा च य रव जरोतिर्थीं च रवाखाताखातागीति क्रितरेष्याखात 
बारे रति श्रेष्ठः।
‡ खाताखातोष्ठो श्रेष्ठः।
§ यत्तःश्वशिष्यार्थक्षारस्मिनु प्रकाचक्षीरेष्यागरवाद्विद्वस्मिः 
कादित्वेष्ठेः। विक्रिक्षरशालामुः परस्मिनुरवववत्स्मिः भावः। 
॥ कुञ्जाळांलिक्षारस्मिनु नाखाताः यज्ञः, खाताखाताः यज्ञ 
वेणुमुर्तव तख्य तदनकुञ्जाळांक्षारस्मिनु वातिः यज्ञं विगुःनुपप्रज्' द्वारा 
क्रितरेष्याति पूर्वतः।
भावनेन च चक्षुः श्रवणात्मकः गोचरः।
तथा विवरणम् श्रेष्ठानलेखणपरिचयः॥८॥
तथा क्षयं तद्रावृच्छि, पचितः पाणं करोतीति विवरणत् क्षयः। तच श्रवणात्मकः, अनुक्रमः चारणार्थः चक्षुः श्रवणात्मकः। पर्यासः वेदेऽ विज्ञानाः स कर्मः। क्षत्रियाप्राणविवरणः॥१०॥
‘नून क्षयार्थः मन्त्रिति श्रवणात्मकः खातः।’
तत्रापि
श्रवणम् चारणार्थः स कार्यान्वयनः करणा।
श्रवणम् चारणार्थः स कार्यान्वयनः कार्यान्वयनः।
चारणाबाष्पम् चारणार्थः श्रवणात्मकः कार्यान्वयनः।
चारणार्थः प्रचारः विक्षेपणः कर्माचूक्तः तत्त्वाचूक्तः।

* न अनुक्रमः परिचयः श्रवणात्मकः, कर्माचूक्तः तत्त्वाचूक्तः।
† ‘अनुवादः’ श्रवणात्मकः” हि नीतिसङ्ग्रहम्।


कुषमालिगः ॥

इत्तथा र्गद्यातिपदिकाः यांश्चयिनः, यत्रव "यथं खण्ड भावानां भूति, तथं यथा श्रीरामापि" दृष्टि, एकपदेपालभावानस्य यस्याः, कर्मादिभिन्नान्तं एव च प्रथमेनि। एवं कर्माणि नाखातपदवायुः ॥ २० ॥

'नभस्तं कांतिधेयं विधिः', तत्तव अतिमहम्मक्षाश्च वर्णं, नापूर्वव तत्त्वाहिनि:।

तद्भाषाम् कार्यस्य, न भिन्नाश्च प्रद्धिनि:। १९ ॥

कर्म खर्गादिः, तद्घृमः कार्यं च दिवेष्यं, तत्तव अति-प्रमुखाः च च स्वयं कार्यं च च गति खर्गायास्यन्वयः प्रवचनाः। यद्व कर्म जय्यीव, तद्घृमः कार्यं च बींश्यं, तत्तव नापूर्वव तत्त्वाहिनि:। सब्बधेयां दृष्टि नाश्च नाश्च शतां स्वायां, च च पुरां-मुर्गाः च च त्तमः, यथायां च कर्मं च तत्र श्राक्षतः। 'ननु कार्यलाभपेश श्राक्षतः', सब्बधेयां च च चाययथा जय्यीव च कार्यं श्राक्षतः भावः', तत्तव तद्भाषाम् कार्यं विधिनि। निरत्विनी-विधानां यथायां प्रमुख्यातं, तच फलाश्च नयोगास्यभावपाईवाणाः। यथा 'ननु कार्यलाभपेश श्राक्षतः', गंगवच्चलेक्ष्माचितायाः दयालविशिष्टाः वशोः दयावोः

* चास 'माहो ममते द्वादिकामात्रायाः' दृष्टि धारित।

† अध्यानं भावः, कामाः कामाविनायवस्तुमादियस्य वस्तुः साधयानां यामार्दीनामायुविनायिनां तदाध्यायसाधयानां तत्त्व: यान्यानां कार्याः, निर्देशाः निर्देशाः च फलाभावेन तत्त्वेऽस्य विभावां प्रमाणायां 'अन्यायापासीतं' 'कथाः संस्कर्तानीवास्याः' दृष्टि निर्देशांनिहिष्याश्च विण्यक्यवायुः निर्तानन्तरायांतिरिति।
पद्मेव", देवका तद्भामात्। अष्टौविशिष्टपृविविशिष्ट कालपु- 
क्षिते:, गम्यवेवकापि द्वि प्रविशिष्टविशिष्ट चारणममारं वा 
स्मायति, प्रागुमभवत्, प्रजेने तथाचे पूविविविशिष्टानापि च वि
धि:। 'ननु कम् यागादि, तद्भां कार्यंं विधि:', तत्रां न 
क्षिताभि:। अष्टिक्षिपादनातिंकाले प्रतचयानात्। च च 
अयिना नार्विनीमि, उक्तदेवानाधिवर्म: II ११ II 

'ननु करण्य श्रमः', तद्भांक्षिपाय तद्भाम प्रवर्तकम्, चत 
प्रवाचः। "अमिन् भावणामकर्माभ्याम बिकामा:। अध्या- 
ताभावना लोका समाक्षिका महारेषः”, अमिन यागप्रणाली 
कानका दतिकी: श्रवानु, अमाम्यायं तयादन्ता उत्पञ्चन- 
कशिक्षियाः' दतिः, चतान 
अष्टिक्षिपादनातीय नामिनाधिपि गरीयीति। 
बाधकृश यामानवत् परिश्रेष्ठिपि दुर्लघ: II १२ II 
अमिनाथाय सागामानात्, अमिनाधिखन्ताभिधानाश्च नाम 
साप्तन्ते:, गरीयी उषिता, सिद्धिन्तयिति वेषः। 'ननु श्रम्यश 

* यथा द्वि ‘मन्वा द्विप्रविविष्टकामि' हकुपायकाविष्टब श्रमिन्य 
रमः, न द्वि 'मन्ववेव द्विप्रविविष्टकामि' हति मन्ववेव व 
कवायक्ष्मेदांकारं श्रमिन्यः, तथा कार्यवेव कार्यं विधिशबासिनि 
न श्रमिन्यः, नन्तु कार्यं विधिशबासिनि उपत्तितविष्ठेन विमानः। 
सिद्धान्तो द्विप्रविविष्टानं प्राप्तविश्वासिनं वसू श्रमकार्यक्षे 
कलं कायप्रतिकारानात् मन्ववेव उपजयविष्यते भावं, प्रजेने- 
पूर्वकाले प्रागुमभवत् नैव सम्बहिति। 

I २
কল্যাঙ্কনী বাধাতু পরিষেবাভিধান লিখনীঃ হিতঃ অনাচার বাধকখাতিঃ। প্রস্তুতি বাধকনির্বাচনঃ। ১২।

‘ননু করণ্ড যাগাদের্ভ মৃত্যুশ্চারন বিশ্বাসয়ঃ’ তন্মাত্র হেতুলাবারনামানচ মধ্যমার্থে বিশেষতঃ।

অন্যত্র কৃত্তিমধাপ্রিয়দানপূর্বকঃ ১২।

বিশ্বাস মৃত্যুশ্চারনতাবা হেতুলাবার কৃত্তিমধাপ্রিয়তাবায়ন নানা কারণ হইতে নির্দিষ্ট করিতে দায়িত্ব দায়িত্ব তথা দায়িত্বাধিকারত্ব হইতে হইবে জনগণ তথা জনগণের মধ্যে তরতি নিত্যঃ তরিত মধ্য-চলামাত্র।’ হেতুলাবারন্তু কৃত্তিমধাপ্রিয়দান নামকীন ভিত্তি নিন্দিত শ্রাদ্ধাবেদন্তকরিত।

* মৈমাংসকসমাবেদনং তথা জেনায়তাদেনান্তরূপে মাপারী ভাবনা, যা চ পরিয়েবাদন রাজ্যভাবনা চেতি বিধান, তথায় বচন-ভাবনাপদাবিধিয়া জাতিমিক প্রয়াসাদিৰূপ আখ্যাতপ্রয়াসাদিকার্যায়, সাক্ষাত্প্রায়সংহিতায় তথা হই ‘ষ্মাসামে ব্যেন্ত’ হয় দায়িত্ব করিতে মানেথ মানেথ অবয়েত মানেথ অবয়েত হইতে প্রায় মানেথ অবয়েত হইতে প্রায় মানেথ অবয়েত হইতে প্রায় মানেথ অবয়েত হইতে প্রায় মানেথ অবয়েত হইতে প্রায় মানেথ অবয়েত হইতে প্রায় মানেথ অবয়েত হইতে প্রায় মানেথ অবয়েত হিতঃ ভাবায়প্রস্তাবন্তী ব্যবস্থার মধ্যে ব্যবস্থার মধ্যে ব্যবস্থার মধ্যে ব্যবস্থার মধ্যে ব্যবস্থার মধ্যে ব্যবস্থার মধ্যে।

† শাস্ত ‘প্রায়মধ্যেন ব্যজনে’ হিতঃ প্রেমঃ। হেতুলাবারন্তু চ হইত ‘মধ্য-সাধননীর্ধাতালম্পি’ হিত পূর্বীনে।


"यथासह विवेचनम्

वै निम्नानुमानस्व यत् निर्मितांविभिन्नतिम्।

मध्यंक्षगम्यगम्यं विद्य द्यायाध्यायवियोगंगतः

कूटां कूटमण्डलांपूर्व विपर्ययः।

अग्नि प्रज्वलितस्मृतिः \(\textit{क्रेश्नं} \) च विज्ञान्य-मामकतम्।

शनिः प्रज्वलितस्मृतिः।

"न कल्यं भवेत्" द्यायवेद्यायविषयविषयवाचितलाभातुरू।

सन्धिनिधानवनमविविधश्च विचारेऽनि

द्याये यस्मिन्। विवेचनार्थम्।

एवं वेदं वेदार्थविवेचनद्वितीयविवेचनस्मृतिः।

वेदविशेषगतार्थविवेचनस्मृतिः।

\(\text{श्रीमान्ते} \) महामहेश्वरान्। १९॥

क्षमाम्।

\* सर्वविद्वसिद्धान्त सर्वविद्वसिद्धान्तासिद्धान्त, स च 'सर्वविद्वस- विद्वसिद्धान्तासिद्धान्त': सर्वविद्वसिद्धान्त: धर्म धार्म धर्म धार्म (१६०:१६६:१५५) दश्म दश्म।

† आदिना विज्ञानविज्ञान, अनुप्रस्तुत्वें तत्तत्वादिविज्ञाना: खण्डांम्

कालाधिकारिष्य: चाप्ता:। तत्तत्वादिविज्ञानगत: विवेचनार्थ । केवला 'सत्यार्थि निम्नानुमानस्व यत् निर्मितांविभिन्नतिम्।

\(\text{सहायं पुरुषोपिनिनिमित्त} \) अध्येयहि, यथा गुरुदेव सामाधाये इवादान।

\(\text{सहायं} \) धृत: यत्र स्म विधानविशेषकार्यवाचारम्। सामाध्ये 'नन्द- साध्यं नन्द मद्विधायं गत: तद्भवक्य:। हतितिविभवान्त: तु नासाध्यायम्।

हस्ताक्षर: प्रज्वलितस्मृतिः। विवेचनार्थ विवेचनार्थ महामहेश्वरान्।

\(\text{श्रीमान्ते} \) महामहेश्वरान्। २०॥
বিধিনির্দেশিতে প্রাতায়ের প্রতিষ্ঠা করা হয়নি।

শাখায় চাইতে পারে।

* কঠিন প্রশ্ন দুই বিষয়ের প্রাতায়ের প্রতিষ্ঠা করা হয়নি।
भारतमय वाक्यान्तरमा
कल्यै एव त वेदेः परमेश्वरस्वरः।
खार्थ्यारैव नात्यम् तत्स्थ सुराग्निर्विविधिण्। १९॥

dक्कुच वेददाराम् ईश्वरः प्रतिपादितः।
ब्रह्मा वै विष्णुः। (तैसबो)
प्राच्यायुषः। (वैयोज) इत्यादि भूतिः। 'तत्स्थ वा वषास्य प्रसासने
गार्ग्य वाणाध्येये विधते निष्ठा।' (हदजो) इत्यादिपुच, न तु
विस्तृत्तत्मा भ्रामसांवान नात्यम्, यथा स्त्रानरकादिवेदविषयोमा
काना, तथा 'ईश्वरामुपायेः' इतिविधेर्विवात्मयत्। तथा लक्षते
5पि प्रामाण्ये, सन्ताता सुराग्निर्विविधिणामपि सार्थे प्रमाणां
न स्वातः, न तद्देवुं क्षार्थ्यारैवैति। खार्थ्यप्रतिपाददाराएव
विधा विस्तृत्ततान्त्रयः। वाक्यातः, वैदिकप्राग्निर्वाचनिन्द्रा-

विविद्युम्बिष्टति, तस्यामभवयुपायं विषि ते तथामुदये; "भनेमाल्य-
चरण् यजेत" इति वि समामन्तं, ग लभ्यतेरितयतं इति
प्रवर्त्यामिनः समादिष्ठे। वथ ब्रजवद्विलेखदिवं नवाहरमुखमणि
विस्तृतं ज्ञाता गैरावसभिषितति, तद्पि प्राचीनमत्तायेः यथा शास्त्रमेव,
ब्रजवद्विलेखदिवसमथये। तस्याम मुखतत्स्थु गुहतर्लाभिदिति प्राचीन-
दानवुसमण्डर प्राचीनमर्म प्राचीनगामेसव साधीम्, तथातः गुरुनवीन-
सर्विद्यावनुसर्वकोशविद्यम्।

* च चायत झर्यहः, विश्वामिथवान्विन्ति प्रश्नस्य वेदस्य वर्णे किया
साग्यमये, भूतायदिवेधरस्य नात्स्य ग सार्थे प्रमाणां परमु विधायशं
व तत्त्वनिर्मिती 'सच्चा वै विष्णुः' रक्तान्यभिषिक्षात्मान्यत् नाहतु स्वास्यमिति
न सार्थे प्रमाणमिति चास्यनया ईश्वरान्यिदितिति समांवाण्डा।
प्राच च तजस्मानिवेयस्य सिद्धान्तः, 'वर्ण दुःखेन सर्वभिषम्' रक्तान्
दीर्घां मुरार्यानामिप सुराग्निर्विविधवात्साधृः 'सर्ववासी यजेत'
इत्यादिविधिेवात्मयते यथा सार्थे प्रमाणां ह्रतकतमसं, तथा 'ईश्वर-
मुपायेः' इत्यादिविधेर्विवात्मयते 'सच्चा वै विष्णुः' रक्तादिर्यान्त-
प्रतिपाददाराएव कामान्य प्रमाणान्तमान्तमान्यायहि दितिति।
वाक्याति प्रश्नावनिद्राज्ञानमूळंकालिः प्रश्नावनिद्रावदवाच्छ-लाते परिणतितुरबवामध्यभण्मदिविन्। १५॥
बंश्याविशेषात्वेव बाखानातरमात्र
कामभूतं भविष्यामीमात्रादिः संख्या प्रवक्ता॥
समाखायिपि च बाखानाः नामनवावचाेते॥ १६॥
वैदिकीकालमुपहेतु खल्लीचारविलयः: शक्ता वाच्या, 'तद्
वै चतुः प्रोक्तं वंज शाम्'(क्रन्द्ये) श्रादिवक्रकु उनमपृष्ठ-
युने। शाखापदार्थमन्यमात्र समाखोयादि। शवावां शाखानां
विकारकाकाकापकाचा: समाखा: संज्ञाविशेषा: सूचने, ते च नामात्मानसग्रहविलयः। अब्रह्माणानानत् तादशावावनपि
तद्यथावता। तबातोक्त्रियार्थदेशी। भगवानेव काश्याकृति: मानाते वादावादार्थकद्वित्तकायकान्नारिविशेषांगिष्ठाय चां शाखामुक्तवान् तथा: शाखायाखाभ्यता वदेश दृति विद्यु-
मोक्षमनं भीमथेतु:॥ १६॥
सम्बन्धिरे न विश्वासां प्रश्वाचः
इत्याव ज्ञिनोनियंशविधश्वविभेदेयाविराचारिते
संख्यानुसारमात्राय चढाय ते शैवशास्त्रविधः॥
किंतु प्रश्वातम्मत्रोपशविधश्वविभेदाविशिष्टान्
काले कार्तिके लक्ष्मी जापया ते तारपायो गरा:॥ १७॥
दत्तशास्त्र: खण्डे, प्रवेशमेउः प्रकारार्थोऽप्रेलस्माः शैवशास्त्र: लोचने,

* चालौ 'संख्यायेन विश्वात्मे ज्ञाते जयानि व दृति कुलविचारस्य समाखायां कीलस्मारस्मारस्मारसः। तादाध्यात्मिति पाठे संख्या दृति प्रेलशास्त्रेऽप्रेलशास्त्र:।
मद्यः खावः।

अतिकाठिनिष्का वा। प्रस्तुते देवरे विप्रतीपविधयः प्रतिकृतः। तादृशा चचों उधैरितिः काले भवविनिकाः।

श्रव्याकालः न्यूतः। कायः॥ १७॥

श्रव्याकालो निर्मगसन्ध्याविरागतो निमग्नः लघूः। लघूः निर्मन्यायां तथापि तरस्य नाशापि बलुप्तं हृति।

तद्भवः लरिव विप्रविधिः कहर्षणः चेत लर्देकायतः।

याते चेतती नापवत्व भवतो याम्यः। पुनर्यात्ना।॥ १८॥

श्रव्यः तत्त्वः। बलुप्तं द्वितीयः करणः करणः।

द्वितोऽविवृत्ति अतिकुमारिक्ष्यविद्याः। यं द्वितोऽविवृत्ति अतिकुमारिक्ष्यविद्याः॥ १९॥

द्वितीयः चामकः।

नेत्र वायुवेदः नेत्र वायुवेदः।

दौतीः शोरिद्रासम्भवः चार्ययोगविविक्तकस्माच्छल्लिकारिका।

वायुवेदः समासम्।
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**शुद्धिप्रत्यैतः**
### Shuklapuram

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| कर्ति |
KUSUMANJALI,

OR

THE HANDFUL OF FLOWERS.

FIRST CLUSTER.

I.—May this handful of flowers of faultless logic, devoted to the twofold proof* of God, delight my mind without hindrance while bee-like hovering over it,—this handful of flowers, opening under favourable auspices, and affording a banquet to the upright by the inhaling of its fragrance,—one which will not fade, however closely handled,—the home of a honey that distils the nectar of immortality.†

II.—“But is there not an absence of evidence to establish any connection between such a fruit as liberation and your argument devoted to the twofold proof of the existence of God,—since the word soul which signifies that soul which is the object of the so-called essential knowledge,‡ merely means that individual soul which is the object of

* I. e. the arguments which establish his existence, and the discussion as to the validity of the premises which becomes necessary if these are not accepted. The words may also mean ‘laid at the feet of God.’
† The latter half of this sloka (the former in the original) has a double meaning, as nearly every word has a technical or logical sense,—‘this handful of flowers, which reveals the knowledge of true minor terms and affords a banquet to the intelligent by the perception of an undoubted universal connection [between the middle and major terms] &c.”—I may add that the proverb alluded to in the commentary ज्ञानं गौरव अभियान्त्रिक याग्नित्य रुपाणि रुपांतमि is quoted to show that though rasa properly denotes an attribute, it here means the subject which possesses it.
‡ Alluding to such passages as that in the Brhadáraṇy. Upanishad (ii. 4, 6.) ‘behold the soul (ātmā) is verily to be seen, heard, contemplated and profoundly meditated upon.'
the illusory knowledge that is the cause of the sensible world; and therefore the contemplating of this is the true means of liberation?"* To meet this doubt he replies,

II.—That Being, whose worship the wise consider as the means of the two heaven-like liberations,—He, the Supreme Soul, is here ascertained (as the object of our contemplation).

The ‘two heaven-like liberations’ [as intensely desirable from the absence of all pain,] are the liberation while still remaining in this life, and the absolute emancipation. The contemplation of God is a means of liberation through the merit produced thereby or through the knowledge of one’s own soul. This S’ruti† is the proof that it is such a cause, ‘having known him only one goes beyond death; there is no other path to obtain it.’ And that the knowledge of one’s own soul is the cause of liberation is proved by the s’ruti,‡ ‘When a man truly discriminates the soul and says “I am He,” what can he wish for? or in desire of what object can he follow the continuous onflow of mundane events?’

III.—Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four wellknown] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit or desert, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahápas’upatas as the Independent one, undefiled by vaedic or secular violations,—the S’aivas as S’iva,—the Vaishnavas as Purushottama,—the followers of the Purápas as the great Father (Brahma),—the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,—the Saugatas as the Omniscient,—the Jainas as the Unobstructed,—the Mímánsakas as Him who is pointed out as

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* This being the seat of the great error, it is to this that our contemplations should be directed.
† S’vetás’vatara Upanishad, iii. 8.
‡ Brihadá. Up. iv. 12.—S’ankara read चक्षुरेऽर्न for चंचरेऽ.
to be worshipped,—the Chārvākas as Him who is established by the convention of the world,—the followers of the Nyāya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,—why farther detail? whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan, Viśwakarman,)—although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable S'iva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, &c. how can there arise any doubt? and what then is there to be ascertained?—Still this logical investigation may be well called the contemplation of God, and this is really worship when it follows the hearing the S'ody. Therefore that adorable one who hath been often heard mentioned in the S'ody, Smṛiti, narrative poems, Purāṇas, &c., must now be contemplated, according to such a S'ody as 'He is to be heard and to be contemplated,' and such a Smṛiti as 'by the Veda, inference and the delight of continued meditation,—in this threefold manner producing knowledge, a man obtains the highest concentration.' Now there is, in short, a fivefold opposition to our theory,—as based, first, on the non-existence of any supernatural cause of another world (as adṛṣṭa, the merit and demerit of our actions);—or secondly, on the possibility of our putting in action certain causes of another world (as sacrifices), even if God be allowed to be non-existent;—or thirdly, on the existence of proofs which show the non-existence of God;—or fourthly, on the opinion that, even if God does exist, he cannot be a cause of true knowledge to us;—or fifthly, on the absence of any argument to prove his existence.

"Very"—without any second; "knower"—existing in the form of pure knowledge; "first wise"—existing in the form of intelligence at the first beginning of creation; "perfect"—as possessed of the eight divine faculties; ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence, are the five "pains;" sacrifice, injuring others, &c.
as causing merit and demerit, are the "actions;" rank, length of life and enjoyment are the "fruits;" merit and demerit the "deserts" left as a residue in the mind. "Revealed"—i.e. manifested [as a previously existing object], since the Veda is eternal. He is "gracious" as being the original instructor in arts, as of making jars, &c. "S'iva," void of the three qualities; the "great Father" as the father even of the father; "omniscient" with a momentary omniscience.* The "obstructions" are ignorance, desire, aversion, delusion, and tenacity of mundane existence,—"pointed out as to be worshipped" as the Vaidic mantras, &c.—possessed of "all that is said worthy of him" in the various descriptions of God. "School" (charaṇa) means here recension (śākhā).† Although the existence of God is indeed established by the S'rutis' evidence, yet, if we wish to employ inference, the absence of doubt need not be a fault in our argument.‡ He therefore proceeds towards the close of the passage to propose a doubt, according to the principle of satisfying an opponent.

IV.—We have to meet the opponent's first objection by establishing the existence of a supernatural cause of another world in the form of merit and demerit, and, if this be established, then it follows that a God is established as the superintendent thereof, since a non-intelligent cause can only produce its effect by the superintendence of something intelligent. He therefore proceeds to establish this.

IV.—From dependence,—from eternity,—from diversity,—from universal practice,—and from the apportionment to each individual soul,—mundane enjoyment implies a supernatural cause [i.e. desert.]

Our proposition is that there exists a supernatural cause of another world, i.e. a cause beyond the reach of the senses. a. First of all, then, to establish the class of causes in general, he says "from dependence." Dependence means here that the effect is occasional. All effects must have a cause since they are occasional, like the gratification produc-

* The Mādhyamika Baudhās hold that everything is momentary, tātāḥ pāti.
† For the original difference between charaṇa and śākhā cf. Muller's Ancient Sanskrit literature, p. 125. On pravara, see ibid., p. 386.
‡ In ordinary cases people do not take the trouble of arguing if there is no doubt to be solved.
od by food; [otherwise, if they did not depend on a cause, they could be found everywhere and always]. b. "But if the cause of a jar, &c. were eternal, would it not follow that the jar, &c. would also be eternal, and therefore we must assume the jar's cause to be itself only occasional, and therefore the perpetual series of causes must be all occasional, each dependent on its previous cause?" To meet this objection of a regressus in infinitum he says "from the eternity [of the succession of cause and effect]," like the continued series of seed and shoot,* the meaning being that a regressus in infinitum ceases to be a fault, if, like this one alleged in our illustration, it can be proved by the evidence of our senses. c. "But [if you require a cause,] why not say [with the Vedántin] that Brahma alone is the cause, or [with the Sánkhya] Nature in the form of various individual intellects?" To meet this, he says "from the diversity [of effects, as heaven, hell, &c.]"—as the effects imply a diversity of causes, from their being diverse as effects. d. "But why not accept a visible cause as sacrifices, &c.—why have recourse to an invisible desert (adriśa) ?" To meet this, he adds "from the universal practice," i. e. from the fact that all men, desiring fruit in another world, do engage in sacrifices, &c. It is only the conviction that they do produce heaven, &c. as their fruit, which makes men engage in sacrifices, &c.; and these [passing away when the action is over] cannot produce this fruit unless by means of some influence which continues to act after the rite is over,—and hence is this invisible influence, called merit or demerit, established. e. "But why not say that this desert does not reside in the same subject as the enjoyment [i. e. the individual soul] but produces the enjoyment by abiding in the thing enjoyed?" He replies "from the apportionment to each soul." Since the enjoyment resides in each soul severally, we should be unwarranted to attribute its production to a desert residing elsewhere.

V.—"But why may we not suppose that the effect arises without a cause, according to the adversary's opinion given in the Nyáya Sátrás (iv. 22), "there is an origination of entities from no cause, for we see the sharpness of a thorn, &c.?"" He replies,

* Cf. Cowper's remarks on his cucumber, "I raised the seed that produced the plant, that produced the fruit, that produced the seed, that produced the fruit I sent you."
V.—"Without a cause" cannot mean the denial of a cause or of production, nor can it imply that the effect itself or an unreal thing is the cause; and if you suggest "spontaneously," it cannot mean that, from effects being definitely limited.

Does your "without a cause" mean that a. there is no cause at all? or b. does it deny all production? or c. does it imply the rejection of all foreign causes? or d. of all real causes?* Under either pair of alternatives the ultimate result is that you have no cause at all, and, under the latter pair, the additional absurdity of a false cause.†—Or e. does it mean "spontaneously"? But effects are definitely limited, since, if they were not, occasionalness would be at an end, [as they might then arise always and everywhere.]

VI.—"But if we are to assume an eternal succession of causes and effects (as otherwise we cannot account for the occasionalness of effects,)—still even then, as that which is distinguished by the nature of fire (scil. fire) will not always be found only where straw, &c., are, these latter will have to be excluded from being causes, and therefore we shall again have our old difficulty of occasionalness being precluded, as no other cause can be mentioned." Here the Māmsakas come in and maintain that we must assume as a cause the fact of there being present a capacity favourable to fire, and thus "capacity" must be allowed to be a separate category‡ varying according to each individual, non-eternal in the non-eternal thing, described as it is in the line

'Eternal in the eternal, and in the non-eternal produced by the cause of that thing in which it resides.'

Or as another opinion holds [that of S'ñkarāchārya] "there is an eternal capacity favourable to fire, abiding in straw, the arāpi wood, and the burning gem."—The Nyāyākṣas however maintain that there is an actual difference of class which accompanies the being produced from straw, arāpi or the burning gem,—since, if we assumed a capacity favourable to one and the same thing (i.e. to fire,) and yet itself existing in things of different classes (as straw, &c.,) then on seeing

* That is, there can be imagined false causes.
† Under any one of the four cases you have really no proper 'cause' at all (thus in the third, the thing must precede itself to fulfil the definition of a cause;) and hence any supposed cause (as in c., and d.,) can only be a false one.
‡ Cf. Siddhānta Muktāvali, pp. 3, 4.
smoke, &c., you could not draw the inference of fire, &c.* And again, [if this assumption were correct], we should not have such respective colligations of concurrent causes of fire, as straw and blowing, arasi wood and rubbing, or the burning gem and the reflected rays of the sun, since we see in other cases that that which possesses the property that determines causation (i.e. according to the present theory, capacity) will produce its effect in conjunction with anything which similarly possesses some other property that determines causation; and therefore, in the present case, we should be led to expect fire to result from such a conjunction as the gem and blowing. If you would meet this by assuming that there is one capacity favourable to fire, which resides not in any one thing alone (as straw,) but in the several combinations, as straw and blowing, and the rest,—this is not the true solution, but you must rather accept (from its greater simplicity) my theory that a difference of class resides in the various fires produced by straw, &c., as is seen by the evidence of the senses, like the fire of a lamp, &c.† Hence Capacity is not to be assumed as a separate category. These discussions are condensed in the following couplet.

VI.—This succession of causes and effects has no beginning, nor has it one capacity abiding in things of different classes [as straw, &c.] ; we must diligently strive for ourselves to fix the several limitations, by determining the constant accompaniments and separations.‡

The meaning of this is that we must assume a difference of class (i.e. species,) in effects produced by different causes. [If you ask “Then, in reference to what cause, is the class of fire (as the genus,) the determining notion of all the various special fires as effects, I reply,] heat as possessing a peculiar hot quality to the touch§ is the cause in the case of all the various fires. [In the case of the different species of fire

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* Fire would not be the cause of smoke, in its nature as fire, but simply as having a capacity for producing smoke; and therefore on seeing smoke, our true inference would be that the mountain has not “fire” but “a capacity for producing smoke.”
† The fire in a lamp lights the house, while fire from wood or cow-dung produces little or no light.
‡ E. g. Fire may be found, and yet no straw, but a gem; and vice versa.
§ This epithet is added to exclude ‘gold.’
we have different causes, straw, &c., but in all alike we have the general cause ‘heat,’ i.e. heat is the necessary and universal antecedent].

VII.—"But may we not say that as one and the same lamp gives light, destroys the wick and illumines different objects as jars, &c., so we may have one common cause, either as the one Brahma (with the Vedántin,) or as Nature (with the Sáṅkhya) which is not to be distinguished from the various intellects apportioned to the different souls, as the cause and effect are identical;—and hence the existence of God will not be established as the superintendent of merit and demerit, [since our supposed causes will evolve their own effects, and we therefore need not assume adhrishta as the special cause of the world]?"

To meet this he says,

VII.—Of one there can be no succession, of the same there can be no variety; it is not a special capacity since this cannot be severed,—nature is hard to be violated.

From one cause alone there can be no determinate succession of effects [as they would be all produced simultaneously;] and from the same cause, i.e. one general cause (as the Sáṅkhya’s prakṛiti) therefore cannot be a variety of effects, i.e. effects of different kinds; and therefore since we find successive effects produced, we must conclude that there are successive causes, and, since we find effects of various kinds, we must conclude the causes to be likewise various in kind.

He now refutes the doubt that perhaps various effects might be produced from one general cause by special capacities, by the words "it is not a special capacity, since this cannot be severed" from the subject in which it resides, as the power and that which possesses the power are really identical; and if you sever them, then we shall have to accept the power as the true cause, and in this way your unity of cause is destroyed, and duality follows.—"May we not hold that one cause can produce various effects simply by its own nature?" He replies "nature is hard to be violated." If that same nature which existed when one effect had to be produced, continued to exist at the time of the production of another, then the nature of water, &c., might exist in fire,—that is, a thing’s real nature cannot remain concealed. The instance of the lamp is not in point, as it can be explained by a difference in the concurrent causes necess-
sary to produce the different effects. *

VIII. "But why may we not say that the potter's staff, &c. may be a cause in the case of jars, &c., but not sacrifices, &c. in the case of heaven, &c.?" He replies,

VIII. The universal practice is not fruitless, nor can it have trouble as its only fruit; nor can it have as its fruit some visible gain; nor can there be such a deception [as this would involve if all were false].

The activity in performing sacrifices to obtain heaven, which all display who desire another world, cannot be fruitless, nor can it have trouble as its sole result,—since activity arises only from a conviction that such a course will be a means to obtain the desired object. Nor can we say that its fruit is the attainment of some visible object, i.e., reputation for sanctity, wealth, &c., since even those perform sacrifices who have no regard to such objects. Should you reply that some knave first devised the custom of offering sacrifices as means of obtaining heaven, and the rest of mankind were cajoled into following his example, this is met by the words "nor can there be such a deception." For who could be so utterly different from the rest of mankind as for the mere sake of deceiving others to impose upon himself a round of actions which necessarily cause all sorts of trouble? and hence we may safely infer that the universal practice of sacrifice is a proof that sacrifices do produce heaven as their result.

IX. "Well, then, why not say that sacrifices, &c., may be the direct causes of [our obtaining] heaven, &c., and not any merit which they are said to produce?" He replies,

IX. A thing long passed cannot produce its result without some continuant influence over and above. The souls, having no distinction, could not have enjoyment even though the objects were affected by adrishtā.

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* Thus for the giving light we have the conjunction of the flame and wick, &c.; for the burning of the wick we have the destruction of the conjunction previously existing between the particles of the wick; for the illuminating of objects we have the conjunction of the eye with the jar, and that of the jar with the light.
A "thing long passed," i. e. the sacrifice, &c., "without some continuous influence over and above," i. e. an operation favourable to producing the result, cannot produce that result; for a cause which has long ceased to be, can only act as a cause by means of some operation [or influence] that continues to exist after it, just as the transient perception of the senses only produces recollection by means of the impression which it leaves in the mind, [to produce the actual recollection we require some reminding association to arouse the dormant impression.]—"May we not say that adriṣṭa may be the cause, as residing in the thing to be enjoyed [and not as merit in the person enjoying?]" He replies by the subsequent line. If the souls had no distinction, one from the other, in the form of different kinds of merit, they could not receive different degrees of enjoyment [as we see they do] from different bodies [higher or lower in the scale], even though these were affected by adriṣṭa,—since these bodies are properly common to all souls. In other words, the varying enjoyment can only be produced by the different bodies and their organs as attracted, in each case, by the respective merit of the individual souls.

X. "But" [the Mīmāṃsaka will say,] "why not allow a certain imperceptible property [i. e. the before-mentioned capacitas] residing in the objects to be enjoyed, which produces the enjoyment in each particular case, just as we accept a particular kind of capacity which abides in fire, &c., and produces their special effects, as burning, &c.? Otherwise [i. e., if the fire burns of itself and not by its capacity,] we should have to expect the effect of burning to be produced wherever there was contact between the fire and the hand, even though the latter wore the fire-extinguishing gem. Nor may you say that the absence of this gem should be considered as also a cause of burning,—because causation must always imply presence and existence.* The true statement is that the gem produces the destruction of the burning capacity, and hence its common name 'the obstructor;' and hence we maintain that the category of Capacity must be accepted." He replies,

X. As existence, so too non-existence is held to be

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* See Jaimini Sūtras l., Mitakṣarā iii.
a cause as well as an effect; obstruction is the absence of means, and that which causes this is 'an obstructor.'

As we prove by constant accompaniment and separation that absence or non-existence (abhāva), i.e. emergent non-existence,* may be an effect, similarly we can prove that it may be a cause,—since there is no reason to establish such a maxim as yours, that 'causation must imply presence and existence.'—The second line replies to the objection that an inanimate thing cannot be said to be an obstructor. Obstruction (pratibandha) signifies "the absence of means," i.e. of causes to produce such and such an effect; and this in our present topic would be "the absence of the extinguishing gem's absence," i.e. the presence of the gem itself. Properly speaking the man who places the gem is the obstructor (pratibandha); but by the grammatical rule which allows the affix ka to be added pleonastically, we may accept pratibandha to be used for pratibandha, the 'obstructor' for the 'obstruction.'

The modern Mīmāṃsakas, however, maintain that "there is a needless complication in assuming such a cause as the absence of such a fire-extinguishing gem as is attended by the absence of all [excitants as the fire-exciting gem, charms, &c.]† it is more simple to assume an eternal capacity in fire, &c., and, when the gem is present, this capacity is deadened. (Nor may you say that 'a capacity is first produced from the straw, &c. the causes of the fire,—this capacity resides in the fire, and is destroyed by the extinguishing gem and rescuscitated by the exciting gem; and any objection on the ground of the indeterminate nature of the cause of the capacity‡ might be met by the assumption that its cause is only such a cause by virtue of itself possessing a capacity favourable for producing the former capacity.' This, we repeat, is unwarranted, because

* Emergent non-existence is the destruction of a thing previously existing. We prove that it is an effect because the destruction of a jar is only seen when it is preceded by some cause as the blow of a hammer, &c. and wherever these are not found, there the jar is not destroyed. The Mīmāṃsā holds that abhāva, being really nothing, cannot be a cause. But he proves that absence can be similarly shown to be a cause,—where absence of the fire-extinguisher is, there is burning, and where there is not this absence, there is no burning.

† If the fire-extinguishing gem were present with the fire-exciting gem, its effect would be neutralised. Cf. Siddhānta Muktāvali, p. 4.

‡ Its cause being sometimes straw, &c. and sometimes the exciting gem.
rather than assume such a multitude of successive capacities residing in the fire, it would be more simple to assume [with our opponents, the followers of the Nyāya,] that the one cause is the absence of such an extinguishing gem as is attended by the absence of a fire-exciting gem.) Therefore we maintain that in the case of burning we must assume, as the determining notion of causation, the presence of an undeadened capacity.” Thus hold the modern Māṁsākasya; but we cannot agree with them, because we should then have to assume an endless number of different capacities, as that of the extinguishing gem to cause the deadening of the burning capacity, that of the exciting gem to destroy the deadening, &c. This is a brief summary of the discussion.

XI. But the Māṁsākasya reply, “In the Vaidic injunction ‘he sprinkles the rice, he shells the rice,’ do we not assume an operation or capacity [i. e. sanskāra,] produced by the sprinkling, which abides in the rice and produces the future shelling, since what we understand by the expression is that only that rice which is sprinkled is capable of being shelled? and it may be taken as a general rule that whenever anything is done through desire of an effect which will reside in some other thing, the former produces an operation which produces the result residing in the latter, as is the case with sacrifices. [Sacrifices are done for the sake of happiness (as heaven, &c.) residing in the man; therefore the means thereto, the merit produced by the rite, must also reside in the man.] And again, unless we accept a continuant capacity, how can we account for rice, and rice only, being produced from sown rice, though the seed is dissolved in the ground into its component atoms? and similarly we must say that ploughing in the month Māgha (Jan.—Feb.) produces a capacity residing in the ground [which eventually produces a good harvest in Nov. and Dec.]” He answers,

XI. We accept an influence produced in man by such acts as sprinkling the rice, &c.* the qualities of the atoms, as form affected by contact with fire, &c., cause the distinction.

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* Some say that there are three ways of sprinkling—prokṣhāṇa with the supine hand, abhyukṣhāṇa with the inverted hand, and udukṣhāṇa by a motion of the hand sideways. But other authorities give them differently.
By sprinkling, &c. there is produced in man an influence which we call ‘desert,’—since it is simpler to assume one single influence residing in the soul directly producing the shelling which is indirectly produced by sprinkling, &c.,* than to assume a variety of capacities for each parcel of rice,—and since some power or attribute must be assumed to be produced by a veda-commanded act which tends to a future result, as there is no visible means for the result being brought about. From the phrase “purified rice” we assume that the influence resides in the rice by a connection† which is the same as the nature of the thing [while it resides in the man by the so-called intimate relation :] and so too in the case of consecrated water, branches, &c. there is produced an influence or merit residing in the man favourable to producing such and such a result [as the consecration of the jar.] [Nor may you say that “if the merit produced do not reside in the rice but in the man, then why is vrñhīs in the objective case, as wherever there is this objective case we find the effect residing there, as in ‘he cooks rice,’—here the effect produced by cooking, i.e., softening, resides in the rice, &c.”—as we reply that] your vaïdic example stands on the same footing as such a common secular phrase as “he sprinkles the fried barley flour”—here there is no Vaidic injunction, yet we find an objective case used, the real meaning of which is this, viz. the possessing a result produced by the action of another (i.e., the man), which result is the conjunction of the water produced by that action, i.e., the sprinkling. Besides your general maxim that ‘whenever a thing is done through desire of an effect, &c.’ fails in such cases as the hawk-sacrifice, which is performed for the sake of the slaughter of an enemy [which slaughter of course resides in him] while it produces a result [hell] which resides in the performer.

* In other words adriśāta is the vydpāra of the sprinkling, according to the principle taj-janyatva avat taj-janyā-janaka hi vydpāraḥ.
† In Hindu philosophy there are three principal relations,—1. the samavāya or intimate relation, i.e., what exists between the whole and its parts, a substance and its qualities, or both these and their guṇas; 2. the kanyogya or conjunction, as between a pot and the soil on which it stands; and 3. svarūpa or the nature of the thing. This last may be generally said to take up all those relations which are not included in the two former, such as the relation between an object and the knowledge of it (vishayatū), that between abhāva and the spot of ground from which the absent thing is absent, &c., and that between a distinguishing attribute (not a proper quality or action) and its subject, as śkāśātwa in śkāśa. Hence the svarūpa-sambandha is sometimes called vishayatū-sambandha. The two former are something other than the things related; the svarūpa-sambandha is really one or the other of them.
He now explains by the second line the determined production of barley, &c., from the several seeds as sown. The qualities of the atoms, such as form affected by contact with fire, &c.* produce the distinction, i. e. the atoms as possessed of the qualities of form, moisture, &c. affected by contact with fire, tend to produce such and such events [rice or barley, as it may be,—the desert of the individual acting as the concurrent cause.] In the case of healing [where the opponent might allege that the medicine produced an after effect by means of his supposed continuant capacity,] the drinking of the medicine produces an equilibrium between the three humours, and this is the means of the subsequently produced destruction of the disease.†

XII. "But how then [except by the assumption of our special category 'Capacity,'] will you account for sensible touch, &c. in the case of air, &c. which seem cold, &c. to the body, where there is no form produced by contact with fire, [as there is in earth?] or again how is the natural liquidity of water stopped in ice, &c. ? or how in images, &c. do such ceremonies become effectual as those for inviting the deity to take up his residence therein, &c. ? We hold therefore that we must admit such a thing as a capacity produced by the rite pratishtá‡ which can be destroyed by the touch of impure persons as the Chândâla, &c., which capacity renders the image a fit object of worship." He replies,

XII. The perceptible form, &c. and their absence [in ice and air] arise from contact with special causes; the deities are worshipped through their coming [into the image] or through the worshipper's consciousness of having duly performed the rite.

The 'special causes' are the various kinds of merit in the person [gratified by the cold air or ice.] The deities become conciliated by

* It is a peculiarity of the element earth that its form, taste (or moisture,) smell and touch are changed by contact with fire.
† Our author does not notice the objection of the ploughing in Mâgha. Another writer Pakshadharamitra in his Padârtha Mâlâ supplies the omission. According to him "Through the ploughing in Mâgha the original soil is destroyed by the series of acts tending to the separation of the atoms which destroys their original conjunction, and subsequently by the disintegration a new soil is produced, and through this is the ploughing in Mâgha a cause of the excellent harvest afterwards."
‡ The ceremony of consecrating an image of a deity.
the ceremony of consecration, and shew it by coming to take up their
residence, i.e. by their appropriation of the image and transference
of self-consciousness thereto; but by the touch of an impure person
such appropriation and self-consciousness are rendered void. Even on
the Mínánsaka view which disputes the intelligence of the deities, we
can say that it is the idea [in the worshipper's mind] that the
worship has been performed in due manner, and that the image
has been duly consecrated,—this idea being also necessarily accom-
panied by the absence of the touch of any impure person,—
which constitutes the image's fitness as an object of worship,
and the ceremony's importance lies in its contributing to produce
this idea. But in reality it is the absence of any impure contact
as with a Cháṇḍála, &c. at the time of the prātiśhthā ceremony and
also after the ceremony is over, which constitutes the fitness of the
image as an object of worship; since the rule "let him worship it
when duly inaugurated by the ceremony prātiśhthā" implies that the
ceremony must be already over. Such is a summary of the discussion.

XIII. "But ought we not to say that in the weighing ordeal, &c.
a power or capacity is produced in the scales by the ceremony of the
ordeal, and by that a result is produced such as the rising or sinking
of the defendant in the scales?"*

He replies,

XIII. Only for the discovering of the concurrent of the
cause of victory or defeat,—which cause abides as an
attribute in the person examined,—are the rules of the
ordeal instituted.

Only to discover the concurrent, favourable to the desired result
(i.e. the rising or sinking in the scale),—the concurrent of the
desert which is the proper cause of the victory or defeat in the
ordeal,—are the rules of the ordeal instituted. "I who according
to the rule of the ordeal now mount the scales am innocent or
guilty,"—this consciousness in the man's own mind is the concur-
rent.—Or another interpretation is "only to discover the residing
of (i.e. to produce,) merit or demerit are the rules of the ordeal
instituted," and thus in relation to innocence such as is conformable

* For this kind of ordeal see Professor Stenzler's essay on 'die Indische
to his protestation merit is produced, and demerit in relation to his
guiltiness.* The second mode is preferable, as in this way an ob-
jection is obviated which would apply to the former, viz.,—"in the case
of a man falsely accused of killing a Brāhmaṇa, &c., as his not
having done it is not meritorious, how could his consciousness of
innocence be a concurrent cause?"†

XIV. But here the Sāṅkhya come in with their system,—"There
is Soul, the abode of intelligence, but not a cause of anything, and
consequently unchangeable and eternal; and Nature which is one,
unintelligent, subject to development and eternal; the first develop-
ment from Nature is Intellect, the so-called 'great' first principle,—
in it are eight attributes, viz. knowledge, ignorance, might, weakness,
freedom from passion, subjection to passion, merit and demerit, or the
eight may be otherwise enumerated as knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire,
aversion, effort, merit, and demerit,—as this school does not accept
the Naiyāyik self-reproductive quality of imagination, bhāvand, since
they hold that at the time of memory the perception itself does remain
in a very subtil form. As without the assumption of soul we cannot
account for the unintelligent product of Nature, Intellect,
imagining itself to be intelligent, we conclude that the existence
of soul is hence established,—identical with its essential attribute
intelligence, since the subject and attribute are always undistin-
guishable. From Nature arises the Great one, from the Great one
Egoism, from Egoism the five subtil elements, form, flavour, smell,
touch and sound; and the organs [of perception and action], the eye,
skin, nose, tongue, ear, and mind, and the voice, hand, foot, anus
and generative organ; while from the subtil elements are produced the
gross elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether. This has been thus
described, [in the Sāṅkhya Kārikā,] "Original Nature is not an
evolute; the seven, intellect, &c. are evolvent and evolute; the set
of sixteen are only evolute; while Soul is neither evolvent nor evolute."
The set of sixteen is made up by the five gross elements and the eleven
organs of perception and action. [Should you ask why we assume
mind as our eleventh organ, we reply,] a, if the eternal Soul were

* By the former interpretation merit and knowledge act conjointly in pro-
ducing the result, by the second merit alone.
† This negative knowledge could not be the sañkārā of a previous punya,
as there is no punya in the absence of an action.
itself associated with the objects of inherent joy and pain, it would follow that there could be no liberation; b. if the connection with objects took place in dependence on Nature, it would equally follow that, since Nature is eternal, there could be no liberation; c. if the non-eternal objects, jars, &c., were associated with the essential intelligence, it would follow that there could be no such distinction as 'seen' and 'not seen,' [as all the things now existing would necessarily be seen at one and the same moment;] and d. if the association of objects and intelligence depended on the external organs only, we could not account for the perceptions through different organs not being simultaneous; and hence we must assume the existence of a distinct organ, mind, in connection with which the external organs produce the association of the object and intelligence. In dreams when a person thinks himself a tiger, &c. there is not present to him the consciousness that he is a man; hence we must also assume the existence of a faculty, egoism, whose function is the assuming the consciousness of various objects. Since we see inspiration and expiration ceaselessly going on, in waking, dreams, and sound sleep, we must assume the existence of a faculty which continues acting throughout, viz. the principle of Intellect endowed with the eight attributes before mentioned; the object being brought into connection with Intellect's development, viz. cognition, conceals the real nature of Soul, and hence it is that liberation arises when, from the destruction of the principle Intellect, there ceases to be any connection with objects; while the idea 'I, the intelligent, act' arises from the nonperception of the difference between the (witness) soul and the active intellect. This has been explained in the Bhagavad Gita "actions are ever done by the qualities of nature, the soul blinded by egoism thinks 'I am the doer.'" And this Intellect consists of three portions, the reflection of the Soul, the reflection of the object, and the arising determination, as in the thought 'this must be done by me,'—here 'by me' shows the reflection of the intelligent Soul, which is not an actual intercourse, but only illusory in consequence of the nonperception of the distinction between the Soul and Intellect; 'this' shows the reflection of the object; and the arising resolve 'must be done' is dependent upon both these. The connection of the Soul, as reflected in Intellect, with the object, is what we call knowledge, and the connection of the Soul with this know-
ledge is seen in the determination 'I, the intelligent, act,'" [whereas in reality the intelligent cannot act and the acting faculty cannot think.]

To meet this, he says,

XIV. The attributes of the agent are the determiners [that knowledge and action reside in the same subject]; and the intelligent is our only agent; otherwise, we should necessarily have no liberation or else no mundane succession of events.

The attributes merit, demerit, desire and aversion must reside in the same subject with action, since experience of happiness and misery resides in the same subject with action [and these produce all such experience]; and in the same way we hold that the intelligent soul is alone the agent, as is proved by the impression 'I, the intelligent, act.' The second line adds another refutation of the Sāṅkhya doctrine. If Intellect were eternal, then there could be no liberation, as the Soul would always remain associated with Intellect; if it were noneternal, then it must be allowed to have been produced, as a noneternal thing cannot but have been produced; and in this case, previously to its production, as the attributes belonging to it would be also then non-existent, it would follow that their effects, the various bodies, organs, &c., assigned to individuals, would as yet be equally unproduced, and consequently there would be no mundane succession of events, [and therefore no bondage of soul, and consequently no need of liberation.]

XV. Here steps in the Chārvāka, "well, let desert be an attribute of an intelligent being; but this intelligent being is not eternal and all-pervading, but a certain kind of element modified in the form of the body, since such phrases as 'I, the pale one, know' prove that it has form [and form is a corporeal attribute.]" He answers,

XV. One does not remember what another has seen; the body remains not one and the same from decay; there cannot be transference of impressions, and if you accept a non-momentary existence there is no other means.

If intelligence belonged to the body, there could be no remembrance in youth of things experienced in childhood, just as Maitra cannot remember what Chaitra saw; nor can you say that the body conti-
nuces one and the same in childhood and youth, because of its "decay," i.e., destruction, since by a difference of size the thing itself becomes different, as the destruction of the former size is brought about by the destruction of the subject in which it resided. Nor may you maintain that the second body, as the effect, may still remember what had been experienced by its cause the previous body, because "there cannot be transference of impressions," otherwise we should have the child in the womb remembering the experiences of its mother. "But may there not be a transference of impressions from the material cause to the effect?" [the subsequent body being made out of the previous one.] He replies "if you accept a non-momentary existence, there is no other means." In other words, if you do not accept the Baudhā doctrine that all things are in a continual flux,—one heap of atoms the next moment producing another heap,—but allow that things do last from moment to moment, then the parts, as the hands, &c., are the material cause of the body; and, if so, then on your hypothesis, if a person's hand were cut off, the maimed body ought not to remember a former experience of that hand, as it would now no longer be a part (i.e., material cause) of the body. Nor can you say that "intelligence belongs to the atoms and therefore there is remembrance because these remain," because, if so, remembrance ought to be imperceptible [while yet it is perceptible by the internal organ, mind,] just as the form of the atoms is imperceptible; and also there ought to be no remembrance of anything once experienced by the atoms of the hand, if there be no longer union with those atoms, the hand being severed from the body.

XVI. "Well then, why not allow, with the Baudhās, that all things are dissolved every successive moment, and that each previous heap of atoms, as a material cause, produces a succeeding heap as its effect? in this way there is no difficulty to account for memory." He replies,

XVI. This could not be without difference of kind, and if this latter were true there could be no inference; and without inference even your hypothesis could not stand; nor could there be perception without ascertainment.

By "difference of kind" he means the Baudhā notion of "efficient
form;"\* without which "this," i. e. the doctrine of a continual flux, could not be established; [and this notion cannot be proved] since, on the simple hypothesis of the seed &c. continuing on from moment to moment, you can easily account for the production or non-production of the effect respectively by the presence or absence of the concurrent causes, water, &c., and thence you can account for the production of the shoot by the nature of the seed [without assuming any 'efficient form;'] so that if the individual seed be allowed to continue on, how can there be any such momentary flux ?—Again, even if you assume this peculiar kind of species, 'efficient form,' to abide in the perceptible individual but to be itself beyond the cognizance of the senses, there could be no such thing as inference, as fire can only then be the cause of smoke, when its nature as fire acts as the efficient form of the first moment's smoke; but even if you suppose that one special smoke (the first moment's,) is produced by fire, you cannot thereby infer that fire is the cause of all smoke, because by your own hypothesis you must allow that this very smoke is the cause of its own special effect, the second moment's smoke, [and this of the third, &c.;] and hence it would follow that all inference would be abolished, as it would be impossible to establish the universal major premises, which depends for its validity on an argument to preclude the possibility of an instance where the middle term is found disjoined from the major, which argument must be always based on the relation of cause and effect [as existing between the major and middle.†] And without inference it is impossible to establish your own hypothesis of a momentary flux, since it can only be cognized by means of inference. Nor can you say that "perception itself is the evidence of flux," because, according to your doctrine, the only perception which can really have authority is the indeterminate‡ (nirvikalpaka) since that alone is produced by the object;

* As the Naiy\'ayik\'a hold that the species jar (ghat\'at\'a) resides in all jars, so the Bandhidhas hold that a quasi-j\'ati, called kuroadri\'apat\'a, resides in each thing when that thing is actively employed in producing its effect, as a jar in holding water, or rice in producing a plant. When there is no effect being produced this kuroadri\'apat\'a is absent. But for their assumption of this occasionally present principle, every thing would always produce its effect.
† Cf. S. Muktav, p. 122. There is an interesting attempt in the Sarva Dar\'a. Sangraha, pp. 7, 8, to establish the authority of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or of genus and species.
‡ The Hindus hold that on the contact of the organ of sense with an object, as e. g. a jar, there arises the idea of a jar and also the idea of the nature, i. e.
yet—since even this is only inferred from the subsequent determinate perception,—in the case of an object which only lasts one moment, there can be no such determinate perception, and consequently, with the failure of this, fails likewise the indeterminate. Again, the so-called species of efficient form in the case of seed-produced plants is not a true species, as it is obnoxious to the charge of 'confusion,' since, a., it will be found present in barley without the species rice,—b., it will not be found in rice stored in a granary [and therefore lying idle and not producing its effect] while the species rice is found present there,—and, c., both species ['efficient form' and 'rice'] are found simultaneously conjoined in sown rice when it is actually producing its shoot.—Hence we Naiyáyikas (to avoid this fault of 'confusion,') assume that there are many subdivisions of the species 'jar' (and not merely one undivided)—these subdivisions being severally pervaded by [i. e. included under] 'silver' &c. [as silver jars, earthen jars, &c.] And [if you ask why we call them all by the common name jar, we reply that] the general appellation jar arises from our viewing them as all possessed of one common attribute, viz. the being composed of parts which [however different in material] possess a particular kind of arrangement [called kambugrīvā in the case of jars].

XVII. "Well, then, let us consider the flux hypothesis as still undetermined, [i. e. it is at any rate not shewn to be impossible;] for as for any argument against it on the plea of recognition ('i. e. this is the jar I saw yesterday,') we overthrow it by maintaining that there is a doubt as to its being the same jar." He replies,

XVII. There can be no doubt as to things continuing, nor as to perception, nor can there be as to authority of proof from the self-contradiction,—as the same proof which establishes the oneness of the object during the moment may establish it during a longer time.

There can be no doubt as to the continuance of objects as we can perceive it by recognition; nor can there be doubt as to our recognition, as we can ascertain its correctness by our being conscious of īdās of jar (both being equally objects of perception,) but the two ideas are distinct,—this is nīvākalpaka. Subsequently the mind combines them into one idea, 'a jar possessing the species or nature of jar,' and this is savākalpaka. We are however not conscious of the first step—it is only recognised as necessary from an analysis of the subsequent compound idea.
possessing this knowledge. Nor can there be doubt as to the authority of all evidence "from the self-contradiction" which it involves, since if you doubt of the authority of your own consciousness of doubt the very existence of your doubt is itself unproved; and again, if you cannot establish any thing as authoritative, you cannot have any doubt even as to authority, because you will not have established your point to doubt upon [and your doubt will have no foundation].

"Well, but may we not doubt [not of all authority but] of the authority of your so-called recognition, since we can see cases of erroneous recognition, as when we say of a man whose hair has grown again after it was cut, 'this is the same hair as before,' &c.?" To meet this he gives the second line. The same proof, viz., the absence of opposite qualities, by which we know in the case of the jar which exists only one moment, that during that moment it is the same and not a different jar,—may teach us in the case of the jar which is supposed to continue on from moment to moment, that it too is the same jar and not a different one. Since just as one cognition may be connected with many different objects [as e.g. a table with the things on it,] so too one object, as a jar, may, without inconsistency, be connected with many different moments, the connection with those moments being necessarily successive,* because it depends on the succession of the moments, its causes.

XVIII. "Well then let it be considered as proved that there is a cause of another world (i.e. adriśta;) but here the doubt may arise, a. is causality essential or communicated by some thing else,—if the first, then it ought to act indifferently towards all things, just as blue is blue to all; if the second, then if we allow the 'communicating something' to have essential causation, it too will be liable to the aforementioned objection; and if, on the other hand, its causation is communicated, we shall have a regressus in infinitum, as we shall require an infinite series of such communicating somethings? b. And again if causation be essential, effects ought to be produced from the very first moment of the existence of the cause." He replies,

XVIII. Without first determining the power of the

* I. e. there must be this difference between the two connections alluded to,—one is contemporary, the other successive.
cause, even blue &c. are not actual existences; it becomes capable when associated with something else, why then should it not be allowed to be universal?

The 'power of the cause' is the cause's nature as a cause, i.e. causality [i.e. its being such a thing as a cause] until we have ascertained this, the 'blue' of your illustration has no authority [because, if it has no cause, it must be merely an error] and so your argument would fall to the ground, viz. "all that is real is universal in its action, as blue, &c. and therefore if causality be not universal in its action, it is not real," since your major premises will not be universally true if you admit that there is a cause for your quoted 'blue', as indeed there must be, since it is non-eternal,—there being no proof of the existence of an eternal blue.—The second line overthrows the second paragraph (b.) "It" the cause, when "associated with something else" i.e. with the concurrent,† "becomes capable" of producing the effect; hence it does not result that its causality must shew itself in action from the very first moment of the cause's existence. The latter words express that the author has no objection to admit universality of action, if properly understood, "why then should it not be universal?" Even the universality of action which you ascribe to blue, &c., only means really that all men speak of and treat them as blue, &c.; and this kind of universality is equally found in the cause when associated with its concurrents [as fire &c. with fuel, or the seed with water, air, &c.] since it is an established fact, that we all do apply the term 'causality' to such cases, and treat them as such.

XIX. "But if we even accept your opinion that desert may reside in the soul, must we not still say that it is not produced by the soul as a material cause,† since in the case of an eternal and all-pervading substance [like soul] there can be no negative instance either in point of space or of time, and causality can only be proved by an induction from affirmative instances together with negative, a cause being defined as that the absence of which necessitates the absence of

* If a non-eternal thing is real, it must have a cause, and therefore your very illustration proves the fact of non-universal causation.
† Our 'condition.'
‡ The Nyaya holds that knowledge, desert, &c. reside in the soul as its qualities, and the subject is the material cause of its qualities.
something else [see the effect]. But since in this way desert will have no material [intimate] cause, of course it can have no non-intimate and instrumental causes, since they are allowed to be causes only as acting in close proximity to the other;* and hence it will follow that desert will be eternal [as it is uncaused,] and therefore, being eternal, it cannot be conceived as producing enjoyment, limited to particular souls at particular places and times.” He replies,

XIX. Surely precedence is causality, since it is proved by any argument; likewise for the eternal all-pervading; otherwise there could not be the idea of the subject.

Causality does not always imply the existence of negative instances, but its true definition is “necessary precedence without superfluous determination.”† The negative instance is not the only means of proving causality, since it may be equally proved by the evidence which establishes its subject;‡ hence the causality of the eternal and all-pervading soul “may be proved by any argument.” “Otherwise there could not be the idea of the subject,” [as the proof of the soul’s existence is that we require a subject for pleasure, pain, &c.] and hence the subject’s (i. e. the soul’s,) being a cause is established by the same argument which establishes the subject’s existence. From seeing that the component halves are always found where jars are and jars never found where these are not, we learn that substance as substance is a material cause to the effect connected with it by intimate relation; and hence, by rejecting earth, &c., we can establish by exhaustion that for the qualities knowledge, desire, &c, there must be a material cause other than earth and the rest, i. e. soul.

But in reality there is one kind of argument from negative instances§ which does establish material causation as follows, “that which is not a half, has no jar connected with it by intimate relation; and similarly, that which is not soul has not knowledge, &c. thus

* Siddhánta Muktávali, p. 12.
† For the five kinds of Superfluous determination of causation see S. Muktávali, pp. 13—16. The anyathsdiddha kāraṇa is that pseudo-cause whose absence does not directly necessitate the absence of the effect.
‡ We have a good instance of this kind of argument in the Sánkyya argument for the assumption of the internal organ mind in p. 17. Mind is assumed in order to account for the fact that two cognitions are not simultaneous,—the same proof will of course equally establish that mind is a cause of cognition.
§ This is called the anvayodayahvya vyatireka in contradistinction to the anyayātahvya vyatireka—the latter is in the form—“where there is no half, there is no jar.”
connected with it.' So too we may argue in the case of time [although
time is eternal and all-pervading] 'that which is not time cannot
have a jar connected with it in that particular relation [called
temporal;'] and in this way the argument from negative instances
may be applied to prove that time is a condition as the temporal
site in which the jar is made.

Thus there is no contradiction between our conclusions and the
declaration of S'rutin which affirms that 'the world is delusive,' since
the terms Delusion, Nature, Ignorance, &c. really mean only 'desert.'
And hence the existence of God is established as the superintendent
of desert in producing its effects [by §. iv.]

XX. He thus sums up the substance of the chapter,

XX. May He whose unparalleled concurrent energy
this is,—called Māyā from its being so hard to unravel,
or Nature from its being the first principle, or Ignorance
from its horror of right knowledge;

May He that deity by whom is lulled the turmoil of the
waves of mundane existence,—immediately, himself being
the witness, the passionless, create in my mind devotion
towards himself.

'This' the concurrent cause in the form of desert,—it is unparalleled
since all effects depend upon it,—the word Māyā is used to mean
'desert' by metonymy, [as it primarily means Delusion,] 'resemblance' being the cause of the extension of meaning,* as each is alike
hard to be unravelled.

* Cf. Śāhitya Darpaṇa, ii. §. 18.
Note on the term ‘Avachhedaka’ (p. 7.)

The term Avachhedaka has at least three meanings, as distinguishing, particularising and determining.

a. In the phrase ‘a blue lotus’ ‘blue’ is the distinguishing avachhedaka (i.e. viṣeṣaṇa) of the lotus,—it distinguishes it from others of different colours.

b. In the sentence ‘the bird sits on the tree, on the branch,’ रेके हस्ताक्षर धरी, s'ākhyātān particularises the exact spot,—this is the ekades' avachhedaka.

c. But the third is the usual Naiyāyika use of the word, i.e. as determining, nityānaka. Wherever we find a relation which is not itself included in any one of the seven categories but is common to several, we require something to determine its different varieties; thus if we say that fire is the cause of smoke, or, vice versa, smoke the effect of fire, we do not mean only this particular case but any fire or smoke; we therefore require, to determine this particular relation of causality, something which shall be always found present with it. This in ‘fire is the cause of smoke’ will be vahnitva, the species or ते ति हे तिव of all fires. This will always be found present wherever the causation of smoke is found, and it is therefore called the dhāma-kāraṇatvāvachhedaka, as dhāmatva would be the vahnikāryatvāvachhedaka. If we have several causes or effects (as e.g. green wood in the case of smoke,) each kāraṇatā or kāryatā will require its own avachhedaka. But we could not say that ‘substance’ is the avachhedaka of ‘quality’ although it does always accompany it,—because quality is a category by itself and not common to several. An avachhedaka is always required for such relations as kāraṇatā, kāryatā, s'ākyatā, jneyatā, pratiyogita, &c. Thus gotva is the avachhedaka of the go-s'abda-s'ākyatā, as otherwise the word go might be restricted to mean only this particular cow or extended to include every animal; and in वहनित्व प्रारूढ विशेषण विशेषण: we have vahnitva as the avachhedaka of the pratiyogita. This determining notion need not be always a species; thus in कार्यवाच्चेतिः प्रारूढः cheshtā is the avachhedaka of kāraṇatā, and cheshtā is included in the category of ‘action.’
SECOND CLUSTER.

I. The Second objection was that there is no proof of God, since the means of attaining paradise can be practised independently of any such being. That is to say, "sacrifices which are the instruments of obtaining paradise can be performed even without a God, since it is proved by the Veda that sacrifices are a means of obtaining heaven, and the Veda possesses authority from its eternity and freedom from defects, and we can also gather its authority from its having been accepted by great saints [as Manu and others] and therefore you cannot establish the existence of God, on the ground that he is the author of the Veda; or we may suppose that the Veda was made by Sages like Kapila and others, who gained omniscience by their preeminence in concentrated devotion."—He replies,

I. Since right knowledge requires an external source, since creation and destruction take place, and since none other than He can be relied on,—there is no other way open.

The right knowledge caused by testimony is one which is produced by a quality in the speaker, viz. his knowledge of the exact meaning of the words used;* hence the existence of God is proved, as he must be the subject of such a quality in the case of the Veda. "But may we not allow that such a quality as the knowledge of the exact meaning of the words used is required in the case of an effect which implies an agent; but in the case of the uncreated Veda it is its freedom from defects which produces its authoritativeness, and we can know its authoritativeness from its having been accepted by great

* All right knowledge, pramāṇa, is produced by some virtue in the speaker, viz. his knowledge of the exact meaning of the words used, as all wrong knowledge by some defect. Thus in sense-perception the virtue required is the ārtha of the eye &c.; in inference it is the knowledge of a real vṛtti; and in testimony the right knowledge must be produced by a speaker who knows the true meaning of the words used. The speaker's claim to this knowledge is vitiated by conscious deception as well as by unconscious ignorance; as in the former case the speaker's right knowledge is in abeyance, and it is his assumed erroneous cognition (śādṛṣṭa-jñāna) which is the immediate cause of the words used. (Cf. Plato, Rep. p. 382)
saints?” He replies “because creation and destruction take place.” After a mundane destruction, when the former Veda is destroyed, how can the subsequent Veda possess authority, since there will then be no possibility of its having been accepted by great saints? And again the non-eternity of sound is proved by the universal conviction ‘the letter g is produced,’ and an eternity in the form of an unbroken succession is stopped by the possibility of mundane destruction. “Well, then, let us say that at the beginning of a creation Kapila and others were its authors, who had acquired omnisciency by the power of merit gained by the practice of concentrated devotion in the former mon.” He replies “none other than He can be relied on.” If you mean by omniscient beings, those endowed with the various superhuman faculties of assuming infinitesimal size &c. and capable of creating every thing, then we reply that the law of parsimony bids us assume only one such, namely Him the adorable Lord. There can be no confidence in a non-eternal and non-omniscient being, and hence it follows that according to the system which rejects God, the tradition of the Veda is simultaneously overthrown,—‘there is no other way open.’

II. “But may we not reply that your assumption of a mundane creation and destruction is unwarranted, since there is no evidence for it, and there are also several arguments against it. Thus a. there is a law that day and night are, from their very nature, uninterruptedly preceded by day and night; b. the nature of time in itself is always accompanied by the perception of the fruit of former works, for time brings to effect the various pre-existing deserts [ripening them as seeds sown]; and you cannot prove that desert can suddenly be stopped in its action; c. a Brahman must be born from a Brahman, but since at the beginning of a creation no one could be a Brahman [for want of previous merit] you could not establish the necessary succession of caste in the succeeding generations; d. as there could then be no teacher or learner, there could have been no acceptance of the conventions of language, and hence you could not establish the tradition of words; and e. at the beginning of a creation there could be no dexterity in the different necessary arts of life as making jars, &c., since this requires previous instruction from another, and thus the chain of the tradition of all the arts of life would be cut short.” He replies,
II. As in the days of the rainy season &c., time as determining mundane existence is the condition; there is cessation of action as in deep sleep; the castes originated as herbs and scorpions; the conventions of words, &c., are like jugglery.

a. If you would prove that the days of the rainy season have been uninterruptedly preceded by similar rainy days, you must first have the condition that they have been preceded by a certain period of the sun's course defined by his entrance into certain signs of the Zodiac, [as Taurus and Gemini,—and so here if you would prove that day and night must have been uninterruptedly preceded by day and night, you must have as the condition an uninterrupted series of previous mundane works; or in other words, the limiting condition is the nature of time as determining this mundane existence [and you cannot argue from the mere nature of time in itself].]  
b. As in time of deep sleep there is a cessation of the desert which produces the fruit enjoyed by certain individuals, so at special times there may be a cessation of all desert for all souls, hence he says, “there is cessation of action as in deep sleep.”  
c. A certain herb can be produced by the seed of that particular herb and also by the manure of rice-dust;† or again a scorpion can be produced from cow dung as well as from a scorpion; and so at special times by a special desert (or fate) acting alone a Brahman can be produced,‡ while at the present time a Brahman can only be produced from a Brahman parent;—there will be no contradiction as (by I. vi.) we allow that difference of species [though not of genus] does reside in different effects.  
d. Just as a juggler having made a puppet pulled by strings, bids it bring a jar and the jar is brought, and thus instructs a child, so likewise God, having assumed two bodies in the mutual connection of master and disciple, and thus initiated

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* The Vedántins and Sánkhyás hold that in deep sleep there is pleasure, but the Naiyáyikás deny it, as without jñána there can be no sukhá.

† The water in which rice has been washed is considered an excellent manure from the fertilising nature of the rice-dust. Besides the tushá or husk, there is a red covering easily pulverised adhering to the rice-berries, called in Sanskrit रंग in Bengali ধূসুপ and in Hindustani. This is alluded to in the Atharva Veda, xi. 3, 5. चः: चम्रा सावधंश्चा सहिशास्याः:.

‡ A similar notion of spontaneous production (تولد) after a mundane renovation is found in the Akhláki Jaláli, Introd.
the tradition of words, taught their meanings to the men then newly created. e. In the same manner having himself originated the tradition of making jars &c., and the other useful arts, he instructed them therein.

III. The opponent’s attempt to preclude any discussion being overthrown, he adds some confirmatory reasons.

III. The gradual failure of the tradition of the Veda, &c. may be inferred from the observed failure of generation, ceremonial purification, learning, &c. and the power of study and of performing ceremonial works.

The argument runs thus,—The tradition of the Veda, &c. is inferred to be subject to entire interruption from its gradually failing, just like a lamp, as it burns on. The rest of the couplet is added to establish the fact of the reason given. a. ‘Failure of generation;’ originally creatures were produced from the mind, then by sexual intercourse solely for the sake of issue, but now entirely through desire of sensual gratification. b. ‘Failure of ceremonial purification;’ originally the very food of the parents† was ceremonially purified, [in the putreshṭi yāga,] then afterwards the child in the womb, then the child after birth, and now hardly at all any how. c. ‘Failure of learning;’ originally they studied the whole Veda with its thousand Sākhās and eventually one Sākhā only, thus it has gradually decayed. By the &c. we may understand ‘livelihood,’ ‘duty,’ &c. d. ‘Failure of livelihood;’ originally they lived on gleanings, then on unsolicited alms, then on agriculture, &c., and lastly they supported themselves on the wages of servitude. e. ‘Failure of duty;’ originally duty had four legs, asceticism, knowledge, sacrifice and charity; in each subsequent age, as the Tretā &c., it lost one leg, until in the Kali it totters on a single leg, charity;‡ or again [taking dharma in the sense of observing the prescribed duties of caste, &c.,] once they ate the leavings of the sacrifice, then next the leavings of a guest, then food prepared by themselves, and lastly they ate even with menial servants. § Then we may notice the failure of power to study one’s daily portion of the Veda and to perform works as sacrifices &c.; from the failure of the power of study as the cause results failure of the power of learning as

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* As Brahma’s mind-begotten sons. See also Indische Stud. ii. p. 97.
† Cf. Rámâyana, i. 15.
‡ Cf. Manu, i. 81, 82, 86.
the effect, hence in the S'loka we have the 'power of study' mentioned separately from 'learning.' And in this way with the destruction of the universe are all included living beings destroyed. Thus do we establish the fact of these universal destructions.—The Veda is authoritative as having been received by great saints who displayed a zealous earnestness in the practice of sacrifices, &c.—which earnestness was untainted by such vicious causes as a wish to deceive, association with heretics, acting for some secret motive, addiction to eristic disputation, living as one pleases,* heedlessness of the distinction between lawful and unlawful food and drinks, &c.†

IV. He sums up the substance of the chapter.

IV. Him who in sport having repeatedly made this strangely wonderful world by his illusive power, again causes it to collapse, and having destroyed it again re-makes it as a magic show,—that Deity, S'iva, the might of whose will bursts forth unhindered into accomplishment,—him I salute, the sole ground of confidence, and may I continue to pay him homage even unto the end.

* As by unlawful trades.
† Other Pandits divide the original differently and explain it to mean "addiction to eristic disputations, desire of a livelihood, or reckless (udvaca) lust of food and drink."
THIRD CLUSTER.

I. The third objection was that there were positive arguments to prove God's non-existence. "Just as we infer a jar's absence in a given space of ground, [i. e. its non-existence there,] so we infer God's non-existence from His not being perceived. If you reply that 'the Supreme Being is not a legitimate object of perception, and, therefore, since we cannot here have a valid non-perception, we cannot assume His non-existence,'—we retort that in the same way we might prove that a hare's horn may exist since we have only to maintain that it is not a legitimate object of our perception." He answers,

I. In an illegitimate object [of perception] how can there be a valid non-perception?* and still more, how can you establish your contradiction? How can the hare's horn be precluded as absurd if it be an illegitimate object? and how can you have an inference without a subject to base it on?

In the case of the Supreme Being who is not a legitimate object; how can there be a valid non-perception? It is only this which precludes a thing's existence; but the absence of perception which obtains in the case of God cannot exert this precluding influence, as otherwise we should equally be forced to deny the existence of ether, merit, demerit, &c. But a horn must be a legitimate object of perception,—how then can your retort contradict our argument? If you say that a hare's horn is an illegitimate object of perception, then of course its existence is not necessarily precluded,—there is only an absence of proof to establish it; but this cannot be retorted against us as the fifth Cluster will fully shew that there are positive arguments to establish God's existence.† "But may we not infer God's non-

* A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as the eye, light, &c.

† We infer that there is no jar when we do not see one, because had there been one, we should have seen it, but in the case of the Supreme Being, ghosts, &c. as they are acknowledged to be imperceptible, we could only at most say that their existence is 'not proven;' and this is here not admissible in the face of the positive argument of the fifth chapter.
existence from the absence, in His case, of a body which always
accompanies an agent, and also of any assignable motive for action?" He replies,—how can you have an inference where the minor term
is itself controverted? while on the other hand the very proof which
will establish the existence of the subject (God), is itself sufficient
to debar your subsequent inference [that there is no God].

II. "Well, then, let us say that God is introduced through an
error, and that the subsequent argument is to prove either the non-
existence of any agency in this wrongly assumed subject or the
subject's non-existence." He replies,

II. The very possession of the absence of some rejected
attribute proves the subject's reality, since it makes it a
locus. The state of a counterentity [to non-existence]
i. e. the absence of the absence, must belong to a some-
thing.

"It makes it a locus"—i. e. it gives to the absence a 'local habi-
tation' in the subject, and therefore an unreal thing can never properly
be a subject. [If you shift your ground and say that the argument
is to prove God's non-existence, we reply that] the state of a counter-
entity to non-existence, i. e. the absence of the absence, cannot belong
to a no-thing, or, in other words, just as that subject from which a
given attribute is excluded cannot be unreal, so neither can an unreal
thing be the object of a negation.

III. "But why may we not learn the absence (or non-existence)
of a thing by its non-perception, even though the thing itself be an
illegitimate object of perception?" He replies,

III. In the case of a hare's horn, &c. the validity of
their perception would imply defective means thereof; but
if these be present, perception would ensue, and if there
be no perception, there can be no such means.

Non-perception can prove the non-existence of a thing only where
it is the so-called 'valid non-perception'; otherwise we should have
to concede the non-existence of all such things as are beyond the reach
of the senses.—'Valid non-perception' means the presence of all the
various means of perception, other than the thing itself [which is
supposed to be absent] or the attributes [as form &c.] inseparably
connected with it. Hence if we allowed that in the case of the [non-existent] hare's horn there was valid non-perception, this non-perception must be accompanied by a set of means connected with certain defects* [like a jaundiced eye &c.; as this is 'the presence of the various means of perception other than the thing itself or its inseparable attributes.'] But this is unallowable, as in such cases a perception [however erroneous, as of a really white shell appearing yellow,] would ensue; and if perception does not ensue, it proves that it is not a case of valid non-perception.

IV. Here the atheistic Sánkhya will interpose, "why not say that the soul is in some respects ignorant, and that the earth, &c., do not prove creative power to reside therein from the very fact of its having the nature of soul?" He replies,

IV. If you mean the well-known soul, our point is gained, if the unknown, your reason is unproved; the general consent brings the same result, and in the case of the class it equally holds.

If you mean by soul the well-known mundane individual soul, we are quite willing to grant what you say; but if you mean the unknown, i.e. the Lord, your reason is unproved [as we may dispute that 'the nature of soul' resides in God]. If you reply that all allow that the subject (soul) has the nature of soul, then, according as you decide the alternative—is this 'soul' of yours similar to our jīvātmā or different,—we shall accept your argument as proving our own point, or meet you by denying your proposed reason [or middle term]. The last clause of the verse meets the reply "let the species, soul, be our subject,"—because in this case too "it equally holds." We agree with you so far as that it is not the species that is the maker of the world [but an individual Supreme Soul;] still as the 'nature of soul' [i.e. the idea or species] does not abide in the species itself [but in the individuals] we still deny your middle.

* To understand this, we must remember that the means of perception are twofold,—those connected with the object, i.e. producing right impressions, and those connected with a defect in the senses (as jaundice &c.) i.e. producing wrong impressions. The non-existent hare's horn cannot be a case of the former, as it is invisible; nor can it be a case of the latter as this would necessitate some perception, however erroneous.—I have followed the Pandita in taking yogyāyyāya-sandha, but it would make this passage useful, if we could take it here as a shashti-tatpurusha, i.e. as equal to yogyāyyāyasandha.
V. "But why not say [with the Vedántin] that the absence of creative agency is to be proved of that soul which is established by the S'rti, &c.?" He replies,

V. If the S'rti, &c. have authority, your negative argument is precluded; if they are fallacious, our old 'baseless inference' [of §. i.] is stronger than ever.

If you admit that the S'rti, &c. have authority, then, as the existence of God's creative agency &c. is thereby established, your argument to prove their non-existence is already precluded. On the other hand, if they have no authority, our old difficulty of a 'baseless inference' returns in full force [as the minor term, soul, in which the middle 'the nature of soul' was to reside, is itself unproved].

VI. Here the Chárýákas step in, "why talk of such a thing as 'valid non-perception'? [§. iii.] let us lay it down as a rule that whatever is not perceived, does not exist, and hence let the mere absence of perception be a sufficient proof of a thing's non-existence. As for this rule of ours overthrowing all inference, we are perfectly content to have it so, and we grant at once that, on the perception of smoke, to conclude that fire accompanies it is mere supposition." He replies,

VI. There is no doubt in seeing or not seeing, since the existence or non-existence of the thing is ascertained; even perception becomes impossible, if its cause is precluded by its not being seen.

a. [We reply that 'supposition' will not explain men's inferring fire from smoke, for] Supposition is "doubt;" but this does not exist in the case of seeing, as the thing seen is then ascertained; nor does it exist in the case of not seeing, as the absence of the thing is then, in your opinion, concluded. b. If the eye &c., the causes of perception, are precluded as causes by the fact that they are not themselves objects of perception, there will not be even such a cause of knowledge as your perception; but if you grant that these exist even at the very time when they are not perceived, your argument proves too much, and therefore the mere fact of a thing's not being seen does not necessitate its non-existence. c. And again a Chárýák, when he leaves his house ought to bewail as being well assured that his wife and children have
ceased to exist; and even on his return he ought not to find his family there, otherwise the mere fact of 'not seeing,' as it proves too much, would be no longer a valid reason, [and he should hold like a true philosopher 'amica uxor, magis tamen amica veritas'].

VII. "But if non-perception be not a proof of non-existence, then would it not follow that a universal proposition can never be determined, as there will always be the fear of some condition at present unseen, and hence an ever recurring fear of some instance of smoke unattended by fire? and if so, what becomes of inference?" He replies,

VII. If there be doubt, there is inference; still more if there be no doubt. Discussion is allowed by all to stop fears, since fear is limited by direct inconsistency.

If, after being assured that in the present instances before us [i. e. this smoke and fire,] there is no false assumption of connection, you go on to fear that there may be such in similar instances in another time and place, this very supposition of another time and place comes from inference; hence inference is proved. If there is no such fear, then, in the absence of any fear of the contrary, inference is all the more established. If you ask "what is to stop this fear?" it is replied that this fear is precluded by a discussion to stop any opposite instances. "But have we not here the fault of an 'in infinitum regressus,' since this discussion is itself based on an universal proposition [i. e. the major premise in which the middle term is declared to be invariably connected with the major?]" he replies 'fear is limited by direct inconsistency;' there cannot be any doubt regarding the major premise on which the discussion is based, when this doubt would contradict some acknowledged principle. Thus supposing that a doubt should arise as to whether the effect might not be produced without any assumed cause,—it would of course follow, if this doubt were legitimate, that we should not seek food to satisfy hunger or employ words to produce an impression on the hearer's mind, [as these and other similar effects could arise without their causes being employed;] and therefore a limiting condition which is only suggested by an unsupported doubt, is of no validity where there is no discussion to back it. This has been thus expressed by a logician, "so long as there is reason to fear even the hundredth particle of a connection
between the middle term and some opposite instance [i. e. one which, though it contains the middle, does not contain the major term, as the redhot iron ball in the argument 'the mountain has smoke because it has fire,'] how can the middle term have any power to convince?" Now the fear of a too general assumption of connection depends on the fear of there being some limiting condition to be supplied; as has been said, "some reasons [i. e. middle terms which are too general, as 'fire' to prove the existence of smoke,] are dependent on universal connections supplied by others [as that between smoke and 'fire produced by wet fuel;'] these too general reasons, even when seen to be present, do not establish the conviction of the major term." Thus the universal connection with the major term, which exists in a middle term that is limited by a 'condition,' is cognized as included in the former middle term [as fire] distinguished by the determining notion necessary to define its relation as a middle term [sc. the species fire,↑] hence it may be said to transfer its own attribute of universal connection with the major term to the old middle term which is, as it were, in juxta-position with it and abides in the same subjects; and therefore the word upādhi, here used for 'the condition,' is used by us in the same sense as when it signifies [with the Vedāntins] the China rose which transfers its own redness to the colourless crystal. These too general middle terms, even when they are actually perceived to exist in the subject, do not produce certainty as to the existence of the major term, since the too general attribute [the possession of fire] creates a doubt as to the desired major [smoke.]

VIII. [Thus far for Inference; the opponent, however, may still retort,] "But may we not say that Comparison (Upamāṇa) precludes the existence of God?!" Now the Vaiseshikas reply that it does not preclude, inasmuch as they do not allow that Comparison is a distinct species of proof [as it is included under inference,

* As e. g. fire produced by wet fuel.
‡ Upamāṇa is the knowledge of a resemblance, which produces an inference consisting in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named. Thus a man is told that a gazelle (bos gaurus) is like a cow, and on seeing the animal in the forest he infers that this is what was meant by the word gaurus. Similarly here we have the inference "whatever is like the individual soul is not omniscient nor omnipotent, and this being which is like the individual soul is what is meant by the word God."
See Nyāya Sūtras, ii. 46-48]. Here the Mīmāṃsakas come in and maintain, that Comparison is that proof which gives us the knowledge of a separate category called Likeness. They reason as follows, —a. Likeness cannot be a substance or a quality or an action, because it is found residing by intimate relation in qualities [and substance cannot thus reside in qualities, nor can a quality or action thus reside in another quality or action.]* b. It cannot be community [or genus,] because it depends on its correlative [i. e. the other thing with which the first is compared,]† and also because it may reside in genera,‡ &c. [as we may say 'the genus of cow is, like that of horse, eternal.] o. Nor can it be non-existence, since it is not cognized in its relation to the counterentity.§ d. Moreover, likeness is not known through perception, since it is not cognized by a simple exercise of our senses [but requires some thought and consideration,] nor can you say that the senses may give us the knowledge of it, when there is the contemporary knowledge of the correlative,—because, after the cognition that the bos gavēs is like a cow, we may also have the cognition that that cow is like a bos gavēs, but this latter cognition cannot be produced by perception as the cow is supposed to be out of sight. e. Nor can the knowledge of Likeness be produced by inference, since it is produced even in the absence of any sign [or middle term].|| f. Nor can it be produced by testimony, since this is not present everywhere. To meet this theory (of Likeness being a separate category,) he replies in this and the following couplets in the character of a Vaiśeṣikā.

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† Likeness is not identity—it implies the existence of points of difference.
‡ Community or genus resides in the first three categories only. I may add here that the Nyāya does not recognize our subdivision of genera and species. The genus is not superior to, but co-ordinate with, the species. Thus ghaṭa and saṭṭa both abide in asvaca, but saṭṭa also abides with ghaṭa in ghaṭa and with s’ukla in s’ukla. Hence saṭṭa is called para, and the others apara.
§ Resemblance implies the correlative, but not the opposite, as absence does, e. g. 'the absence of a jar,' where the knowledge of the absence depends on the knowledge of a jar.
|| The supposed inference would be “That cow is like the bos gavēs, because the former is the correlative to the likeness residing in this latter.” But the knowledge called epamiti may be found when this middle term is not explicitly recognized.
¶ The information was to the effect that the bos gavēs is something like a cow; and the man’s subsequent inference is in a different form, viz. ‘that cow is like a gavēn.”
VIII. In the case of contradictories, there can be no middle course; nor can you assume the two contradictories to be identical, because the fact of their contradiction is directly asserted.

"There can be no middle course," i. e. you cannot make some third supposition different from either, from the very fact that they are contradictories [and therefore the one or the other must be true]; nor can you assume them to be identical. The word 'contradictories' in the second line is an instance of the so-called hetugarbhā-vidēśhāna, or attribute which contains an implicit reason,† [i. e. this very word shows why you cannot assume them to be identical.] When you say 'it is not non-existence,' we know that it must be existence, and when you say 'it is not existence,' we know that it must be 'non-existence.' The whole purport of this is as follows,—Likeness must be either existence or non-existence,‡ since no one knows of any third alternative. If the latter, then it at once falls under non-existence, the seventh category [of the Vaisëshikas.]
If the former, then, a. if it possess qualities, it must be under the category of substance; b. should it not possess them, but possess genus, and be other than a quality, it must be under action; and c. should it be other than an action, it must be under quality. d. Should it be without qualities and genus, but not itself reside by intimate relation, it must be under the category of intimate relation; e. should it be found residing in intimate relation and that too in many subjects; it must be under the category of genus; f. but if found residing in only one subject, it must be the (vaisëshika) category of particularity.—In the same way we may refute the supposition of such additional categories as Capacity, Number, &c.

IX. "But why should not Likeness be only a common property, and Comparison be that proof which produces the cognition thereof?"§ He replies,

¶ We have here our 'excluded middle.'
† In this it differs from the svarūpa visēśhāna, which is simply descriptive and nothing more. Cf. the kavyatīkā in Rhetoric (Sahitya Darp. X. §. 710).
‡ What follows can only be understood by a reader acquainted with the seven Categories of the Vaisëshikas (Cf. Dr. Rooër's translation of the Bhāṣāhā Parichchheda, pp. 1—8.)
§ This was the view of the Vedántins (see Vedánta paribhāṣā, iii.) according to which the instrument, in knowledge derived from comparison, was the cognition that 'this animal is like a cow,' and the conclusion was that 'the cow is like this bos gaurus.' It is refuted by the supposed Vaisëshika.
IX. As Likeness, so too Unlikeness; and so a new proof would be required. If you answer, 'the latter is only a case of Presumption,' then why not say the same of the former?

After the cognition, 'this (camel) is unlike a cow,' you must suppose another cognition, 'that cow is unlike this (camel),' which must, on your view, be produced by a new proof [i.e. a fifth].—"No, this clearly arises from the process called Presumption," as you cannot have in this thing unlikeness to that without also having in that thing unlikeness to this." But the same process will equally apply in the former case, as you cannot have in the bos gavæus likeness to the cow without also having in the cow likeness to the bos gavæus. So that there is no need to accept a new proof (Comparison) which is to produce a knowledge of Likeness.

X. [Thus far the Vaisēshikas, whose opinion we Naiya'yikas accept so far as it overthrows our common antagonists, the Mīmāṃsakas; but as they have gone further and have attempted to overthrow the existence of this assumed proof,] the Naiya'yikas here step forward in defence of the impugned proof, Comparison.

X. They hold that the knowledge of the connection of a name with the thing named is the result of Comparison,† since it cannot arise from Perception, &c.

The 'knowledge' or ascertainment of the 'connection'—i.e. power or meaning,—of the 'name,' as bos gavæus, with the 'thing named' i.e. the animal distinguished by the species bos gavæus, is the result of the particular kind of proof called Comparison; 'since it cannot arise from Perception, &c.' as the several causes of those other proofs, i.e. the senses, sign (or middle term,) and testimony have no power to produce it.

XI. 'But why may there not be a knowledge of the word's

* "Presumption is deduction of a matter from that which could not also be. It is assumption of a thing not itself perceived but necessarily implied by another which is seen, heard or proved." (Colebrooke)—See Sūtradhāna Muktāvali, p. 128. The Mīmāṃsakas make this a separate proof, but the Naiya'ya'nikas make it only a particular kind of inference, corresponding to our disjunctive Hypothetical Syllogism (see Bādham P. s'f. 143.)

† This is the Naiya'ya'nik view of Upamāna, cf. Nyāya sūtras, i. 6, and Tarka Saṅgrahā, §. 68.
meaning from the information previously given, that an animal like a cow is what is meant by the word *gavaya*; or from the inference drawn therefrom, that an animal distinguished by the species *gavayatva* is what is meant by the word *gavaya* from the very fact of likeness to a cow?” He replies,

XI. Since mere Likeness cannot be the determining attribute, and since the determining attribute is not then known, the definite meaning [fixed by the will of God or by human convention.] cannot be made known by testimony or inference previously [to seeing the *gavaya* itself.]

The ‘definite meaning’ means here the connection [between the name and the thing named] in the form of the word’s power as determined by the species *gavayatva*.† This cannot be obtained from testimony or inference, as the man previously [to seeing the actual *gavaya* in the forest] had not any idea of the true species of the animal.‡ Nor can you assume that the mere idea of likeness can be the determining notion to fix the word’s meaning, as it is too vague to possess such an authority.

XII. “But why not say that even although, on first hearing the information given, there is no knowledge of the species *bos gaurus*, yet when the species is known by perception, then from the information ‘a thing like a cow is what is meant by *bos gaurus*,’—which by metonymy comes to mean the species,—we may gain the knowledge of the meaning of the word in that form [by testimony and not by comparison?”] He replies,

XII. The sentence, having already logical connection, is complete and seeks nothing further; we only need connection with an implied meaning, where the existing connection of the meanings of the words is incomplete.

When the verbal testimony has produced the knowledge of what is

* The opponent endeavours to show that this knowledge can be accounted for by testimony or inference, without assuming such a new proof as Comparison.
† The Nyāya holds that a word does not properly mean a species or an individual, but an individual as distinguished by such and such a species; thus the species is the determining notion by which the word can mean any individual of the species. See S. Muktāvali, pp. 82, 83.
‡ At first he only knew vaguely that the word *gavaya* meant something like a cow; but he did not know the actual species of the animal, its peculiar attributes, form, &c., until he had positively seen it.
meant by the word *gavaya*, from its being applicable wherever the attribute 'likeness to a cow is found,'—it has no further tendency [or *nisus*] to produce any verbal knowledge of the species, because its logical connection is already complete. For it is only where the primary meanings of the words are deficient in their logical connection,—i. e. are in any way incompatible with one another,—that we have to search for a connection with some other meaning produced by metonymy, as in the stock example 'a herd station on the Ganges,' [where the word Ganges, primarily meaning a 'river,' by metonymy means the 'bank].'

"But may we not say that the generic argument* "the word *gavaya* is possessed of that which causes direct significance, because it is a word properly formed according to the rules of grammar,"—as we can disprove any other assumed cause of direct significance,—will ultimately, by exhaustion, necessitate our accepting the species *gavayatwa* as the cause of the word's direct significance?" We reply, no, because your major term in the conclusion cannot have any other form than that which it had in the major premiss.† Nor can you say that "the word *gavaya* is possessed of *gavayatwa* as the cause of its direct significance, because it has some such cause and all other causes are severally precluded," because such a negative argument is not valid, as your proposed major term is not current, [i. e. your major term "possessed of *gavayatwa* &c." is only applicable to this one word, and is therefore not a 'major' term at all.] And again, the cognition that "the abode of *gavayatwa* is what is meant by the word *gavaya*" is established by consciousness as actually experienced, even in the absence of any negative inference; and hence we are compelled to assume a special proof for it, viz., *upamāna* or Comparison. [As for any attempt, as in § ix., to establish a separate proof from unlikeness, we reply,—] After understanding the meaning of such a sentence as 'Shame on the camel with its extraordinarily long neck and eating the hardest thorns, the outcast of beasts,'‡ the cognizing, on seeing such an animal, that this was what

* For this and the other two kinds of *anumāna* see Nyāya Sūtras I. 5. It is defined by the Commentator as "that which is recognised from generic properties, its own specific ones being unnoted."

† If from premisses which established that wherever smoke was, fire was, and that the mountain had smoke, we inferred by exhaustion that the mountain had the fire peculiar to mountains and not culinary or digestive fire, this would be an improper inference; and, similarly, here we cannot infer that, because the word *gavaya* is possessed of that which causes direct significance, it therefore must be possessed of *gavayatwa* as that cause.

was meant by the word 'camel' is also produced by Comparison,
[which is equally the recognition of likeness or unlikeness.]—Our
conclusion is that Comparison, which properly only ascertains the
direct significance of a word [and has nothing to do with establishing
the object's existence or non-existence,] cannot preclude the existence
of God.

XIII. [We now proceed to examine the fourth proof, i. e. Testi-
mony;—and here] the Vais'eshikas at once assert that there is no
need to fear lest Testimony should preclude the existence of a Su-
preme Being, as this supposed proof is not different from Inference,
[and has therefore been already discussed.] On hearing the words
spoken and consequently recollecting their meanings, an inference
arises, [they say,] to establish a logical connection between these
meanings,*—this inference being in the one or the other of the two
following forms,—a. "These meanings of words are mutually connect-
ed from the very fact that they are brought to recollection by the
aid of words which possess expectancy, compatibility, and juxta-
position,† just as in the special case of the meanings brought to our recol-
clection by the aid of the words, 'drive the cow with the stick';" or ß.
"those words must have been preceded by the speaker's right cogni-
tion of the connection between the several meanings which these
words respectively call to our recollection,—from the very fact that
they are words possessing expectancy, &c.;"—the latter inference
establishing the hearer's knowledge of the connection, from the
general rule that 'the cognition of a cognition must have the same
object as the original cognition,' [and therefore when I know that
such and such was the speaker's meaning, my knowledge must have the
same object as his, and consequently no such pramāṇa as 'testimony'
or s'abda is needed.]—He replies,

XIII. If your alleged inference implies certainty, it in-
volves too much; if only possibility, there is no ascertain-

* S'abda-bodha is often called awaya-bodha, sc. the knowledge of a logical
connection between the meanings of the words. There is a current definition,

† "Expectancy means a word's incapacity to convey a complete meaning
without some other word to complete the construction. Compatibility consists
in a word's not having a meaning incompatible with that of other words in the
sentence. Juxtaposition consists in the enunciation of the words without a long
pause between them." Dr. Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha, § 71.
ment; expectancy is a cause [of Verbal knowledge] by its very presence; juxtaposition, if accompanied by compatibility alone, is unrestricted.

a. In the case of the former inference where the subject is the 'meanings of words,'—we must mean the conclusion to be either that they are certainly mutually connected or that they are possibly connected, i. e. possess a capability of being connected.*

The former alternative involves too much, as it would apply in such phrases as 'he sprinkles with water,' [which would not hold in the case of water in the form of ice];—under the second, there is no ascertained connection at all, and there is also the fault of superficial inference, as your conclusion, i. e. 'possessing capability of being mutually connected,' is already included in your alleged reason 'from the very fact that they are brought to recollection by the aid of words which possess compatibility, &c.'—as the 'compatibility' there mentioned only means that they indirectly possess a character† which necessitates a logical connection between their meanings.

b. As for the second inference, 'Expectancy' is properly the mind's inquiry after certain additional meanings, which are supplied by words suggested by the construction,—as, e.g. on hearing the word cyathum the mind goes in search of a fresh meaning supplied by a suggested affer or vide, and on hearing the word affer, it similarly supplies cyathum or ves-tum; Expectancy is therefore a cause of verbal knowledge by its very presence, [i. e. whether it is definitely known or not; but if it were to be included in the middle term of your inference, it must be actually known in order to be so included].

c. "But why may we not say that the cause of verbal knowledge is juxtaposition together with compatibility, [thus excluding expectancy?]"—He replies that they are 'unrestricted,' i. e. they are not limited by any 'universal connection' with verbal knowledge‡ [and are therefore useless to produce a conclusion.] Thus in such a sentence as hic adest filius regis homines summovabantur; the words regis and homines possess compatibility and juxtaposition, and would therefore,

* Similarly a cause (Kārama) is said to be mārtāpa-poyya and yhalopādhyāya,—in the former case it exists kārama, in the latter kāramya.
† Poyantā resides directly in the padṛtha but indirectly in the pada.
‡ So it. they may be found present where it is absent, as fire is found without smoke.
according to your view, possess a logical connection and produce verbal knowledge, although there is no expectancy, [as the sense is already satisfied by the logical connection between filius and regis].

XIV. But here the Prābhākaraśa come in and say, "Testimony can be a source of right knowledge in the case of the Veda, as the Veda is not made by man and consequently there can be no inference to establish the speaker's knowledge; but in secular matters there is required a previous knowledge, viz., that the testimony is given by a reliable [i. e. worthy, dpti,] speaker. And thus we have first such an argument as 'this speaker possesses a correct knowledge of the meaning of the sentence which he uses, because he uses a sentence produced by a knowledge of its meaning which knowledge does not arise from mistake, &c.,' [sc. he himself knows, and speaks to inform me;] and this argument will establish the sentence's meaning indirectly, as being the distinguishing characteristic of the speaker's knowledge. We may next proceed to use a second argument, [having previously by the former one established that the speaker's knowledge is correct,] viz., these meanings of the separate words are mutually connected, because they are the object of the speaker's correct knowledge, and thus directly establish the meaning of the sentence. In this way, i. e. only after these two arguments, does the knowledge of the connection of words [i. e. the knowledge produced by testimony] arise from words whose meaning is previously fixed by compact; and hence testimony in secular matters is only a repetition [of what is previously known,] and consequently not itself a source of right knowledge at all.† To meet this, he replies,

XIV. Since the meaning is already ascertained, before the inference, from the words whose signification has been ascertained, it is the middle term of your inference which will be a repetition, since the recollection of a universal proposition implies delay.

Even in secular cases the meaning of the sentence is ascertained previously to any supposed inference, since the meaning of the words has

* The Prābhākaraśa are the followers of the great Mīmāṃsaka doctor, Prabhākara. He is also called the Guru in contradistinction to the Bhaṭṭa, i. e. Bhaṭṭa Kumārila.

† The Prābhākaraśa define right knowledge as aprākṛta-prabhakarac, 'the apprehending something previously not apprehended'—see the fourth chapter.
been already determined in the Veda [as you yourselves admit;] and therefore it is your middle term which is obnoxious to the charge of superfluous repetition, since inference must always produce a slower cognition than testimony, as the former is unavoidably impeded through the delay involved in recollecting the necessary universal connection (cyédpit).

XV. "But since knowledge produced by testimony is out of the question, where there is any doubt as to the speaker's being reliable and still more where it is certain that he is not,—why should we not hold that the ascertainment of this point is the real cause of such knowledge,—and a thing's being spoken by a reliable speaker will mean that it is produced by an accurate knowledge, in the speaker, of the original meaning of the sentence?—thus the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence must originally be derived from inference." He replies,

XV. Since even there we must establish our point by an inference,—*these* Vaidio meanings are mutually connected from their being brought to our remembrance by words which are themselves free from any imputation of defects incident to a human being,—how can even the Veda itself be cleared from that?

There is no evidence to prove that the ascertainment of the speaker's being reliable is a cause of verbal knowledge; [a truer cause is the one generally admitted to be a concurrent to S'abda, viz., the ascertainment of compatibility between the words used,] since in an incompatible sentence we see the knowledge of the connection [i. e. the so-called verbal knowledge,] stopped in consequence of the knowledge of the compatibility—i. e. the absence of any manifest contradiction,—being retarded [and hence the two seem related as cause and effect.]* If not, then, in the case of the Veda, let the knowledge of its being unproduced by a person, be the cause of verbal knowledge; and as we shall thus have the connection between even the Vaidio meanings established by an inference such as this,—*these

* This will no doubt require an inference, but this inference will not establish the S'abdadodha but only clear away any apprehended contradictions and leave the way open to the proper cause S'abda-jmána. The inference is only a negative, the S'abda-jmána is the positive, cause.—I may add that this discussion on S'abda is one of the obscurest parts of the book. The old printed text was here very corrupt, and that now given is from the two old MSS. mentioned in the preface.
Vaidic meanings are mutually connected from their being brought to our remembrance by words which are themselves free from any imputation of defects incident to a human being,—how can we clear the Veda itself from 'that,' i.e. the old charge of superfluous repetition?

Some, however, have said that "it is not the word but the word's meaning which is the instrumental cause of verbal knowledge,—hence we can understand written poetry, &c., because the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence is produced by the meanings of the words [although the words are here not spoken*]. [It might be said in objection that, if this were true, the accusative diāram 'janam' ought to produce verbal knowledge by itself; but to this we should reply that] even though we grant the knowledge of 'janam,' there can be no knowledge of connection, i.e. verbal knowledge, in the absence of the quality of 'expectancy' which necessarily resides in the word's meaning; according to the rule 'verbal expectancy is fulfilled by words alone.'§ In this way we should refute the opinion of the Guru Mānasakas, viz., that 'the meanings of words are [not the cause of verbal knowledge but] only the distinguishing mark of the phrase 'knowledge of the meaning of the word,' since without the knowledge produced by words there cannot be the knowledge of the connection of the meanings of words,|| as has been said, "from their coming first, from their power of conveying a meaning, and from their conveying the speaker's intention, the power of causation must pre-eminently be held to reside in words." † This opinion, we repeat, is overthrown,—because, if we only substitute 'reliable speakers' (āptānām) in the sūkta quoted, for 'words' (paddānām), we see directly that the 'being spoken by a reliable speaker' is only a distinguishing mark of the phrase, 'the knowledge of its being spoken by a reliable speaker;' ‡ and since the knowledge of the word's meaning must be granted, the word per se is a superfluous, and not a true, cause."—This

* Pada means a word spoken, cf. S. Muktavali, p. 78.
‡ In written poetry none of the words are properly padas and therefore there can be anusya and ḍānakāh between them; but not so between one spoken word as janam and another not spoken as the understood clause.
§ In written poetry it is ārtikādkānkāh.
|| That is, according to the Guru, there is a series, 1, the pada, 2, the paddathpathīt, 3, S'ābdabodha, but the first is the true cause of the third.
‡ That is, the supposed series will be, 1, āpta, 2, āptātāvajñāna, 3, S'ābdabodha; but all allow that āpta is not the cause of verbal knowledge but only of the spoken words. Similarly pada cannot be the true cause in the former series,
laboured exposition is, however, mistaken, since the meanings of words cannot be the cause of verbal knowledge, from the very fact that they may apply to past or future as well as to what is actually present; nor can we say that the recollection of the word’s meaning is an instrumental cause, since it has no operation (vyāpāra). The true instrumental cause is the knowledge of the word [produced by hearing,] and its accompanying operation is the recollection of the word’s meaning— [these directly and indirectly producing verbal knowledge.] In the objectified case of written poetry, &c., the instrumental cause of verbal knowledge is a mental knowledge of the word, [its corresponding operation remaining still the same, i.e. the recollection of the word’s meaning].

XVI. [Having thus established the fact that testimony is a separate proof against the Vaisëšikas in § xiii. and having overthrown the wrong notions of the proof as held by the Mīmāṃsakas in §§ xiv. and xv., he now proceeds to show that this proof cannot preclude the existence of a Supreme Being.]

"Well, then, let us concede that Testimony is a distinct kind of Proof; but why should it not preclude God’s agency as a Maker † Thus we read in the Bhagavad Gītā “Though actions are ever done by the qualities of Nature, the soul, blinded by egoism, thinks ‘I am the doer.’” ‘Nature’ means here the principle, Intellect,—the ‘qualities’ goodness, &c.; the soul thinks through delusion that itself does the actions done by these. Hence agency is imaginary, not real. But in the case of an omniscient Being there could be no such imagination; since He would see every thing as it really is.—For the grammar of the couplet quoted, we make Karta govern the accusative instead of the genitive, in accordance with the rule in Pāṇini (ii. 3. 69.)"

He replies,

XVI. The testimony of an unworthy person has no force of proof; there can be no ‘worthiness’ in the case of a thing not seen [by the speaker]. We must have an omniscient Being to see the invisible, and an eternal Veda is untenable.

* The Naiyāyikas maintain, against the Vedāntins, that every karaṇa must have a vyāpāra,—for the latter’s definition, see supra p. 18, note.
† In which case it would preclude his existence, as the Naiyāyikas only accept a Supreme Being as a Creator, and not as an Epicurean deity.
If this testimony of the ‘Sruti, which you bring forward to establish that God is not the Maker of all things, is the testimony of an unworthy person, it has no authority; if it is the testimony of a worthy person, then one who possesses the knowledge of such transcendental facts must possess an eternal and all-embracing knowledge, since all allow that He has no organs, &c.* The eternity of the Veda has been already disproved [in the second cluster]; and therefore the existence of an eternal and omniscient Author of the Veda is established.

XVII. “But if so, then what becomes of those passages of ‘Sruti† which declare that there is no such Maker?” He replies,

XVII. Such passages have more than one meaning, since the ‘Sruti also declares His existence; they may merely mean that He is unstained [by attributes]; and if the ‘Sruti declares His existence, it cannot imply the opposite.

These passages, to which you refer, do not necessarily bear only one meaning, i.e. His non-existence,—since there are many other passages which establish His existence, as e.g. that from the Gitâ, “from me all proceeds;” and the two meanings cannot be equally valid, since they are mutually contradictory. If we examine them more closely to decide which alternative is the true one, we shall find that the [apparently] opposing passages really mean only that God is to be contemplated as the Soul void of all special qualities; while the confirmatory passages become the properly authoritative, inasmuch as they are supported by the inference, based on the discussion of the relation of cause and effect, &c., [which will be given in Chapter V.].

XVIII. [Having thus shown that Testimony cannot preclude the existence of God, he next proceeds to examine the supposed fifth Proof of the Vedântins and Pûrva Mûnâsakas, i.e. Presumption or Arthâpatti.] “But if this Being were omniscient, would He not cause us to act, even without giving us definite instructions [as in the Veda?] —and hence the uselessness of Vaidic instructions, thus involved in your hypothesis, is of itself sufficient to preclude the existence of God.

* The &c. includes body, middle term in inference, &c. These causes of knowledge being thus excluded, God's knowledge must be uncaused, and therefore eternal. If any should be inclined to attribute them to God, on him must lie the onus probandi.
† E.g. the Rig Veda, ko addhâ veda, &c.
You cannot say that He does not know how to make men act in a certain way unless He gives them definite instructions,—since this would overthrow His supposed omniscience. This is a case of Presumption, and Presumption we hold to be a fifth kind of Proof."

He replies,

XVIII. Since the absence of the cause involves the absence of the effect, there can be no knowledge without proof; and in the absence of knowledge there can be no action. The same rule will hold even on an atheistic theory of sacrifice.

If there be no cause of knowledge, (pramāṇa) there can be no knowledge, (pramāṇa)† since the absence of the cause necessitates that of the effect; and if knowledge be wanting, there can be no action, since action is caused by knowledge. Now, in the present instance, the only cause of knowledge is such a Vaidic injunction as "let him who desires heaven offer the Agniśṭoma sacrifice," &c.,—hence Vaidic instructions are by no means useless. Otherwise [i.e. if you allow the possibility of ceremonial works without an authoritative command (vidhi,)] "the same rule will hold even on an atheistic theory of sacrifice" [like that of the Mīmāṃsā:] as we can similarly prove that the Veda is still useless, since destiny can set men in action without it. But the true view is that Presumption is not a separate kind of Proof.

XIX. This latter view he now proceeds to establish,

XIX. If there were no limitation, there could be no inconsistency,—that which does not limit cannot establish [any absurdity;] there can be no real contradiction between two equally trustworthy proofs; and if Presumption were admitted, it would equally apply to the commonest cases of Inference.

a. The well known example of Presumption is—that on ascertaining that the living Devadatta is not in the house, there arises the knowledge that he is out of doors. But in this very instance, if there were no limitation or understood 'universal affirmative connec-

* For Colebrooke's definition, see supra, p. 40, note.
† Pramāṇa here means only jñāna,—it simply implies a conviction in the agent's mind, whether right or wrong.
tion' (anvaya-vyópti,) there could not arise that conviction of absurdity or inconsistency with the premises which any other conclusion would involve, [which forms the very essence of Presumption; since it is only valid by adding as a suppressed major premise that the living Dovadatta must be either within or out of doors.] "That which does not limit,"—i. e. that which does not invariably accompany the middle term—cannot establish your presumed inconsistency, since this inconsistency is only valid where the absence of the including major term necessarily involves the absence of the included middle. Hence the recognition of such a threatened inconsistency [as you maintain in this proof of Presumption] can really be resolved into the recognition of a general negative proposition (vyatireka-vyópti,) which would necessitate a negative conclusion contrary to the facts.†

b. It has also been maintained that "after the cognition that 'he is somewhere but he is not in the house,' there arises the idea of contradiction, and our proof of Presumption comes in to resolve this apparent contradiction by shewing that the words 'he is somewhere' really mean that he is somewhere else than in the house." But this is untenable. For two equally trustworthy evidences‡ cannot be contradictory, because, in such a case, one would necessarily have to give way; but wherever we have such an apparent contradiction, inference will serve to establish that they must relate to different subject matters, as we may reason that an [apparent] contradiction must relate to different subjects from the very fact that it is established by certain proof, for if it did relate to the same subject it would involve an absurdity. If this were not so, you might have such a Presumption as 'smoke will establish the existence of fire,' since without fire it would be absurd, and thus there would be no such proof as the Inference which our opponents allow as well as we. Again, we might have such an apparent contradiction as 'fire is not perceived at the foot of the hill, and yet the smoke is a proof that there is fire somewhere,' and we should have to call in the assistance of your Presumption to establish the existence of fire in some other part of the hill. [Nor can

* I. c. The absence of fire (the vyópaka in an anvaya-vyópti,) necessarily involves the absence of smoke (vyópta).
† I. c. His not being out of doors (when he is not within,) is always accompanied by his non-existence.
‡ As c. g. the sense-perception that he is not in the house, and the testimony that he is somewhere, drawn from the infallible dictum of astrology that our friend will live a hundred years.
the opponent object to this that "inference must still always be granted, as without it the proof that establishes the constant accompaniment of smoke by fire could not establish the conclusion that fire exists in the present case,—because we reply that] even if there were no such thing as inference at all, the proof that establishes* the constant accompaniment of the middle term by the major would still establish the existence of the major term in the present case [i. e. that there is fire in this mountain] by Presumption. Hence the admission of Presumption as a proof would only abolish Inference.

XX. That Non-perception (Anupalabdhi) [which the Vedántins and. Púrva Mímánsákás add as a sixth proof or source of right knowledge,] cannot preclude the existence of God, has been already shewn in the first couplet of this chapter; but in reality this is not a distinct kind of proof at all. This he now proceeds to shew,

XX. From the cognition of non-existence not being mediate—from the senses not being then engrossed in other objects—from its instrumental cause not being cognized,—and from the internal sense having to do with actual entities,

a. All must allow that that knowledge is a case of 'perception,' the cause of which is a non-perception whereof we are ourselves unconscious,†—since that knowledge of an object's non-existence which was produced by a conscious non-perception would be a case of 'inference,'‡ and all knowledge is produced by the senses which is non-eternal§ and immediate. By its 'not being mediate' we mean that it is 'not caused by knowledge,' [which is the distinctive mark of perception, as contrasted with inference, comparison and testimony.]

b. The senses are the instrument in the perception of a jar's absence as of its presence, since there is no preferable object to engross their energy,—for assuredly we cannot say that their energy is then engrossed in the perception of the site, since the ear can detect the cessation of sound (i. e. its dwans' dbháva,) even where there is no

* See Bhásha parichchheda, 'al. 196, a.
† A common definition of perception is 'that knowledge whose cause is not cognized', ajñata-karuyakam jñánam, o. g. the sight does not perceive the eye, &c.
‡ The inference is that a jar is not here from the fact that it is not perceived.
§ I. c. janya. The D. vina pratyaksá is of course eternal.
perception of its site, ether,—and the eye can similarly detect the absence of form in the air. c. We can also conclude by inference that the knowledge of a thing's absence is produced by the senses,—from its being a knowledge produced by an instrumental cause which is itself not recognized. d. Our perception of external objects is universally produced by the mind (or internal sense,) assisted by instrumental causes [as the senses] which are themselves actual entities [and not like Non-perception, a mere negation]. For these four reasons we conclude that the senses, and not the so-called Non-perception, are the true instrumental cause in the perception of a thing's absence from a given spot.∗

XXI. He now adds other reasons for this opinion, as follows.†

XXI. It must be the senses, from their power of perceiving the counterentity; from the inseparability of the operation from the cause; from the fact that defects reside in the senses; and from determinate perception.

Our intended conclusion is that the senses are the true instrumental cause in the perception of a thing's absence.

a. "From their power of perceiving the counterentity! to the absence, [i.e. the thing said to be absent]. Just as Inference can make known to us a thing's absence as well as its presence, so also can the senses. b. "But may we not say that the power of perceiving the counterentity is not a proper reason for your inference, since all causes are of course subject to the condition of 'being free from superfluous causation'?† and in the present case, the senses perceive the site, and are therefore 'superfluous causes' for perceiving the absence in that site,‡ [the perception of the site being the true cause of the perception of the absence]. To this he replies, "from the inseparability of the operation [from the cause]." Thus the senses are not a 'superfluous cause,'—because the perception of the site [which you erroneously take to be the cause] is only the operation (nyāpāra) which invariably accompanies an instrumental cause.§ If this were not so,

∗ Both parties allow that non-existence is an object of perception, but the Vedāntins hold that anupalabdhi is its proper cause, while the Naiyāyikas hold that the senses are the true instrumental cause and anupalabdhi only a concurrent.
† For upādhi and anyathādīdhyatena, see p. 37, and note, p. 24.
‡ Just as the father of the potter is a superfluous cause for making the jar.
§ The nyāpāra is the cause causali (jāt:janyatena sati tāj:janya-janakah.)
the eye, &c., would be superfluous instrumental causes in the perception of a thing's existence, in consequence of such an operation as the conjunction of the eye with the object. a. We must all allow that an erroneous perception of a thing's absence, [when it is really present,*] arises from a defect in the instrumental cause, and defects reside only in the senses, &c., for non-perception in itself admits of no defect, and the true faults of the senses are such as jaundice, &c. Hence he adds "from the fact that defects reside in the senses."

b. A determinate perception of the spot of ground and the absence† cannot [according to your opinion] be produced by the senses, because it is a perception of absence or non-existence,—nor can it, on the other hand, be produced by Non-perception, as it partly includes existence [so far as the spot of ground is concerned;]—hence we must accept the senses as the cause of determinate cognition.‡

XXII. [The opponent may, however, raise an objection to our last argument.] a. "Why may we not say that Non-perception, [although it does not produce the determinate cognition,] produces the [indeterminate] cognition of the absence of the jar, and then follows the cognition of the spot of ground as possessing the absence of the jar, [which latter cognition is produced by the senses, acting by a transcendent relation called ḫndalakṣāya,] just as the transcendent perception by the eye that 'sandal wood is sweet'§ is said to follow the perception of its sweetness by the proper sense, i.e. that of smell; and in this way non-perception may be called an instrumental cause as producing the cognition of absence. By examining a determinate perception we are compelled to infer that the object must be first perceived indeterminately and is then subsequently perceived determinately by the senses. b. Again, how can we be said to have any proper 'senso-

* As when a jaundiced eye does not see a white shell but a yellow one. See supra, p. 27, note.
† I. e. this spot of ground has the absence of a jar,—see supra, p. 20, note.
‡ By the opponent's opinion this particular determinate perception can be produced neither by ḫndriya nor by ḫrupalabda; but according to ours there is no difficulty, as ḫndriya is equally the instrumental cause in cases of ḫdasa and ḫbdesa, the difference being that in the former ḫndriya-sampuya, in the latter ḫrupalabda, is the concurrent.
§ This is the so-called ḫndha-lakṣāya which takes place where one sense supplies a perception which is properly given by another. (Cf. Bhikshā-para-chhoda, n. 64.) It is said to cognize the object (as saṃvabhā) per se, apart from any thing connected with it, and is thus distinguished from the saṃvēṣa-lakṣāya which cognizes all the cognate objects under the form of the species, as definitely perceived in the individual object; e.g. all jars past, present, and future, as possessing the species of this jar. Both are transcendent (alautikā) perceptions.
perception' of non-existence since it has no direct connection with the senses? for the only relation which absence could be said to be capable of, i.e. that called the vis'eshyaata sambandha,* cannot but involve another relation simultaneously existing with it. Hence we must allow that the instrument [in the cognition of abhava] cannot but be our unavoidably assumed Non-perception, and not any one of the senses." 

He replies,

XXII. From the cognition of the distinguishing mark, if such is accepted,—from the superfluousness of the assumed proof, if such is not accepted,—from the 'in infinitum regressus' if we assume another relation; and if you do not accept my view, any other explanation is untenable.

a. Those who hold that the cognition of the 'distinguishing mark,'—i.e. the cognition of the counterentity,†—is the cause of the perception of abhava, must also hold that there can never be an indeterminate cognition of abhava at all, since we find in this case the means for producing determinate cognition only;‡ but in the perception of a real object, as a jar, there must be first the indeterminate cognition alone, since at that moment there can be no cognition of the distinguishing mark as distinguishing, [i.e. ghatatva] which is the cause of the subsequent determinate cognition. b. But those who hold that we can perceive abhava apart from its counterentity, [i.e. without bringing in the idea of any relation between them,] can also allow that we have an indeterminate perception of abhava; and as this can be easily derived from the senses like any other case of indeterminate perception, it follows that the supposition of Non-perception as a distinct proof is superfluous.

a. "From the 'in infinitum regressus,' if we assume another relation." The relation called 'the nature of the thing' and not any new

* Vis'eshyaata means 'the state of being a vis'eshaya or distinguishing mark or property' thus the jar on a given spot is the distinguishing peculiarity of that spot, and there are thus two relations which the jar holds to its site, that of 'distinguishing' (vis'eshyaata) and that of 'contact' (sanyoga). But since in abhava there is no such second relation, we have no right to suppose the first. The Naiyayikas, however, hold that this is really included in the avacchheka sambandha, see supra, p. 13, note.

† The avacchheka or vis'eshaya, in the phrase ghatatbhava, is of course the counterentity or pratiyog, i.e. ghaTa.

‡ In the indeterminate, you have not as yet the idea of the relation of 'distinguishing' and 'distinguished,—see p. 21, note.
category, is really the only relation existing between the abhāva and its site,—since the assumption of such a relation here as a special vis'na-
shāyatā, would certainly lead to an endless succession of relations; and hence we must accept such a relation as that called ‘the nature of the thing,’ [and this being su| genor| requires no second relation].
[If you ask ‘how can abhāva be an object of sense perception at all,’ we reply,] that its sense-perception is possible because the relation between the eye and its object, which is necessary in every act of perception, is here fulfilled (in the case of an absent jar,) at second hand by the relation between the spot of ground and the said absence, which we call the distinguishing relation.†

d. If you do not accept my explanation of this svap|āpa relation between the jar’s absence and its site, then it will be extremely difficult to establish any other principle, even on your hypothesis that a proof called Non-perception is an instrumental cause. For to explain more fully,—all allow that no proof or source of right knowledge [and therefore not even your own Non-perception] can apprehend any thing subsequently which was not originally an object of indeterminative cognition,§ and thus even in inference, &c., we all admit that there must have been some previous indeterminate cognition of fire, &c.|| [and therefore there must be an indeterminate cognition of abhāva, and this can only be caused by the senses alone.] Again, the very phrase, ‘a site of ground possessing the jar’s abhāva’ compels our opponents to admit some relation between the abhāva and the site [and this can only be that called svap|āpa, which we have previously established.]

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* Understanding by it a separate relation from svap|āpa.
† I. e. just as the relation of contact requires another relation, i. e. that of intimate relation, so this relation would require a relation to connect it with its related subjects, and so on. The Nyāya holds that svap|āya and abhāva abide in their subjects by the svap|āpa sam|ānahā only.
‡ The spot being distinguished by the absence of the jar, ghad|ab|uddavat bhad|atam. This will be clearer to the reader if he will compare the description in the Siddhānta Muktāvalī, p. 51, how the eye sees the jar by direct contact, its form by the intimate relation existing between the jar and its qualities, and the form’s species (rāpatwa) by the intimate relation between that species and the rāpa. It may be illustrated algebraically \( (a + b) + c \) + d.
§ The indeterminate knowledge is neither grand nor bhrama, and therefore there is no grāndāya for its production.
|| Similarly in testimony, before we can understand the sentence Devadatta gau|abrāhi|, (i. e. Devadatta gau|amakartā ast), we must have had an indeterminate cognition of Devadatta and gau|ama.
XXIII. He thus sums up the substance of the chapter.

XXIII. Paralysed in their power by necessarily looking to His countenance,* the various proofs,—Perception and the rest,—fail even to attain their proper nature,† and the threatened rise of contradiction is utterly crushed down; to Him, then, the one to whom all are subject, who delights in the sportive exercise, unrivalled and independent, of His almighty power,—to Him, the god even of gods, we betake ourselves with our highest faith aroused.

"Paralysed in their power by necessarily looking to His countenance," i.e. their force precluded by positive arguments which prove the subject’s actual existence. ‘He delights in the sportive exercise of his power,’ since He is the one primary cause of the absence of pain.‡

* They depend on God, as otherwise, by § 2, the inference would be baseless without a subject; and this defect is only removed by the inference itself being overthrown—in other words the dvrayāṣiddhī is only avoided by bddha.
† They come to be ‘proofs’ at all.
‡ Cf. the definition of Final Liberation in the Nyāya Sūtras, I. 22 as ‘absolute deliverance from pain.’
FOURTH CLUSTER.

I. The fourth objection was that even if God did exist, he could not be a cause of right knowledge to us. "God cannot be an authority to us, because he has no right knowledge, as his knowledge lacks the indispensable characteristic of cognizing an object unrecognized before;" hence he neither possesses right knowledge himself nor can produce it in us, and who would trust the words of a being who cannot be a cause of right knowledge?" He replies,

I. Cognizing for the first time is no true mark, as it is both too narrow and too wide; we hold right knowledge to be an independent impression which corresponds to the reality.

Your "cognizing an object unrecognized before" is not an indispensable characteristic mark of right knowledge, as it fails to apply in such an affirmative instance as repeated knowledge [i.e., seeing a thing a second or third time], and wrongly applies to such a negative instance as the erroneous judgment that 'this [nacre before me] is silver.' He then gives his own definition in the second line. The ancient Pandits did not apply the term 'right knowledge' to remembrance, because it is necessarily 'dependent,' as it has the same object as the original impression which produced it, and therefore its authoritativeness must stand or fall with that of its originator. Hence he adds the epithet 'independent.'

II. "a. But" (reply the opponents) we may deny that our definition is too narrow as not applying to repeated knowledge. We maintain that cognition must produce a particular quality, [i.e., cognizance,] residing in the object,†—otherwise there would not be

* The P. Mīmāṃsā concludes that as God must always know, his knowledge would not fall under the definition of 'right knowledge.' They deny that remembrance can be right knowledge; the other schools generally allow that it is a kind of pramā but not independent.
† The Sanskrit reader will observe that this is the opinion of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas in the S. Muktāvali, p. 118. They hold that all cognition is super-
in cognition the definite distinguishing of the object, [i. e. that this thing is cloth and not a jar;] and hence, even in repeated cognition, we have 'the cognizing of a thing before unrecognized,' [since each separate act of cognition on our part produces anew this particular influence or quality in the object, and this therefore is ever cognized anew.] b. [Again, you would prove the existence of God by the argument that the creation of the world must imply a previous knowledge of the material cause,—i. e. the atoms, out of which it was made,—from the very nature of effects, since all effects, as jars, &c., imply such a knowledge; and as this knowledge is not found in individual souls, it must belong to the Supreme Soul. But we would meet this by proposing a dilemma.] When you talk of 'God's knowledge of the world's material cause,' do you allow that this knowledge produces this particular quality of cognizedness in its object or not? If you allow it, then you must also concede a second similar quality of cognizedness, residing in the knowledge itself, in order to distinguish definitely that it is the knowledge of the material cause, [i. e. to know that he knows it,] and this again will necessitate a third and so on,—thus we have a regressus in infinitum. If you do not allow it, then your alleged reason (or middle term) 'the very nature of effects' fails from being too general,—since in this very instance 'cognizedness' is an effect and yet you own that it is not produced by a previous knowledge of the material cause. Hence we cannot admit that the existence of God is proved as the Maker of the world." He replies,

II. In the absence of the object's real nature to distinguish it, it would be uselessness to seek help [from cognizedness;] and even supposing that, without this (nature), you might succeed in an existing object, yet what could you do in a non-existing?

The especial nature of the thing is that which definitely distin-

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guishes the object [so that we determine it to be not a jar but cloth;} otherwise there would be no definite distinction, even though your quality of 'cognizedness had been communicated to it. And again, even although we granted that 'cognizedness' is produced in the case of an existing object, yet it could not arise in the case of a non-existing object, [as e. g. a jar now destroyed,] since its material cause, [i. e. that object,] would be non-existent; and hence it would follow that here, at any rate, there would be nothing definite to distinguish the object. We therefore conclude that a thing's special nature is that which alone definitely distinguishes it.

III. "But may we not apply the general rule, 'an action must produce some effect on its object,' and hold that the action of cognition similarly produces a quality residing in its object?" He replies,

III. 'Action' cannot serve you as a reason to prove any new quality [such as 'cognizedness,'] since it is either too general or falsely assumed; nor will perception prove it, since it shews that cognition is itself the distinguishing connection.

a. 'If you mean by 'action' the signification of the verbal root, then, as in such an instance as 'he unites his arrow to the sky' there is no effect produced by the action on its object the [impassive] sky, your assumed reason is too general. b. If you mean by 'action' the operation of the instrumental cause, then again also your reason will be too general, as no effect is produced on the jars by the contact of the organs of perception therewith. c. If you say that 'action' means motion, then, as cognition is not a motion at all, your reason is falsely assumed in the subject. d. "But may we not say that such phrases as 'the jar is cognized,' 'the jar is intuitively known,' &c., shew that perception is the proof of this very quality of cognizedness?" [as 'cognized,' &c., really mean 'possessed of cognizedness,' &c.] He replies by the second line of the s'loka. Wherever you have a de-

* Cf. Bhāshā P. 'sl. 58. and supra., p. 19, note.
† Svarjadiśiddhi is that fallacy where the assumed middle term is not present in the subject or minor term, as 'the lake has fire, because it has smoke.' In the present case the argument is 'cognition produces an effect on its object from the very fact that it belongs to the class action,' action being defined to mean 'motion.'
finitely distinguished cognition, you have as its object the distin-
guishing attribute, the thing distinguished, and the connection which
exists between them; and this connection may sometimes be
that of contact [as in such cases as 'the spot of ground possessing a
jar on it,'] in others it may be the connection constituted by the
nature of the things connected.* Now just as we see in such [re-
versed] phrases as 'the cognition of the jar'† [where the jar is that
which distinguishes the cognition, and the Mīmāṃsakas allow that
their cognizedness only resides in an object and not in the cognition,]
that the latter kind of connection is that which exists between the
cognition and the jar, so the same connection appears to be found in
such phrases as 'the jar is cognized' [where the cognition is that
which distinguishes the jar†]. Otherwise, if this were not the con-
nection, you would have to assume in such cases as 'the jar is desir-
ed,' 'the jar is produced,' novel connections such as 'desiredness' and
'producedness.'

IV. [If the opponent reply, "why should we assume these novel
connections? The well known *svarūpa-sambandha, i. e. the connection
constituted by the nature of the things, will suffice in these
cases;" to meet this] he now proceeds to show that the *svarūpa-
sambandha will equally serve in the original case of dispute, [i. e.
the same connection which holds in such cases as 'the jar is made,'
'the jar is desired,' &c., will equally hold in 'the jar is cognized.']

IV. The cognition is distinguished by its object alone,
since the cognitions themselves have no definite form to
distinguish them from each other; and in the common
phrases about the objects of actions it is the verb which
distinguishes.

Just as [in such phrases as 'a cognition of the jar'] we have the
knowledge distinguished by its object the jar, [i. e. it is that which

* See note, p. 13.
† Here we agree that the cognition does not reside by intimate connection (as
the genus in its individuals,) nor by contact (as the jar on the ground;) and
therefore by exhaustion it must be the vishayatād-sambandha. *Ghaśa-jnānam
therefore means vishayatād *ghaśavat jnānam, and similarly jnāta *ghaśah
means vishayatād jnāna-viśeśhaḥ ghaśah.
‡ The Mīmāṃsā holds that jnāta is a quality in the object, the Nyāya that it
is a svarūpa-sambandha between the jnāna and the object.
makes this cognition different from other cognitions; and just as in common phrases about the objects of actions, as jars, &c., we have the particular meaning of the verbal root as that which distinguishes the particular phrase [and thus makes it differ from other similar phrases], so too in such alleged cases as 'the jar is cognized,' it is the cognition alone which distinguishes this particular knowledge in regard to the jar, and it is not from any other supposed attribute [as your 'cognizedness'].

V. "May we not, however, still maintain that God's knowledge is not properly 'right knowledge' (pramāṇa) since it is not produced by proof (pramāṇa); and therefore God can neither be a right knower (pramāṇā) Himself nor be a cause of right knowledge to us, since the essential conditions for both are absent in Him?" He replies,

V. Right knowledge is accurate comprehension and right knowing is the possession thereof; authoritative ness is, according to Gotama's school, the being separated from all absence thereof.†

Right knowledge is a notion corresponding to the object; and this is not inconsistent with God's knowledge, even though His knowledge be not produced [but eternal]. 'Right knowing' [i.e. the being a right knower,] means the being connected with right knowledge by intimate relation, [i.e. that relation which connects a substance and its qualities;†] and this can be established of God, even though He be not a cause of right knowledge to us. In the same way God is an authority as being Himself ever connected with right knowledge, i.e. as being ever 'separated from all absence thereof.' There is no need to include as absolutely necessary in your definition that He must be an instrument of right knowledge to others, since God's Authoritativeness is thus declared in the Nyāya Sūtras, (II. 68.) "The fact of the Veda being an authority, [i.e. an instrument of right knowledge,] like the spells [against poison, &c.,]

* Thus in 'a jar is made,' 'a jar is broken, &c.,'-it is the verb which distinguishes the several sentences.
† I. e. there may be a partial pramāṇa even in a case of error, (thus the jaundiced perception is right as to the shell, though wrong as to its colour;) but pramāṇa can never be found where there is any, even only a partial, absence of pramāṇa.
† God is pramāṇa-kartā, i.e. pramāṇā, but kartā must not be taken in its usual meaning (as his knowledge is eternal,) but in that of ākāra.
and the medical science, follows from the authoritativeness of the fit person [who gave it"]. Nor need you object that this will lead to God's being a fifth cause of right knowledge, (pramāṇa) and thus our old division of four pramāṇas will be violated,—because our old division will still hold as applying to instrumental causes of right knowledge, [and the Veda, our fourth pramāṇa, is God's instrument]. Nor need you object that "God's knowledge [if He be omniscient] will embrace error [as well as truth,] and apprehend the objects of error [as well as those of truth,] and therefore will itself be liable to the imputation of error,"—since the nature of right knowledge is not violated so long as the knowledge is not associated with a contradictory object, [i. e., so long as I do not apprehend silver in what is not silver but nacre]. Now it is an actual fact that in error there is a definite object, as nacre, and also that it is viewed under the notion of silver; and God's right knowledge cannot be impaired by his apprehending this fact.

VI. He now gives a slōka recapitulating the purport of the Chapter.

VI. He, in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to Him and dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various existing objects is contained,—all the chaff of our suspicion being swept away by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the slightest want of observation in Him,—He, 'Śiva, is my authority; what have I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be with rising doubts?

"The succession of all the various existing objects"—i. e. all the world is the object of God's perception. "All possible faults," as partiality, aversion, &c. "All the chaff of our suspicion is swept away,"—all our suspicion as to the Veda's want of authority. "Others," i. e. heretics.
FIFTH CLUSTER.

I. The fifth objection was 'from the absence of positive proof.' "May we not say that there are no proofs to establish God's existence?" He replies, *

I. From effects, combination, support, &c., traditional arts, authoritativeness, 'Sruti, the sentences thereof, and particular numbers,—an everlasting omniscient Being is to be established.

a. The earth, &c., must have had a maker because they have the nature of 'effects,'* like a jar; by a thing's having a maker we mean that it is produced by some agent who possesses the wish to make, and has also a perceptive knowledge of the material cause out of which it is to be made.† b. 'Combination' is an action, and therefore the action which produced the conjunction of two atoms, initiating the binary compound, at the beginning of a creation, must have been accompanied by the volition of an intelligent being, because it has the nature of an action, like the actions of bodies such as ours. c. 'Support, &c.' The world depends upon some being who possesses a volition which hinders it from falling, because it has the nature of being supported, like a stick supported by a bird in the air; by being supported we mean the absence of falling in the case of bodies possessing weight. By the ' &c.,' we include destruction. Thus the world can be destroyed by a being possessed of volition, because it is destructible, like cloth which is rent. d. 'From traditional arts.' *Pada [which is not used here in its usual sense of 'word,' see infra § v.] is derived from the root pada, i.e. 'that by

* This is proved because the world consists of parts which are arranged in a certain way and are severally produced and destroyed, (see Sarva D. Saṅgraha, p. 81, last line).

The argument from Kāryākya is really the same as that employed by Chalmers (in his Natural Theology,) to rebut Hume's objection to the a posteriori argument on the ground that the world is only a singular effect.

† Cf. Bhāshā Parichchheda, § 149.
which something is known,' i. e. the traditional arts of mankind. The traditional arts now current, as that of making cloth, &c., must have been originated by an independent being,* from the very fact that they are traditional usages - like the tradition of modern modes of writing† [invented by men independently, as systems of short-hand, &c.] e. 'From authoritativeness.' The knowledge produced by the Veda is produced by a virtue residing in its cause,‡ because it is right knowledge, just as is the case in the right knowledge produced by perception &c.§ i.e. 'From śruti,' i. e. the Veda. The Veda must have been produced by a person from its having the nature of a Veda like the Ayur-veda (i. e. the upaveda so called, treating of medical science) g. Again, the Veda must have been produced by a person because it has the nature of sentences, like the Mahābhārata; or, in other words, the sentences of the Veda were produced by a person because they have the nature of sentences, just as the sentences of beings like ourselves. h. 'From particular numbers.' The measure of a binary compound is produced by number since it is a derived [i. e. not eternal] measure and at the same time is not produced by measure or aggregation,¶ like the measure of a jar composed of three kapālas which is larger than that of one composed of two such kapālas: [and this increase can only be due to number, as the kapālas in themselves are all equal;] for the

* Svatantratvaśam is defined as asamadhyā-nyavahārānddhāhna-nyavahārā-kartīteśam.
† The Hindus hold that the Devangarī alphabet is of divine, while Bengali, Persian, &c. are of human, origin.—There is a current śloka of Brihaspati.

† See Bhāṣā P. §§ 130-3. Wrong knowledge or error is produced by a fault in its cause, as jaundice, &c. in the eye; and right knowledge is produced by a guna or virtue, (like Aristotle's ἑρετική ἐρετικὴ or βεβαιοτήτι βεβαιοτήτι) . This virtue in the case of the Veda is its quality of being uttered by a fit person, i. e. one possessing a true knowledge of words and meanings.
§ Some say that the guna here is the absence of jaundice, &c., others the direct contact of the organ with a true object.
¶ By Nyāya Sūt. II, 68, we learn that 'that is Veda where the fact of being a cause of right knowledge is admitted.'

‡ Cf. Bhāṣā P. § 110. The infinitesimality of atoms is eternal.

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measure of an atom does not produce measure because its measure is eternal [and therefore incapable of change] or because it is the measure of an atom. Hence at the beginning of a creation there must be the number of duality abiding in the atoms, which is the cause of the measure of the binary compound, but this number cannot be produced at that time by the distinguishing perception of beings like ourselves. Therefore we can only assume this distinguishing faculty as then existing in God.†—By the last words of the text it is meant that it is the Being, possessed of this attribute [of omniscience,] who is everlasting,‡ and hence is established his eternal omniscience.

II. "a. But may we not say that inasmuch as only one possessed of a body can be a maker, the existence of God is precluded as the distinguishing attribute of a maker is precluded? b. We have also the contrary syllogism, that we cannot allow the earth, &c. to have been produced by a maker, as there is the absence of the being produced by a body which invariably accompanies the being produced by a maker. c. There is also an opposing universal proposition, viz. that only one possessed of a body can be a maker. d. By the induction

* Ibid. § 14. The atoms of Hindu philosophy, being infinitesimal, would only produce still smaller totals (like multiplied fractions or added negative quantities) as measure can only produce a further result homogenous with itself. It is the tertiary compound, which, as having finite magnitude (mahatwa,) produces measure, just as the jar’s measure is caused by that of its two halves.

† To understand this argument, we must remember that the Nyāya holds that all number beyond unity is produced in things by an effort of our mind,—in nature all things exist singly, and it is we who combine them into sets of two, three, or more at our pleasure. The first operation is that distinguishing perception called apakshabuddhi, by which we say of each thing, ‘this is one,’ ‘this is one,’ &c. This produces duality, &c. in the objects, as e.g. in two jars, which duality resides by intimate relation in each of the objects, but resides in both by a peculiar connection called parāyāna—i.e. it is this last which gives the idea of "two pots," and not merely that of one pot possessing duality here and another possessing it there. As the binary compound only differs from the atom by number and not by measure or size (as both are, as far as we are concerned; alike infinitesimal, however one may be really larger than the other,) we must have recourse to the Supreme Being's apakshabuddhi to account for the existence of number in the binary compound at the time of creation. The smallest perceptible size is the tertiary compound, consisting of three binary ones. See Colebrooke, I. p. 278. It is singular that the Nyāya should adopt such a conceptualistic view of number, while it yet holds such realistic notions of genus.

‡ There are two kinds of anvaya or logical connection, vis’ātha-vidhayā and upalakṣaṇa-vidhayā. The former is where the epithet is emphatic and is therefore never disjoined from the subject; the latter is where the emphasis is laid on the subject and the epithet or predicate may be sometimes separated. (Thus Phidias the sculptor is not always actually sculpturing.) In the present case the epithet "everlasting" belongs to the former class and can never be separated from its subject the Supreme Being as distinguished by the attribute of omniscience, and this attribute is therefore everlasting.
which extends over every case presented by experience [as jars, &c.,] we
infer that a maker must have a body, but by the relation existing
in the present argument between the minor term earth, &c. and the
major term it would appear that the maker is incorporeal [as no
maker is in this case perceptible]—hence the possibility of the al-
leged major term is unproved, and there is also a mutual contradic-
tion between the subject, [maker,] and the attribute ascribed to it,
[incorporeal.] e. We may also establish the fallacy of a too gen-
eral middle term by inserting the condition § "from being produced
by a corporeal agent" instead of the old middle "from being an
effect." Thus there are five separate fallacies involved by the alleged
middle term.’’ He replies,

II. There is no precluding, as this, [our middle term.] is
indispensable; nor are there any valid counterarguments,
as those alleged are too weak; whether our assumed con-
nection be established or overthrown, there is no mutu-
al contradiction; nor can you have a too general middle
term, without any reason for it.

a. Because the possession of a body is precluded in the case of
the subject [sc. the Supreme Being.] it does not follow that his
possession of the attribute of being a maker is precluded, since
‘this,’ i. e. our middle term (—‘‘having the nature of an effect’’—)
which necessarily establishes the existence of the subject [as every
effect implies a cause] is too powerful to be set aside, as it is
this which must undoubtedly be looked to as producing the know-
ledge of the subject at all, and without the knowledge of the
subject, as we have previously proved, [in III. § ii.] it is im-
possible to establish the knowledge of non-existence. And thus
there is no such pretended perception as would preclude the existence
of God because his distinguishing attribute as maker is precluded.
Nor again is there any such precluding inference as “God cannot be
a maker because he has no body,” [since in your opinion the very
existence of God is unproved, and how then can you discuss his attrib-
utes?]  
b. We cannot admit as a valid opposing argument “the earth,

* For Upadi, the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general
middle term, see supra, p. 37.
&c. are destitute of a maker because they were not produced by a body," because your middle term is fallacious as assuming too much, since the words 'by a body' are superfluous.*

a. The middle term in our argument, "having the nature of an effect," is more valid than that of the opposite argument ["the earth, &c., are not produced by a maker from their not being produced by a body,"] because ours is supported by its being actually found as an attribute of the minor term [earth, &c.], and there is also an argument to stop any certain negative instance;† while on the other hand your alleged universal proposition "only one possessed of a body can be a maker," is too weak to stop us [as it is not found as an actual attribute of the minor term and there is moreover no such acknowledged principle.]

b. If by the connection existing between the minor and major terms it be established that the maker is incorporeal, then there is no contradiction, since in that case it is understood that being a maker may coexist with incorporeality; and, again, if it be not established, then, even in this case, there is no contradiction, [i. e. your alleged fault falls to the ground,] from the want of any subject in which it is to abide.

c. Since there is an argument on our side by which to preclude any certain negative instance, there cannot be here such an inconclusiveness as a mistake as to the major premiss caused by the absence of any such precluding argument, i. e. the fallacy of a too general middle term; and moreover your pretended 'condition,' "produced by a body"—is itself overthrown by the absence of any argument on your side to preclude a negative instance.‡

III. "But may we not bring forward the opposing argument, that 'if God were a maker he would have a body?' while at the same time there is no argument of equal weight to support your view." He replies,

* The older Nalāyikas maintained that the argument "the mountain has fire because it has blue smoke" involved the fallacy of vyāyāvatādīdhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily restricted. See Siddhānta Muktāv. p. 77. The moderns however more wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet b. in the text by asserting that there is no proof to establish the validity of the assumed middle term.
† I. e. wherever you have an effect, you must have a producing cause,—therefore you cannot have an effect without a maker.
‡ There are two readings here बिप्रवधानामावेग and बिप्रवधानायवार्त्त. If we adopt the latter, it means "by the presence of an argument on our side to preclude a negative instance."
III. Our opponents' arguments, being defective, cannot invalidate our reasoning by their fallaciousness,—while the favourable argument from the abolition of effects tells on our side.

These opposing arguments are 'fallacious' because they are subjectless, so long as the existence of their subject, God, is itself unproved. But the argument "there could not be an effect without a causer," is 'on our side.' There is also Sruti to prove it, "I am the origin of all, from me all proceeds."* And that Sruti has pre- eminent force which is supported by reasoning, according to the verse, [of Manu] "He, and none else, knows religion, who investigates, the Veda and the religious teaching of the Rishis by means of such reasoning, as is not contrary to the Veda and the Sāstras."

IV. "But how does the fact of a thing's being an effect necessitate that it should have been produced by volition?" He replies,

IV. If it [the atom] acts independently, it ceases to be brute matter,—desert does not abolish visible causes; if there be no cause there is no effect; a particular effect has a particular cause.

There cannot be an effect without a causer. If the atom were endowed with volition it would follow that the atom was intelligent, since an unintelligent thing can produce an effect only when impelled, by an intelligent being; and desert [or fate] can only produce effects by the concurrence of visible causes.† Nor may you say that "the volition of the conscious agent is the cause in effect; only and not in all action generally," because even though a particular kind of volition may be the cause in the case of effort, this does not preclude volition generally as the cause of action generally; otherwise, because a particular seed is the cause of a particular shoot, it would follow that seeds in general [i.e. the class, seed] could not be the causes of shoots in general.§

* Bhagavad Gītā, x. 8.
† Otherwise all things would be produced by desert alone, and all other causes would be superfluous.
‡ There is a memorial verse, छात्रायं भविष्या रूपायं भवेत् ज्ञाति।
वाक्यं अनेकं च चेदायम् चं चवेत् निषय। Ichchāḥ is chakrēdē, kriši in yaśas or 'volition.'
§ This argument depends on two principles,—a. the same relation of cause
V. "But what is the proof that support, &c. (§ i.) are produced by volition?" He replies,

V. In this way 'support' and 'destruction' require no limiting condition because they are effects; and the same thing holds of 'traditional arts' and 'authoritative- ness, &c.' through an interruption [of the tradition].

'Support' and 'destruction' do not require any limiting condition [i.e., they are not too general middle terms] because they are produced by volition [i.e., inasmuch as they are effects, they involve volition by § iv.]: Since, through the interruption of the tradition,—i.e., through a partial destruction of the world [as of one loka,—there is an absence of all patterns, &c. the succeeding copier cannot himself be the origin of the tradition since he does not know the tradition; hence is established the existence of some being who, at the beginning of a creation, originated the various traditional arts, as of making jars, &c.* In the same way we may prove that the authoritativeness of the ideas produced by the Veda, &c. are not too general middle terms, [Cf. § xvi. infra.]

VI. Or we may interpret the first couplet of this Chapter in the following manner.

a. 'Effect' may mean 'purport' [i.e., the 'effect' to be produced on the bearer's mind;] it has been said that words are authoritative only in reference to their purport, and therefore he is God whose purport is declared in the Veda.

b. 'Combination' may mean 'explanation'; the Vedas must have been explained by some one who knew their meaning, since their sentences have been received by great saints; and, if they had not been explained, these saints, not knowing their meaning, would not have fulfilled their injunctions by sacrifices, &c., and if a finite being had explained them, his explanation could not have been relied on.

and effect which exists between particulars exists likewise between their respective classes गुण विशेषणोऽलोकोऽनुवर्त्तितं गृहस्थवस्तुतम् च गुणस्वरूपिनि और b. the general causes only produce their effects when conjoined with the particular causes. धार्मिकतां विशेषाय विशेषायप्राप्तितिमायां आयं अवश्यति. Thus Archbishop Whately has made a book on Logic,—man can therefore make logical books; only in each particular case we require the concurrents, education, leisure, &c.

* See supra, p. 28. It is interesting to compare this with Isaiah xxviii. 26. Cf. also the Greek legend of Triptolemus, and Whately's Lectures on Pol. Economy, pp. 79, 84.
c. 'Support' may mean 'preserving the tradition.' The &c. may include 'performance.'

d. The existence of God is also established by the meaning of the 'words' I's'wara, &c., as has been said, "Denomination is purport, the explanation of an all-seeing one is valid; the words I's'wara, &c. must have a meaning in accordance with the custom of mankind." 'Denomination' here implies a particular kind of wish. In the same way in such verses as "I am the origin of all" the word "I" means an independent utterer, since even in secular matters that word alone has authoritativeness which possesses a definite meaning; and in accordance with the rule, "he who knows secular things knows Vaidic also," the same rule holds in a transcendental subject which holds in the case of a secular 'I,' &c.

e. The word pratyaga which we formerly rendered 'authoritativeness' may also mean 'affix,' i. e. the affix of the imperative implying 'let' [as in 'let him sacrifice;'] the meaning of the command has been defined as 'the will of a fit person;' and He whose will it is, is God.

VI. Activity is really volition, (yatna,) and this springs from the desire to act, and this from knowledge, and the object of this knowledge is a command, or [as we would hold] it is rather that which causes a command to be inferred.

After the knowledge produced by a command arises 'activity;'; § and this activity springs directly from a certain wish, i. e. 'the desire to act;' and this desire arises from the 'knowledge' that the thing is to be accomplished by action and that it is the means to obtain the desired end [happiness]; and the object of this knowledge is the fact that the thing is to be done and is a means to our obtaining the desired end, i. e. the fact of its being a command. This was the opinion of the ancient Naiyáyikas; but he expresses his

* The &c. includes Om, &c.
† Colebrooke translates udder's by 'enunciation,'—"the mention of a thing by its name,—that is, by a term signifying it, as taught by revelation; for language is considered to have been revealed to man."
‡ This interpretation of pratyaga leads to a long and intricate discussion on viśākha which lasts to the end of § xiv. He goes on with his explanation of § i. in § xv.—The first question is, since visākha is pratyaktva viśākha, what is pratyaktva?
§ Pratyāña is divided into three kinds (Bhāshā P. § 148.)—pravṛtti, nivṛtti and jivaña-kāraṇa, i. e. activity, cessation from activity, and vitality,
own in the last words of the couplet 'or rather it is that which causes a command to be inferred,' i.e. the real meaning of the tense affix expressing command is 'the will of a fit person,' which causes the hearer to infer that to act accordingly will be the means to obtain the desired end.

VII. He now proceeds to prove by exhaustion what is the object of that knowledge which causes that wish which produces activity, [i.e. he here shews what it is not, his own view will be given in § xiv.]

VII. [The various current notions of the meaning of 'command' are wrong; thus] it cannot be an attribute in the agent, either from improper exclusion and inclusion,—or because activity does not always ensue,—or from the ensuing inconsistency,—or from the non-existence of the action-producing wish,—or from the involved uselessness [as a cause] of the knowledge that such an action is a means,—or from confusion.

a. If you say that an attribute in the agent,—muscular action,—produces 'activity,' [and is therefore the meaning of 'command,'] then it would follow that in such a command as 'let him know the soul' we should properly have no activity at all, while, on the other hand, on hearing such an indicative sentence as 'he goes to the village' we should have activity produced in the hearer. b. If you say that the real meaning of 'command' is 'volition,' then follows the fault that activity does not always ensue; since, although volition is also implied by other tense signs than those of the potential and imperative, yet no activity follows if we do not ascertain that it is a means to a desired end, or if we know that it is a means to an undesired end.

c. If you say that 'wish' [i.e. the agent's, as in 'let him who desires swarga offer such a sacrifice'] is the proper meaning of 'command,' then you incur the fault of 'inconsistency.' If 'wish' be the meaning of 'command,' then on the one hand the knowledge of the wish [i.e. the knowledge of the command] can only be produced by the previously existing wish [as all knowledge depends on the prior existence of its object,]—while on the other hand the wish must be
produced by the knowledge of the wish,—hence you reason in a
circle,—which is called in the couplet, ‘inconsistency.’

d. But an opponent may reply that ‘the abovementioned know-
ledge of the wish [i.e. the mere knowledge of the wish itself as im-
plied in the terms of the command ‘svargakāma yojeta’; this knowledge
of the meaning not being accompanied by any conscious wish in the
person’s own mind,] is produced by the tense affix,’†—to this he
replies, ‘from the non-existence of the action-producing wish.’ Even
if the knowledge of such a wish be produced, yet no activity will
ensue, as there is no such wish present as we defined in § vi. to be
the cause of activity, since only such a wish can produce activity
as is a cause by its own nature (and not simply from its being
known),‡ and even on your own showing there cannot be such a wish
at the time of hearing the tense affix of the command, but only that
knowledge of a wish which is produced by the spoken word. e. But it
may be replied ‘is not this very wish produced by the tense affix of the
command ‘let him, &c.?’’ he replies, that the universally acknowledged
cause, knowledge, will be overthrown. The knowledge that the action
enjoined is a means to the desired end, which all accept as the
cause of the wish, will be in danger of being overthrown, as the effect
will be sometimes produced by the tense affix, even where this ac-
knowledge cause is not found.

f. But some may say that ‘the meaning of the command is a
wish [for the end] produced in the mind of the agent by a knowledge
determined by happiness, &c.§ (as the ultimate fruit to be desired) at
the time of hearing the command,—he replies, ‘this will cause con-
fusion.’ All allow necessarily that the knowledge that the action is a
means to the desired end is the cause of the wish for the means [i.e.
the required action of sacrifice,] and as there is no other cause for

* I. e. you will have a consecutive series, 1, ichchā; 2, ichchā-jñāna or vidhi-
ñāna; 3, ichchā. The second ichchā is ‘the desire to act’ of § vi. which arose
from the knowledge that such an action is commanded.—The true order is, 1,
ichā śālā; 2, ichchā, (updechchā); 3, pravṛtti. He here proves
that vidhi cannot mean the second; he subsequently shows that it cannot be the
third. Udayana and the old Nyāya differ as to the first, see § xii.
† I. e. by Śūdra, not by ichchā.
‡ There are two kinds of causes svārūpa sat and jñāna; an example of the
former is ‘eating is the cause of satisfying hunger,’ of the latter ‘smoke is a cause
of fire (being inferred’).
§ The &c., includes ‘absence of pain.’ The former fault will not apply here
as this knowledge of the desire for the fruit will cause action,—if a man does not
desire heaven, the command Svargakāma yojeta is not a command to him.
this knowledge that the action is the means to the desired end, the tense sign of the command must be its cause;—hence the knowledge of the wish for the end is not a cause of activity, as activity can be found where it does not exist [if only the knowledge of the action's being a means to a desired end exist;] and hence there would be confusion of the two causes, because your cause 'the knowledge of the desire for the fruit' is always found accompanied by my cause, 'the knowledge that the action is a means to a desired end' [and as in certain cases mine is found where yours is not found, mine will be sufficient by itself and why then need we bring in yours at all?]
The commentator adds another objection in the fact that as there is no proof that the knowledge of the wish for the fruit produces the wish for the means, [this being produced by the knowledge that the means will produce a desired end] it follows that the former cannot be the meaning conveyed by the tense affix of the command [because this meaning whatever it be, must necessitate action].

VIII. "Well, but why not say that the knowledge of volition [as implied in the potential: used imperatively] is alone that which sets men in action, but that no tense-sign besides this does express volition, since all the other tense-signs express only an operation in accordance with the meaning of the root? For we find this the case in such instances as 'the chariot goes' [where we have an operation but no volition.]" He replies,

VIII. In consequence of the fixed rule about applying the term 'maker' drawn from the distinction between the use of the phrases 'made' and 'not made,' making or action means volition only; and that action which is causative in reference to a subsequent thing is the meaning of the tense-sign.

In accordance with such phrases as 'the pot is made,' 'the shoot is not made,' we may say that the potter, &c., are makers but not the other instrumental causes [as the wheel, &c.,] hence we may say that the meaning of the root Kṛi is making or action, [i.e. kṛiti, or volition.]—"But if so, would not the words 'volition' and 'tense-sign,' be synonyms? [as all tense signs can be resolved into kṛiti, i.e. yātana.]" He replies by the last paragraph. That making or action, which is the means in reference to an actual sub-
sequent end, is the meaning of the tense-sign,—i. e. the meaning of the tense-sign is only a volition in accordance with the end. Or (according to another view) the meaning of the tense-sign is a volition which produces a repetition of the meaning of the root, in the form of successively repeated operations in accordance with the desired end; one following the other. In this way the tense-sign will have three meanings, volition, accordance with the root and successive repetition [while under the first view it will have only the two first; under either view, however, the tense-sign will involve more than simple volition and therefore cannot be its synonym].

IX. "But may we not allow that the root K'rī may mean volition, and yet maintain that the tense-sign only means an operation in accordance with the root, the volition being only understood by an inference?"* He replies,

IX. The meaning of the tense-sign is a volition and this applies to all tense-signs equally; since by it all can be clearly developed, and since the alleged inference cannot be established.

As by 'it,'—i. e. making, or the word which expresses making (karoti) the meaning of the tense-sign is developed at length, as in pákan karoti, 'he makes cooking' for pāchati, 'he cooks,'—we must have 'making,' i. e. volition, as the meaning of the tense-sign; [and again your supposed inference fails] since an operation in accordance with the root does not always imply a volition, as an operation in accordance with the root 'cook' in the present case can be found even in an unintelligent thing [as in the wood; fire, pot, &c., where of course there can be no volition.]

"But, if so, why on hearing the objective case 'boiled rice,' do we naturally require the sentence to be be filled up by 'he cooks' or 'he eats?' [On my hypothesis it is easily explained, as I maintain that all tense-signs imply an operation in accordance with the root's meaning, and from this we can infer volition in this instance; but on your hypothesis, it is not so obvious."] This can be explained, in our view, by the fact that an objective case is invariably accompanied by a volition [expressed by the tense-sign,] just as on the other hand

* The inference will be in this form—wherever there is no volition there is no operation in accordance with the root.
on hearing the verb 'he cooks,' we naturally require the sentence to be filled up by some object.

X. "But since by developing the full meaning we do obtain an agent (as in 'he makes cooking' for 'he cooks') why should we not say that the tense-sign signifies also an agent?" He replies,

X. We must not suppose that the tense-sign directly signifies [an agent.] as this which is connected with number can be obtained by inference; and in the obtaining of that which is connected with number, the rule holds for that only which has expectancy.

We must not suppose that the tense-sign signifies an agent, since this 'agent' is gained by an inference from the number expressed by the tense-sign. What we mean by 'being gained by an inference' is that something is qualified by the meaning of the tense-sign, while at the same time it is expressed by a word ending in the nominative case. We use the former phrase 'qualified by the meaning of the tense-sign' to exclude such ambiguous cases as 'having eaten Devadatta goes away,' &c., and we use the latter phrase 'while at the same time, it is expressed by a word ending in the nominative case,' because in such instances as 'it is slept by Devadatta,' &c., it is the meaning of the root, 'sleep,' which is qualified by present time, as implied in the tense-sign [and verbal roots have no cases.] [Nor may we say that the object is connected with the tense-sign as well as the subject,—because] in such phrases as 'Chaitra cooks rice,' &c., since the meaning 'rice' is already connected with the idea of object as implied in the objective case, we are not to suppose that there is any further dependence (as of expectancy) on the volition expressed by the tense-sign; hence the tense-sign is connected with the meaning of the crude form as expressed in the unmodified 'casus rectus.' Hence in accordance with the rule that 'the number [of the tense] is connect-

* Here Devadatta is qualified by number and volition through the meaning of the tense-sign, i. e. Devadatta ekapranā bhāṣyāno 'rūpamānē 'ritamānē ; but bhāṣyā is not thus qualified,—it itself is an adverb and qualifies the verb. According to Hindu grammar the adverbial suffix had involves the elision of the nominative affix (cf. Pág. 2, 4, 82) and therefore the second part of the definition would apply, but not the former.

† i. e. Non-oblique case, i. e. not a kāraṇa, त्रि means here rectus; there is a Sātra. तिर्त्रि स त्रि त्रि: ' The signs of the Nominative case are used after a word which is the subject of a verb.'—The 'casus rectus' will be Chaitras in the Karttiyodhyā sentence, and tāṇulām in the Kartmyodhyā.
ed with that with which the volition implied by the tense-sign is connected,—since this follows because this volition and number are expressed by the same tense sign,—the nominative case is employed only where the number of the agent, &c., are already signified by the tense-sign. And in the same way the object cannot be said to be directly signified by the tense-sign.

XI. "Well, but," say the Mimánsakas, "may not the command be the attribute of the object?" He replies,

XI. The object cannot be the meaning of the command because it would apply too far; nor can the produced desert (apúrva) since it would lose its very nature; nor can an especial effect, since it is not always found present; nor, also, can the act, since men do not necessarily engage in the performance.

a. If you say that the objects [of the sacrifice] are heaven, &c., and the meaning of the command is an attribute in them, i. e. the fact of their having to be produced,—it is answered, 'the object cannot be the meaning of the command because it would apply too far,'—since, if, as you say, the attribute of their having to be produced resides in heaven, &c., it would follow that a person possessing this knowledge might engage in any other action than sacrifice [as eating, &c., since 'the having to be produced or accomplished' resides, according to your opinion, in the object and not in the act.]

* I. e. the agent Kartá in most sentences, and the object Karma in such as 'the prize is gained by Devadatta.' As in the sentence 'Devadatta goes' the tense-sign signifies the volition (kriti) and not the agent, but by the connection we gain the latter, so in the sentence "the prize is gained by Devadatta' the tense-sign equally signifies the volition, and by the connection we gain the object.

† In the sentence Cháitara taśgulaṃ pachati, taśgula means simply 'rice' and is connected with the suffix am which signifies that taśgula in the singular number is the object; this am is connected with the root pacha which means 'cooking'; pacha is connected with the suffix tip which means 1, vartamána-kdga, 2, yatna. 3, saṃkhya. The present time as implied by tip is connected with yatna, and yatna and saṃkhya are connected with the kartá Cháitara. In the sentence Cháitara taśgulaṃ pachyate, the same process can be traced; cháitara is connected with the suffix fd, fd with the root pacha, pacha with the suffix te, and te as before with taśgulaṃ. The grammarians maintain that in the former case the real meaning of the verbal affix is directly Kartá, in the latter Karma; the Nâyáya maintains that in both cases it is yatna (so, Kriti), but indirectly by avaisya it may be respectively Kartá or Karma.

‡ As in such commands as "let him who desires heaven offer the jyótishoma sacrifice," &c.—The opponents maintain that their real meaning is, "heaven is to be produced," evamah káryah, but not 'the sacrifice is to be performed.'
b. If you say that the 'object' means \textit{apúrva}, and that the meaning of the command is an attribute in \textit{it}, i.e. the fact of its having to be produced,† then it is answered, 'it would lose its very nature;' for the very word \textit{apúrva} [as compounded of a 'not' and \textit{púrva} 'previously existing'] implies that it was not known before the verbal knowledge was produced by hearing the command; and if it is known before [as it must be, if the words of the command are to imply it,]‡ then it would cease to be \textit{apúrva} at all; and, on the other hand, if it is not known before, then how can you have any knowledge of the meaning of the tense-sign in the command, and consequently how can you have any verbal knowledge of \textit{apúrva} produced by this tense-sign?

c. If the Mīmāṃsāka replies, 'why should there not be a previous knowledge that \textit{apúrva} is the meaning of the command, so far as regards its general character as a thing to be produced,—but when the verbal knowledge is gained, then in consequence of the compatibility§ there arises a knowledge of \textit{apúrva} as an \textit{especial} thing to be produced,' to this it is answered, 'because we do not always find this especial \textit{apúrva} present,' i.e. it would follow that there is no \textit{apúrva} in necessary observances [as the morning and evening prayer, &c.,] or in absolute prohibitions [as that from injuring living creatures,] since we find no persons enjoined to perform them as they desire certain fruit to ensue [which fruit is to be attained by the produced \textit{apúrva} as the means,—and consequently the tense-sign as in \textit{má hín-}šyāt becomes meaningless.]

d. Or we may take this third sentence of the original in a different sense as follows: An objector might say, "but why might we not hold that we recognise that the word means a particular \textit{apúrva}

\footnote{The unseen efficacy which arises from the sacrifice cf. p. 10.}

\footnote{† In this view the meaning of the command will be 'by him who desires heaven, the merit which is the cause of its attainment, is to be produced by the jyotishtoma sacrifice.'}

\footnote{‡ 'The knowledge of the power of a word is necessary, for if the power of a word be not apprehended previously, there could not be any recollection,—since this depends upon that relation called 'power' (i.e. the connection between a word and its meaning)—even though the word might be heard' (Siddh. Mukt. p. 79.) The knowledge of the connection between a word and its meaning is the cause of the meaning's being recollected when the word is heard, and from this recollection ensues verbal knowledge.}

\footnote{§ Expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition are the three causes, or rather necessary conditions, of verbal knowledge, see supra, p. 43.}

\footnote{|| See Dr. Hall’s Refutation of Hindu Philosophy, pp. 22—24.}
accompanied (though not necessarily so) by being an effect, just as the word ‘earth’ means a something necessarily distinguished by possessing a certain nature but not necessarily accompanied by the attribute of smell? To this it is answered ‘because we do not find it so,’ i.e. because we cannot so know an apūrva distinguished by the character of apūrvatva. It is possible for the substance possessed of the special nature of earth to be known to possess smell, by means of memory or inference from a previous perception; but such a supposition is precluded in the present case by the very name apūrva, which implies an absence of any previous perception, and which would therefore be rendered nugatory.

e. “Well, why not take the sacrifice as the ‘object,’ and then the meaning of the command will be an attribute of it, i.e. the fact of its having to be performed?” To this it is answered in the last words of the original verse. Your view cannot hold, since we do not see that men engage in the performance of the sacrifice, if there be present in their minds the idea that it will be only a means of trouble and expense, [while on your view the simple fact of their knowing it to be a command that ‘by him who desires heaven, the jyotishoma sacrifice is to be performed’ should, irresistibly] to, the performance thereof.]—The word ‘also’ implies that the object cannot mean ‘apūrva,’ since the very same objection will hold as in the previous supposition of ‘the sacrifice.’

XII. “But may we not say that words are the instrument of verbal knowledge, and that the enforcing power is an attribute residing in them,† and that the knowledge thereof incites men to engage in the enjoined rites;—hence it is said, ‘the tense-signs such as the imperative, &c., express a special signification, i.e. an enjoining power, while the common signification of all the tense-signs is an effort of the agent in accordance with the meaning of the root.’ There arises from the tense affix of the imperative the idea of an enforcing power, setting a man to perform the enjoined sacrifice;

* For upalakshita see note ‡ in p. 66.
† Under this view the real meaning of the command will be ‘by him who desires heaven the jyotishoma sacrifice is to be performed.’
‡ According to the Mīmāṃsā, bhāvam resides in the agent as a volition (yatma) to perform some act to attain a desired end, and it may be expressed by any tense-sign; but it resides in the eternal Veda as an enjoining power (pravasa), the end of which is the production of the former volition of the hearer,—this is only expressed by the imperative or potential.
while the general meaning of all the tense-signs is an effort tending to the production of a certain action [thus Devadatto gachchhati means that "Devadatta is possessed of a volition tending to produce going."] He replies,

XII. This enforcing power of the imperative, &c., is not to be maintained, since it cannot be proved, and since men do not engage in the performance, even though they know of the existence of this presumed enforcing power, [i.e. unless they have also the knowledge that it will be a means of procuring their wishes;] and again exhaustion is difficult to rest upon, as contradiction equally applies to this view, as well as to the others.

If you object that as every other meaning of the imperative tense-sign is excluded, it follows by exhaustion that this enforcing power must be its meaning, he replies that the contradiction equally applies to this opinion, as well as to the others, [as action does not necessarily follow from the knowledge of it.]

XIII. "But," says the Naiyāyika, "why should not the meaning of the command be the fact that the rite is a means to a desired end,—this residing as an attribute in the instrument, the sacrifice?" He replies,

XIII. [This cannot be] because it is sometimes given as the reason for the command; because the command may be inferred therefrom; from the absence of this meaning in the second and third persons [of the imperative]; from its recognition in other meanings; and because on this view prohibition could not be established.

a. Because the fact of its being the means to the attainment of a desired object is often alleged by the speaker as proving the meaning of the command; and as a thing cannot be its own proof [it follows that the fact of its being a means to a desired object cannot be the meaning of the command]. Thus when it is said as a secu-

* The old Nyāya maintained the meaning of vidi to be रूढ़िवाचनम् वाचेभवं, Udayana maintains it to be वाचवक्षीर्भवं: The modern Nyāya (i.e. Siddhānta Mukt.) gives वाचवक्षीर्भवं
lar command, 'let him who desires fire rub two pieces of aruri wood together,' if you ask 'why?' the utterer of the command replies, 'because the rubbing two pieces of wood together is a means of producing fire.'

b. Another reason against your view is—because a command may be inferred even after the knowledge that the action is a means to the desired end has been produced by the arthavāda [or supplementary passage explaining the purpose of the command];—but if by the command which is thus inferred we were only to understand the fact that the action in question is a means to the desired end, then this inference would be wholly superfluous. Thus on hearing the Sruti 'he crosses over death, he crosses over Brahmanicide [who offers the As'wamedha], all the systems allow that there arises the inference of a command in such a form as 'let him who desires to cross over death and Brahmanicide, offer the As'wamedha.'

c. "From the absence of this meaning [i.e. its being a means to the desired end,] in the second and third persons of the potential used imperatively;" in such phrases as 'you should do it' and 'let me do it' an injunction, or wish is implied [but not the fact of its being a means to a desired end]—injunction means here the wish of the speaker; and consequently we may conclude that the first person also only means the wish of the speaker [and not the fact of the action being a means to the desired end.]

d. "From the fact that this meaning of 'wish' is acknowledged in the other meanings of the potential," as for instance in its meaning of 'respectful solicitation.'

e. "Because on this view prohibition could not be established." Thus in the injunction "let him not eat the Kalanj,' you cannot maintain that it is not the means to a desired end [as of course the eating will produce its proper pleasure.] Nor can you say [with the modern school] that the meaning of the command is that the action is not accompanied by a predominant undesirable result, because this will not apply to such cases as 'let him who desires

* In Hindu grammar the third person corresponds to our first.
† कपिया is the कपिण of Pāṇini (3, 3, 161). The Sankshipta Sastra explains it by सम्पाष्युमः गुरौर्च्योगम् as सम्पाष्युमः गुरौर्च्योगम्.
‡ Some hold the Kalanjı to be the flesh of a deer killed by a poisoned arrow—others hemp or bhang—others a kind of garlic. See Bakhmandaṇa's Ekādaśi tattwa.
to kill his enemy by incantation offer a hawk' [because this rite produces hell as its fruit]. And [if you say that in the case of the offerer, hell is not considered by him as a predominant undesirable result, since he still performs the ceremony, I reply that this does not hold, as] you cannot maintain that the sacrifice generally does not produce a result which the mass of mankind regard with predominant aversion, because the man who does not perform the sacrifice certainly has this predominant aversion which restrains him from yielding to the temptation of the gratification of a present revenge at the risk of a future torment in hell.

XIV. [After this lengthened discussion of the various current opinions on the nature of vīdhi or command,] the author now proceeds to deliver his own.

XIV. The primary meaning of the potential used imperatively, &c., is the will of the speaker in the form of a command enjoining activity or cessation therefrom; while we conclude by inference that it is the means to a desired end for the doer.

The will of a fit person, i.e. God, having for its object engagement in the performance of an act [i.e. as in command] or restraining therefrom, [i.e. as in prohibition,] is the primary meaning of the affixes of the potential, &c.; and from these is to be inferred (see § vi.) that it is the means to obtain a desired end, [and hence the existence of 'command' proves the existence of a commander, God].

But the commentator here adds as a remark, that this view of Udayanāchārya is untenable, as by it you could not properly have prohibition at all, since every action of every kind is in one sense the object of God's will, [i.e. nothing, whether good or evil, takes place without his will]. If you reply that 'command' is 'God's will,' meaning by 'will' such a will as is unaccompanied by any predominant undesirable result, we object that the definition becomes needlessly complicated; and the old Naiyāyika opinion of § xiii. is after all the best.*

* Udayana gives as his definition of 'command' the 'will of a fit person,' i.e. God. It is replied that this will include too much as even evil actions are in one sense done with God's will. The definition is then corrected to 'such a will as is unproductive of any predominant undesirable result.'—In this view we may allow God's will in the case of an evil action, but here we shall not have vīdhi, 'command,'—as it is such a will of God as produces hell to the doer.—The com.
XV. He now [resumes the interpretation of the first Slokas, interrupted by the late discussion on vidhi §§ vi.—xiv. and] proceeds to give the second meaning of 'Sruti.'

XV. All the Veda refers to the Supreme Being as its object; only, by means of its own primary meaning, like the words 'heaven,' &c., can it refer to a command.

In every part of the Veda is God's existence established, as for instance in such passages as, 'Vashnu verily is the sacrifice' (passim), 'he sees without eyes,' (Swet. Up. iii. 19) 'by the command of this (previously mentioned) indestructible being, O Gargi, heaven and earth stay upheld in their places, (Brihadār. Up. iii. 8, 9.) Nor may you say with the Mimāṃsā, that 'these passages, being declaratory or indicative* [and not expressed in the potential or imperative, as commands are] refer to something else, i.e. a command elsewhere expressed,' [or in other words they are the arthavāda of a previous vidhi],—because even according to your own opinion, these passages about God do possess an authority to establish the existence of their primary meaning, from their agreeing with such positive commands as 'let him adore God,' just as the passages declarative of heaven, hell, &c., [establish the objects which they primarily mean, because they are connected with such positive commands, as 'let him who desires heaven offer such a sacrifice,']—otherwise the very words 'heaven,' 'hell,' &c., would have no authority to establish their own primary significations. Hence he adds the latter line of the Slokas, since it is only by establishing its own primary meaning that a declaratory passage can be said to agree with a command.

[The commentator now proceeds to give a second explanation of 'the sentences thereof' in § i.] The 'sentences thereof,'—i.e. the sentences of the Veda, expressing praise and blame,—must have been preceded, in the speaker's mind, by the knowledge of praise and blame, from the very fact that they are sentences which express

mentator objects to this as needlessly complicated; but it is not uninteresting to find the same thought in Anselm's 'cui Deus homo?' "although man or an evil angel be unwilling to submit to the will and ordinance of God, yet he cannot escape from it, because if he will flee from the will of God commanding him, he comes under the will of God punishing him."

* According to the Mimāṃsā those passages which are not vidhi are siddha as opposed to sthita; they describe something past or present (swarūpakathanam), while the vidhi relates to something future which is to be performed.
praise and blame, like such a secular sentence as 'the mango fruit is very sweet when ripe,' [as none could say this with authority unless he possessed previous knowledge thereof].

XVI. He now gives a second explanation of 'particular number' in § i.

XVI. In such phrases as 'let me be,' 'I was,' 'I will be,' &c., the number belongs to a speaker; nor could there be the current names of the 'Sákhás, without a primal utterance.

a. The first person singular as used in the Veda declares the 'number' of an independent speaker,—there being many such instances, as in the passage* "It reflected, 'let me, the one, become many,'" &c.

b. He now gives a third meaning of the word sankhyá, as making it the same as another derivative from the same root, samákhya, 'name, fame,'—"nor could there be &c." There are traditional names, in the Veda, of all the various Sákhás (or current recensions,) as Káthaka or that belonging to Kátha, Kálapa or that belonging to Kálapa, &c.; nor can we explain this on the hypothesis† that these men first read that particular recension only, [others having before then read many or all.] since the number of readers is endless and in the eternal succession others besides these mentioned may well be supposed to have read those Sákhás only, [and why then were not the Sákhás called by their names?] Therefore we are driven to the belief that the adorable Supreme Being, seeing all supersensuous objects and possessed of boundless compassion, did at the beginning of each creation assume a particular body belonging to Kátha, Kálapa, &c. which body was moved by the merit of beings like ourselves,‡ and the Sákhás which He thus uttered were severally called by these particular names,

* The two old MSS. read this quotation as I have printed it. Some copies read य for य but none have the usual reading found in Chháánd. Up. vi. 2.
† Cf. 'Salman's Comm. on Jaimini, i. 1, 30.
‡ The final cause of God's assuming these bodies was to render possible the happiness due to the merit of men like ourselves,—adrishtha is an impelling cause of every thing down to the junction of two utons, see Muktavali, pp. 104, 105.
Thus have we established that it is the contemplation of God, which is the true means of liberation, (see I. ii.)

XVII. He now adds a couplet in reference to those who believe not in God.

XVII. Iron-souled are they in whose hearts Thou canst find no place, though thus washed by the repeated inundations of ethics and Vaidic texts; yet still in time, Oh merciful one, Thou in thy goodness canst save even those who oppose our proposition, and make them undoubting in their conviction of Thy existence.

XVIII. But as for us, O Thou essentially Fair, though our minds have been long plunged in Thee, the ocean of joy,* yet are they verily restless still and unsatisfied; therefore, oh Lord, haste to display Thy mercy, that our minds fixed only on Thee, we may no more be subject to Yama’s continual inflictions.

XIX. This garland of flowers of ethics, radiant in its beauty,—what matters it, whether it perfumes the right and left hand† or not?—only may the Guru of Indra’s Guru‡ be pleased by my presenting it as an offering at his footstool.

* For **addha** explained as *tathvam*, see ‘Siva’upâsa-badha, iii. 42, schol.
† Or ‘the sapaksâ and vipaksâ of my argument.’
‡ ‘Siva, as the guru of Brihaspati. Brihaspati is represented as the guru of Indra in the Atharva Brahmâs, VII. 28.'
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